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 Introduction
We used to think that people who were not with us were truly the enemies 
of Islam. Even if they were Muslims. We soon became afraid of even our 
own wives. It’s because we were living in a system where everybody was 
a suspect. Yet, thank God, compared to the past, we can gather more 
people (around us) and help them nowadays. If you ask me what has 
changed in me, I would tell that I have come to realize that words are 
more powerful than weapons and I never take up a gun anymore … In the 
past, we used to take action against our enemies with guns; but now and 
then, we respond to them with ideas, books, conferences, and meetings.
These are the words of a Kurdish Hizbullah member speaking to a journal-
ist about Hizbullah’s transformation in the past decade.1 As the activist 
clearly points out, the master strategy of Hizbullah has changed. Armed 
revolutionaries, formerly lodged underground, would now seek a place 
within the civic sphere on democratic grounds. In 2004, the very year 
Hizbullah released its f irst publication ever, interesting civic initiatives 
were taking place among militant leftist Kurds as well. A guerilla com-
mander explained why the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) undertook 
such a radical transformation:
After thirty years of struggle and changes in the world, we also changed. 
As a result of the Kurdish freedom struggle we had to leave behind the 
struggle based on one class and nation. We have accepted Öcalan’s de-
fense writings for the (European) Human Rights Court as a manifesto for 
us. The manifesto calls for democratic civilization and an understanding 
of the history of human beings. We have a new organization, the Demo-
cratic Ecological Society. When we don’t clash directly with the state but 
disagree with them, this leads to a more democratic approach. By doing 
this, the basic aim is to develop a democratic mentality in the society. 
In the Middle East, there is a reality of religious/nationalist clashes. In 
this perspective, members of Kongra-Gel [the new platform of the PKK 
movement] try to solve their problems within the Democratic Ecological 
Society in a democratic manner.2
1 Çiçek 2008: 58-59.
2 Interview with David Romano in the PKK camp in Iraq’s Qandil Mountains, see Romano 
2006: 145.
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Hizbullah and PKK militants both attest to the fact that Kurdish politics in 
Turkey have undergone a great transformation over the past decade. On the 
eve of the new millennium, the Turkish State was still openly denying the 
existence of Kurds, calling them “mountain Turks,” and Kurdish-populated 
cities were ruled under martial law. Kurdish politics in Turkey was largely 
dominated by violent PKK guerillas in the Qandil Mountains. Less than a 
decade later, the PKK’s total war with the Turkish State had all but ended, 
and Kurdish political movements of numerous stripes had emerged. The 
Turkish State even introduced an off icial Kurdish language TV channel. 
How did this rapid change occur?
Imagine that Herbert G. Wells’ time machine exists and you are trans-
ported to 1990s Diyarbakır, the key city for Kurdish political activism. 
Before your trip, people repeatedly advise that you be careful and stay 
inside at night. After your arrival, you hear stories of death, kidnapping, 
interrogation, and torture every day. Some Kurds blame Hizbullah for this 
violence while others charge the PKK. Most Kurds do not report the events 
to the police, fearing that the perpetrators might actually be the Turkish 
Armed Forces’ unoff icial intelligence unit, JITEM. Living at this moment, 
you would quickly notice that the PKK and Hizbullah militants are engaged 
in a bloody fight against each other. The death toll reaches tens of thousands, 
comparable to the notorious dirty wars in modern Spain and Argentina.
However, this is not the look of the Diyarbakır of 2016. The anarchic 
atmosphere of the 1990s is long gone. The PKK’s larger platform, the Kurd-
istan National Congress (KCK), encourages its dedicated followers to join 
pro-Kurdish political activism. Hizbullah members open new civic centers 
each year, control numerous media outlets, and run for off ice in the name 
of their new political party, the Party of God (HÜDA-PAR). The pro-Islamic 
Gülen movement’s Kurdish activists have no fear of establishing educational 
centers in slums where PKK recruitment is high.
Why do radicals change? How do militant pro-ethnic actors such as PKK 
and Hizbullah members become moderate social movement activists? I 
argue that pro-ethnic activists may f ind their interests are best served 
by constructing a non-violent competition culture for the sake of gaining 
material as well as symbolic resources such as legitimacy, reputation, and 
prestige. This book explores the conditions that encourage this non-violent 
engagement and explains the mechanisms of social movement competition 
in emerging civil societies. It is a study of conflict transformation in ethnic 
politics.
1 Ethnic Conflict and Social Movements
A Multi-Institutional Politics Approach
“In the next decades,” wrote Robert Rubinstein in the afterword of a recent 
volume on conflict resolution,
[I]t will become increasingly important for peace and conflict scholars 
to understand the dynamics of actors ‘below the level of the nation 
state’; that is, of citizens acting as individuals and in groups to effect 
change. Increasingly, citizens at a variety of levels of organization, from 
small voluntary associations through larger, more formally organized 
groupings, like nongovernmental organizations and activist organiza-
tions, are involved in def ining the scope and nature of conflicts in the 
contemporary world. As a result, it is especially important that peace 
and conflict scholars develop frameworks for understanding how local 
groups project political authority, and how they gain standing among 
large groups of people and articulate these understandings through the 
political process.1
Rubinstein’s call for attention to grassroots activism is especially important 
for ethnic conflict studies, which increasingly address the questions of 
identity and belonging. As globalization provides an impetus for the revival 
of local identities,2 we begin to witness a resurgence of identity based ethnic 
clashes which are the most diff icult conflicts to transform positively.3
Pro-ethnic grassroots activism and social transformation, however, is 
understudied by scholars. Dominant paradigms of ethnic conflict prioritize 
either structural forces, such as the nation state building,4 or socio-psycho-
logical dynamics, such as boundary-making and out-group demonization.5 
1 Rubinstein 2008: 283-84.
2 The literature on resurgence of local identities under globalization grows fast. For prominent 
works from European and American scholarship respectively, see Castells 1997 and Olzak 1992, 
2006. For a comprehensive review, see Bernstein 2005. 
3 For more on challenges of ethnic divisions in conflict transformation, see Ross 2007, 2009; 
Smithey 2011.
4 See Gellner 1983 and Aktürk 2012.
5 For the boundary-making approach, see Sahlins 1989, Brubaker 1992, Wimmer 2008, 2013. 
For more on socio-psychological approaches, see Volkan 1998, 2006; Boudreau and Polkinghorn 
2008. 
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Despite their useful insights, these two perspectives suffer from signif icant 
def iciencies in attempting to explain transformations in ethnic conflicts. 
Explaining changes in ethnic politics by the pure factuality of state policies, 
the former falls into the trap of what Alberto Melucci calls “action without 
an actor.”6 Likewise, the latter depicts an “actor without action”7 by over-
stating the role of emotions in conflict transformation. Thus, there is an 
ever-growing need to link these two distinct paradigms in analysis.
Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly aptly criticize the 
surprising disconnection between ethnic conflict literature and social 
movement scholarship. The detachment is due to an increasing “schol-
arly specialization” that “has left many ethnic conflict scholars largely 
uninformed of recent advances in social movement theory,” whereas on 
the other hand, “social movement theorists from the West have generally 
chosen more bounded, less volatile movements to study than those based 
on ethnicity and religion.”8
In this book, I utilize a multi-institutional politics approach to study 
ethnic conflict transformation (see Table 1.1).9 A multi-institutional politics 
approach rejects the notion that power is solely vested in the nation state; 
instead, it regards power as dispersed across social institutions including 
religion, economy, civic initiatives, and cultural norms.10 Unlike structuralist 
accounts of social movements,11 this account analyzes ethnic mobilizations 
in their own local dynamics and historical contingencies. In this view of 
society, the nation state is certainly an important actor in ethnic politics 
because it has remarkable resources to shape other social institutions; 
however, the role of the nation state should be understood within the larger 
multi-institutional environment. Pro-ethnic activists challenge not only the 
nation state but also cultural norms, legal institutions, science, religious 
authority, f iction, and institutions of education. Moreover, their activ-
ism targets not only institutions but also activists from other pro-ethnic 
movements who compete for the same constituents, resources, and goals.12
6 Melucci 1988: 329.
7 Ibid.
8 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 1996: 21.
9 For the Multi-Institutional Politics perspective, see Armstrong and Bernstein 2008, Gürbüz 
and Bernstein 2012, Steinman 2012, Bernstein 2013.
10 Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 82.
11 For path-breaking works in this tradition, see Tilly 1978 and McAdam 1982.
12 An exclusive focus on the relations between the PKK and the Turkish state, for example, 
would depict a single insurgent ethnic movement under the forces of a semi-authoritarian 
regime. In this “incumbent vs. challenger” perspective, state repression appears to be an 
explanatory cause for the PKK insurgency, and thus, we can expect that more democratic 
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As seen in Table 1.1, one of the key research questions in the multi-
institutional politics perspective asks why challenges take the forms that 
they do. The structuralist paradigm explains “movement form” by political 
opportunity structures.13 Robert White, for example, argues that it was 
primarily state repression that led the Irish Republican Army to employ 
violent methods.14 Vincent Boudreau maintains that political opportunity 
structures directed many democratic movements toward a militant course, 
especially in authoritarian settings.15 In his analysis of protest waves in El 
Salvador, Paul Almeida suggests that state sponsored repression causes 
violent forms of resistance.16
A multi-institutional politics approach remains cautious about the 
aforementioned structuralist explanations of movement forms. In crafting 
their political strategy, pro-ethnic activists found themselves in a “multi-
organizational f ield” with multiple targets.17 State policies, therefore, should 
be considered in the specif ic local context when it comes to analyzing 
movement forms. Ali Mazrui, for example, f inds that the cross-cutting 
nature of ethnic and religious divisions might reduce ethnic violence in 
certain contexts.18 In this regard, Jeff Goodwin’s study of categorical terror-
ism is noteworthy. Goodwin indicates that socio-cultural elements such 
as religion, language, and territory are remarkably signif icant in shaping 
the type of violence that insurgents use. Categorical terrorism, he argues, 
is “most likely where there has been little such interaction or cooperation, 
resulting in weak political alliances between the revolutionaries and com-
plicitous civilians,” for instance “where the revolutionaries and complicitous 
civilians speak different languages, practice different religions, claim the 
reforms would lead to moderation, especially after the PKK’s total defeat in 1999. And yet why 
did the PKK decide to retake up arms right after the implementation of pro-Kurdish reforms 
in 2004? As Güneş Tezcür (2010b) points out, the pro-Islamic AKP emerged as a competitor for 
Kurdish votes, and thus, organizational competition led to the PKK’s rearmament. Similarly, 
why did the pro-Kurdish party, frequently victimized by off icial closures of political parties, 
reject constitutional reform that would minimize political party closures in Turkey? Again, this 
apparent contradiction could only be explained by examining the role of pro-Islamic actors 
such as the AKP and the Gülen movement in Kurdish politics. Political opportunities, thus, 
should be examined within the larger multi-institutional environment where local actors and 
cultural dynamics play a key role. For a conceptual discussion based on various local contexts, 
see Goodwin and Jasper 2011.
13 McAdam 1996: 29.
14 White 1989: 1277.
15 Boudreau 1996: 185.
16 Almeida 2008.
17 Curtis and Zurcher 1973: 53.
18 Mazrui 2000: 37.
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same land, and/or are territorially segregated.”19 Goodwin’s broader account 
of socio-cultural elements, which are tied to a variety of social institutions, 
goes beyond the traditional literature on state repression and provides a 
better understanding of insurgent movement forms.
A multi-institutional politics perspective offers insight not only into 
structuralist social movement theories but also into structuralist approaches 
within ethnic conflict literature. The cross-cutting power of religion over 
ethnicity or vice versa, for example, is often disregarded or omitted in ethnic 
conflict studies.20 Research questions are often shaped along structuralist 
lines such as “does Islam solve the Kurdish question?” and “did Catholicism 
support the Basque separatism in Spain?”21 A multi-institutional approach 
to ethno-politics, instead, would locate religious institutions in a larger 
f ield of ethnic political contestation and thus provides better insights about 
transformations in ethnic conflicts.
Along these lines, Philip Gorski and Gülay Türkmen-Dervişoğlu rightly 
argue that one should investigate “whether ethnicity trumps class or vice 
versa, which ethnic categories are central and which are peripheral, are 
not f ixed or given but continually up for grabs”; therefore, we need to un-
derstand that “ethnicity and nationalism are not structures but processes, 
not entities but relations, not things but events.”22
The complex relationship between religion and ethno-politics, thus, 
moves scholars to go beyond the sphere of formal governance. Unlike the 
structuralist perspective that defines ethno-politics within the boundaries 
of the formal political arena, the multi-institutional politics perspective 
locates ethno-politics within the broader power struggles in the society as it 
manifests in the state, other key institutions, and culture (see Table 1.1). This 
broader definition of ethno-politics challenges the traditional definition of 
“pro-ethnic” movements in the mainstream literature.
Structuralist accounts would locate pro-ethnic movements vis-a-vis 
the state, def ining their identity against the established order. Thus, by 
def inition, ethnic movements “incite conflict against other ethnic groups, 
make claims to authorities demanding the end of discrimination, or make 
demands for expanded rights of geographical autonomy, separatism, or 
statehood that are not being met.”23 This view, however, does not consider 
19 Goodwin 2006: 2027.
20 For a comprehensive criticism of this omission in the current literature, see Gorski and 
Türkmen-Dervişoğlu 2013.
21 For the Kurdish case, see Çiçek 2008 and Sarigil 2010. For the Spanish case, see Molina 2011. 
22 Gorski and Türkmen-Dervişoğlu 2013: 203.
23 Olzak 2006: 13.
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hybrid social movements that utilize ethnic repertoires against pro-ethnic 
players as well as those actors aiming to transform the “rules of the game.”24 
As Susan Olzak notes, “different layers of cultural difference expressed as 
ethnicity” complicate the issue.25 Moreover, consciousness along ethnic 
lines changes over time, especially with the diffusion of global human 
rights ideologies. Thus, “the persistence of any gap in human rights, income, 
well-being, minority treatment, etc., among ethnic groups” is now conceived 
primarily in terms of ethnic identity issues.26
The multi-institutional politics perspective enables researchers to 
understand ethnic conflicts in a broader context, and therefore it suggests 
useful insights on conflict transformations. The definition of ethno-politics 
24 Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 76.
25 Olzak 2006: 30. For an in-depth discussion on this particular point, see Brubaker and Cooper 
2000.
26 Olzak 2006: 12.
Table 1.1  Comparing structuralist and multi-institutional politics perspectives
 Structuralist  Multi-Institutional Politics
Model of society 
and power
a. domination organized 
around the state
b. culture as secondary
a. domination organized 
around the state, other 
institutions, and culture
b. culture as constitutive
Goal of pro-ethnic 
movements
a. state as target
b. seeks policy change, new 
benefits, or inclusion
a. state, other institutions, and/
or culture as targets
b. seeks policy change, new 
benefits, inclusion, cultural 
change, or changes in the 
rules of the game
Definition of 
ethno-politics
a. Related to governance, 
formal political arena
a. Related to power, as it 
manifests itself in the state, 
other institutions, or culture
Key research 
questions
a. under what conditions do 
pro-ethnic movements 
originate, survive, and 
succeed? 
a. Why do pro-ethnic 
movements take the forms 
that they do? What does 
the interaction between 
challengers and target 
tell us about the nature 
of domination in society? 
under what conditions do 
challenges originate, survive, 
and succeed?
adapted from armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 76
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and ethno-political actors is expanded to include hybrid movements such 
as religious mobilizations. Consider for example the presence of Hizbullah 
in Southeast Turkey. Based on an Islamic worldview, Hizbullah’s Kurdish 
activists support both pro-Kurdish rights and Islamic brotherhood in the 
region. Should this be considered a pro-ethnic movement? Since the move-
ment is not a challenge to the Turkish State, the mainstream structuralist 
perspective would answer in the negative. In the multi-institutional politics 
perspective, however, we might consider Hizbullah as a pro-ethnic move-
ment. In a region where ethnic identity and Islamic identity are not easily 
separable, pro-Islamic and pro-Kurdish identities blur in Hizbullah activ-
ism. The same logic applies to the pro-Islamic Gülen movement’s Kurdish 
activists whose identities blend religion and ethnicity in strong ways. The 
Gülen activists aim to change the rules of the game in Kurdish politics, 
and they systematically challenge the PKK and Hizbullah. That is why the 
Gülen activists are primarily perceived as “pro-ethnic” activists: ironically, 
they are seen as “pro-Turkish” in the eyes of their rivals in the region but 
portrayed as “pro-Kurdish” among others.
Hence, considering hybrid religious movements as important “pro-ethnic” 
players, we can define the f ield of Kurdish politics more broadly, as sug-
gested by the multi-institutional politics perspective. A broader perspective 
of ethno-politics will enlighten the processes of conflict transformation.
What Makes a Kurdish Activist
David Romano’s book The Kurdish Nationalist Movement remains an es-
sential study in conceptualizing various pro-Kurdish struggles through the 
lenses of social movement theory. Romano explains how Kurdish activist 
identities are formed as freedom f ighters not only in Turkey but also in the 
larger Middle East.
Romano’s theoretical synthesis pays specif ic attention to (a) political 
opportunities, (b) resource mobilization, and (c) cultural framing. Unlike 
earlier work on Kurdish nationalism that either prioritizes opportunities 
or resources,27 Romano regards culture and framing seriously as they are 
in constant relation with structural factors. The PKK insurgency was not 
a simple extremist reaction to state oppression but a strong mobilization 
27 Most essential works on Kurdish nationalism are Olson 1989, van Bruinessen 1992, McDowall 
1997, and Wadie Jwaideh’s (2006) seminal doctoral dissertation in 1960 published as a book after 
four decades. 
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effort in mundane life. PKK activists called on ethnic Kurds in Turkey to 
join the “freedom f ight” by narrating that
(1) their problems were not theirs alone, but rather shared by all Kurds; (2) 
these problems resulted from a system perpetuated by foreign (non-Kurdish) 
colonizing and exploitative governments; (3) the Kurdish nation should and 
could mobilize together to challenge the system; and (4) the movement 
presently organized and bringing them this message was the most available, 
suitable, credible, and legitimate vehicle for such mobilization.28
Romano also explains how numerous technological advances in communi-
cation were utilized in the PKK’s framing efforts. He rightly captures that 
the PKK insurgency has become greater than its main components, and 
thus, the nature of guerilla tactics has changed.
“If Kongra-Gel or other Kurdish challenger groups,” argues Romano, 
“could successfully portray themselves simply as citizens demanding more 
democracy and recognition, the Turkish State’s capacity to exclusively 
pursue a campaign of repression might well reach its limit.”29 According to 
the author, the PKK has in fact pursued such a strategy since 1995 but has 
never achieved a substantial outcome. By the time Romano’s book was 
published, however, competition among nationalist and Islamic Kurdish 
groups was nascent and Öcalan’s thesis of Türkiyelileşme [co-existence in 
a democratic Turkey] did not yet form an organizational body within the 
larger ethno-nationalist movement.
Following Romano’s social movement perspective, a number of scholars 
have provided rich descriptions of pro-Kurdish activist identity in transfor-
mation. Nicole Watts’s Activists in Office, for example, highlights the need 
for a relational perspective to grasp how Kurdish activists seek to evoke 
pro-Kurdish identity:
Conceptualizing movements as part of a relational dynamic encourages 
us to explore the variety of ways that movement activity may affect differ-
ent movement goals and sets of relations. It also discourages us from the 
common tendency to conflate ethnic communities with ethnopolitical 
movements by explicitly disentangling this relationship … Ethnopoliti-
cal movements … don’t just seek policy changes from the target state 
but are also often involved in nation-building projects themselves. Like 
28 Romano 2006: 173.
29 Romano 2006: 179.
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nationalizing states, they seek homogenizing categorizations (e.g., “Kurds 
are persecuted,” or “The Irish want a united Ireland”) and try to evoke 
generalizations to create a more f irmly delineated “we.” Despite the very 
real sacrif ices activists make to further their movements, this creates 
deeply ambiguous and often conflicted relations with the communities 
affected by such activities, as well as with authorities, who are competing 
with movement activists for authority over the same population.30
Examining pro-Kurdish municipalities in Southeastern Turkey, Watts bril-
liantly describes how Kurdish activists utilized electoral politics in order 
to gain access to legal and administrative resources that were unavailable 
through armed contention. Akin to Watts, Emre Uslu employs a social move-
ment perspective to explain both the PKK’s transformation and politiciza-
tion of Kurdish Islamic identity.31 According to Uslu, tribes and religious 
networks are also mobilized by pro-ethnic entrepreneurs similar to the PKK 
movement. Uslu’s examination of Hizbullah in particular is remarkably rich.
Another notable study is Cengiz Güneş’s recent book The Kurdish National 
Movement in Turkey in which symbolic resources of PKK mobilization are 
closely analyzed. For Güneş, reinvigoration of Kurdish culture and music 
was crucial in the PKK’s appeal to the masses. Popular nationalist myths 
such as Kawa the Blacksmith, who claimed to lead Medes’ liberation war 
against the Assyrian empire, are reconstructed in narration of the PKK’s 
rebellion in the modern era. Thus, the Medes are not only constructed as 
ancestors of Kurds but also pioneers of the PKK guerilla f ighters.32 Likewise, 
Güneş describes how the myth of Newroz was reinvented as “Kurdish” new 
year despite its celebration among Persians, Azerbaijani Turks, and other 
nations in the Middle East on 21 March, the spring equinox:
The PKK reactivated the myth of Newroz to construct a contemporary 
myth of resistance centered primarily on the PKK inmates’ resistance 
in the Diyarbakır Prison during the early 1980s and its ongoing struggle. 
The PKK’s construction of a temporary myth of Kurdish resistance to 
represent its struggle and the romanticizing of its guerilla war against the 
state enhanced its hegemonic appeal by bringing the myth of resistance 
into reality.33
30 Watts 2010: 11.
31 Uslu 2009.
32 Güneş 2012: 77.
33 Güneş 2012: 34.
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According to Güneş, the PKK’s engagement with Kurdish cultural reper-
toires has paved the way for ideological and discursive transformation in 
the Kurdish nationalist movement.
A common characteristic of the aforementioned studies is their applica-
tion – whether explicit or implicit – of the “dynamic mobilization” model, 
introduced by Doug McAdam, Sidney Tarrow, and Charles Tilly in their 
most ambitious work, Dynamics of Contention. This scholarship is worth 
discussing at length here as it remains the dominant perspective among 
scholars who combine Kurdish studies and ethnic mobilization.
“We come from a structuralist tradition,” wrote McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly in Dynamics of Contention, “(B)ut in the course of our work on a wide 
variety of contentious politics in Europe and North America, we discovered 
the necessity of taking strategic interaction, consciousness, and histori-
cally accumulated culture into account.” The authors go on to develop this 
thinking along lines of the interpersonal:
We treat social interaction, social ties, communication, and conversa-
tion not merely as expressions of structure, rationality, consciousness, 
or culture but as active sites of creation and change. We have come to 
think of interpersonal networks, interpersonal communication, and 
various forms of continuous negotiation – including the negotiation of 
identities – as f iguring centrally in the dynamics of contention.34
Such a move toward a relational, dynamic view of social action is encourag-
ing, especially for those who criticize the structuralist bias in the study 
of mobilization.35 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly highlight their approach to 
collective identity as relational because humans “actually live in deeply 
relational worlds,” and they argue, “If social construction occurs, it hap-
pens socially, not in isolated recesses of individual minds.”36 The authors’ 
discussion of Hindus and Muslims in Pakistan is in congruence with the 
emerging boundary-making approach in ethnic politics,37 which aims to go 
beyond the essentialism vs. constructivism debate.
In chapter 6, “Transformations of Contention,” McAdam, Tarrow, and 
Tilly discuss the issues of violence and conflict. They criticize competing 
34 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 22.
35 For thorough criticisms of the structuralist bias, see Polletta 1999; Goodwin and Jasper 1999.
36 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 131.
37 For applications of the boundary-making approach to ethnic politics, see Wimmer 2008; 
2013.
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paradigms of rationalist and historical institutionalist perspectives in their 
approach to the role of individual incentives and institutional compromises 
in bringing social change. “(B)oth accounts largely ignore the enormous 
amount of contentious politics that preceded and accompanied each epi-
sode, as well as the mechanisms of political change and conflict that created 
new actors and new identities, and transformed institutional politics.”38 
The authors suggest focusing on episodes of contention through useful 
meso-level processes (what they call “mechanisms”) such as brokerage, 
identity shift, radicalization, and convergence.
The most valuable aspect of the dynamics mobilization model is its 
explicit recognition of deficiencies in the classical social movement agenda. 
For example, political process theory explains radicalization, moderation, 
and other political orientations as “by-products” of political opportunity 
structures. As Andrew Walder notes, structuralist accounts consider collec-
tive violence “a product of the organization of the regime and the strategies 
and organizational capacities of the two sides.”39 The structuralists, thus, 
neglect some crucial meso-level dynamics such as the activist perception of 
social structural elements,40 cross-cutting cleavages that impede or encour-
age ethnic violence,41 ideological/religious commitment to non-violence,42 
and movement activist “know-how” or “taste” for defiant tactics.43 Although 
Dynamics of Contention does not offer substantive solutions to problems 
in structuralist perspectives, its serious attention to social and relational 
processes is noteworthy.
Perhaps the major problem with the dynamic mobilization model is its 
state-centered assumptions. Contentious politics are primarily regarded as 
episodes of contention with the state. “By contentious politics we mean,” the 
authors elaborate, “episodic, public, collective interaction among makers 
of claims and their objects when at least one government is a claimant, an 
object of claims, or a party to the claims.”44
A critical reader observes that this definition would purposefully exclude 
studies of contention “between a social movement and a countermovement 
(with the government as a third party), or an interaction between a social 
38 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 161.
39 Walder 2009: 404. See, for example, White 1989, Boudreau 1996, and Almeida 2008.
40 For this line of criticism, see Kurzman 1996; Goodwin 2006.
41 For impediment, see Mazrui 2000; for encouragement, see Fox 2002.
42 See, Nepstad 2004, 2008.
43 Two signif icant works in this growing literature are Jasper 1997 and Crossley 2003.
44 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 5.
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movement and its wider social environment.”45 This negligence is a serious 
oversight for a framework that claims a relational approach. It also raises the 
question whether the authors really go beyond the traditional structuralist 
assumptions that plague political process theory. Armstrong and Bernstein 
rightly contend that “challenges directed at states may not reveal general 
social processes or mechanisms but processes and mechanisms that are 
specif ic to a particular institution or type of institution.”46
Consider, for example, the mechanism of certification which is intro-
duced as a “powerful selective mechanism in contentious politics because 
a certifying side always recognizes a radically limited range of identities, 
performances, and claims.”47 One would be tempted to apply this notion in 
studying revolutionary activists’ reputation work to get validation in the 
larger society. By def inition, however, certification refers to “validation of 
actors, their performances, and their claims by external authorities,” putting 
the state at the core in power relations.48 This, of course, does not mean 
that the mechanism is not useful; instead, we are still in need of f inding 
and explaining similar mechanisms wherein the state is not central to the 
analysis.
For this very reason, for example, competing PKK and Hizbullah activists’ 
subversive strategies cannot benefit from the discussions in Dynamics of 
Contention which rely on a “polity model” similar to earlier structuralist 
approaches. As Jack Goldstone reminds us, the polity model erroneously 
“emphasizes conditions relating to states” and neglects the crucial role 
of “counter-movements, allied movements, critical economic conditions, 
global trends and conjunctures, and various publics.”49 A feasible alternative 
is to search for “a model of society and power that renders challenges to 
nonstate institutions comprehensible.”50
Despite deficiencies in Dynamics of Contention,51 the leading social move-
ment scholarly orientation toward the relational approach is promising. 
45 Rucht 2003: 114. For similar criticisms, see Taylor 2003: 124.
46 Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 80.
47 McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly 2001: 158.
48 Ibid. Emphasis added.
49 Goldstone 2004: 356.
50 Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 80. 
51 A number of critics severely questioned if the “dynamic mobilization” model goes beyond the 
structuralism, f inding Dynamics of Contention “reads like it was written by a committee that is 
not quite sure of its agenda” (Oliver 2003: 120), “not totally clear to whom” it is addressed (Diani 
2003: 112), “unf inished” (Koopmans 2003: 116) and “confusing” (Goldstone 2010: 363). Moreover, 
the authors’ peculiar def inition of “mechanisms” was found dubious. See Koopmans 2003 and 
Oliver 2003.
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In fact, the later works of Charles Tilly show his most recent shift toward 
relational sociology. Calling for a “relational realism,” Tilly’s recent books 
develop a new perspective that is “close to a kind of nonteleological dialectic, 
akin to American pragmatism or to the dialogic theories of the Russian liter-
ary theorist Mikhail Bakhtin.”52 Why and Credit and Blame are most engaged 
with the emerging literature on the processes of social boundary-making, 
inter-actor competition, and reputation work in politics.53 In Trust and Rule 
and Democracy,54 Tilly argues that trust networks should “be integrated 
into public politics through a relatively open state structure” because “local 
us-them boundaries are potentially compatible with democratization.”55 
Studying the role of trust in a relational perspective would properly place 
“communication, including the use of language, at the heart of social life.”56
Following Tilly’s advice, this book examines the role of Kurdish activists’ 
reputation building, among other factors, in making up the trust networks. 
Charity organizations of competing Kurdish activists, for example, are not 
simply driven by electoral competition – as political clientelism theory would 
suggest –; instead, it is a “group-making” strategy that aims to gain the “trust” 
of the constituency. These organizations not only benefit moderates who par-
ticipate in institutionalized politics, but they also affect the radical flanks.57
52 Krinsky and Mische 2013: 17. According to John Krinsky and Ann Mische, this is why Charles 
Tilly’s later works draw heavily upon examples from political ethnography as a method that best 
f its with the relational approach. They aptly quote Tilly (2006b: 410): “Ethnography engages the 
analyst in looking at social processes as they unfold rather than reasoning chiefly from either 
the conditions under which they occur or the outcomes that correlate with them.” 
53 Tilly 2006a, 2008. His latest articles, “The Blame Game” and “Another View of Conventions,” 
posthumously published in The American Sociologist, also engaged in similar themes (Tilly 2010a, 
2010b).
54 Tilly 2005, 2007.
55 Cited in Krinsky and Mische 2013: 17.
56 Tilly 2005: 24. Jack Goldstone (2010: 365) nicely captures Tilly’s critical shift in these works: 
“Tilly also recognized that the relations in trust networks can weaken and segregate in times 
of crises, and that states can react with coercion as well as consultation. Thus he notes that 
there can be both democratization and de-democratization depending on circumstances. 
Democratization is thus not an inevitable march across categories of government, but the 
outcome of multi-level negotiations among diverse actors. By developing this theory of how 
democracy comes not from capitalism or urbanization or other large impersonal processes, but 
from the gradual building of trust between citizens and state actors, Tilly seemed determined 
to turn his earlier work upside down.” 
57 Similarly, we cannot examine trust without paying suff icient attention to emotions, which 
are largely ignored in the dynamic mobilization approach. For a comprehensive review and 
criticism, see Jasper 2011a. Consider Kurdish Hizbullah’s demonstrations in the wake of the 
Danish cartoon controversy. It was the f irst mass protest in Diyarbakır organized by an Islamic 
movement, mobilizing hundreds of thousands into the streets. Among the protestors were a 
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The Argument of the Book
In this book, I explore how grassroots activists transform an intractable 
ethnic conflict from a culture of violent enmity to a culture of polite 
competition. The activists under study are not from a single pro-ethnic 
movement; instead, they belong to different social movements that have 
rigid boundaries and histories of severe clashes among them. In what 
follows, I provide a new conceptualization of these social movements as 
“rivals,” def ining their relations as “rivalry.”
Existing literature characterizes the relations among social movements 
as friends or enemies. Some scholars note that a variety of movements can 
form a “movement family,” i.e. “a set of coexisting movements that, regard-
less of their specif ic goals, have similar basic values and organizational 
overlaps and sometimes even join for common campaigns.”58 This type of 
friendship was evident in the alliance between abolitionist and suffrage 
movements as well as relations among leftist progressive movements in 
the 1960s and 70s.59 Studies on movement-counter-movement dynamics, 
on the other hand, indicate how opposing mobilizations could engage in 
brutal violence and the slaughter of adversaries.60 Notable examples include 
the adversarial relationship between the Christian Right and the LGBT 
movements as well as the pro-choice and the pro-life movements.61
large number of supporters of the PKK-led Kurdish movement. How could we make sense of 
Hizbullah’s pro-Islamic protests with respect to Turkey’s Kurdish issue? As chapter 5 argues 
in detail, Hizbullah’s public demonstrations provided them with an identity re-construction 
from violence to non-violence, with the aim of partly redressing their public image. At a time 
when many members of the group were still behind bars in Turkish prisons, these attempts at 
public symbolism were indeed forms of reputation work to establish trust within the movement 
as well as trust in the larger public. As Hizbullah activists seek their place in the emerging 
civil society, these demonstrations have become a collective ritual, repeated each year in the 
name of commemorating the Prophet. In the larger picture, Hizbullah’s search for its soul as 
it moves toward moderation has influenced the PKK’s ideological shift as well as the Turkish 
state’s strategic engagement with a multifaceted Kurdish movement containing Islamic and 
ethnic elements. These exchanges have been signif icant in the construction of a competition 
culture, and thus, they have helped to transform the ethno-political conflict. For elaboration 
and discussion, see chapters 4 and 5.
58 Della Porta and Rucht 1995: 232.
59 For the connection between abolitionist and suffrage movements, see DuBois 1978. For the 
leftists movements’ collaborations, see McAdam 1988; Meyer and Whittier 1994. 
60 See, for example, Turner and Killian 1972; Mottl 1980; Zald and Useem 1987; Meyer and 
Staggenborg 1996.
61 For an in-depth account on the adversarial relations between the Christian right and 
the LGBT movements, see Fetner 2008. On the f ight between the pro-choice and the pro-life 
movements, see Munson 2009.
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I suggest a third possibility – that is rivalry, as a construct of the inter-
movement relationship. I use the term “rival movements” to mean two 
or more social movements that are actively engaged in challenging the 
dominant power structure as well as one another.62 The rival movements 
neither try to exterminate each other as seen in opposing movements nor 
do they show elements of friendship in their relations. Instead, they engage 
in a f ierce competition for material and symbolic resources.
Competition is a key dynamic among social movement activists. Despite 
the lack of attention to inter-movement competition, intra-movement 
competition is well studied in the literature. Social movement scholars 
point out how social movement organizations compete for the distribution 
of resources such as money, time, energy and skills.63 Activists within the 
same movement also compete for allocation of symbolic resources such 
as prestige.64 Scholars analyze how competition among social movement 
organizations is influenced by macro-level changes,65 intra-class struggle,66 
and religious aff iliation.67 The existing literature on intra-movement com-
petition would provide insights in conceptualizing inter-movement rivalry.
My definition of rival movements is a symbolic interactionist classif ica-
tion. Rival social movements are neither innately nor permanently “rivals.” 
When Kurdish ethno-nationalists and Kurdish Islamists, for example, were 
locked in deadly violence and rage against each other during the 1990s, 
their relationship was more likely to be of the opposing movement type (i.e. 
movement versus countermovement) where elements of enmity dominate. 
As demonstrated in this study, they transformed their relationship into 
a competitive one in the past decade: that is, they have accepted each 
other’s right to exist in the Southeast region and have started to open 
competitive civic organizations in order to shape the views of the Kurdish 
public. In other words, friendship, enmity, and rivalry among movements 
do not refer to def initive roles or qualities that social movements attribute 
to themselves. Following Alexander Wendt,68 I treat different roles that 
62 The term “rival movements” was f irst employed by Charles Tilly (1999: 268). Yet, in this short 
article, Tilly did neither def ine nor develop the term conceptually.
63 See Zald and McCarthy 1980; McCarthy and Zald 1977; 2001.
64 See Benford and Zurcher 1990.
65 Minkoff 1995, 1997, 1999; Olzak and Ryo 2007.
66 Stepan-Norris and Zeitlin 2003; Stepan-Norris and Southworth 2010.
67 Trejo 2009.
68 Alexander Wendt’s (1999) Social Theory of International Politics remains one of the most 
cited works in the f ield of International Relations. Wendt analyzes how the nation state system 
is socially constructed through three cultures of anarchy, i.e. friendship (Kantian), enmity 
(Hobbesian), and rivalry (Lockean).
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social movement activists take as property of a social structure, instead of 
identifying various roles as properties of agents. Thus, friendship, enmity, 
and rivalry are three distinct interpretive systems in which various roles 
dominate culturally.
How Does Meaning-Making Matter?
Social movement scholars have become better equipped to acknowledge 
the signif icance of interpretive processes, especially after the cultural turn 
in the social sciences. In the introduction to the second edition to his path-
breaking study, Doug McAdam notes the following:
The ongoing interpretation of events by various collectivities shapes the 
likelihood of movement emergence, as it shapes all of social life. Indeed, 
these continuous processes of sense-making and collective attribution 
are arguably more important in movements insofar as the latter require 
participants to reject institutionalized routines and taken-for-granted 
assumptions about the world and to fashion new world views and lines of 
interaction. And yet, for all their importance, these crucial interpretive 
dynamics are largely absent from our theories of the origins of move-
ments and other forms of contentious politics. There is virtually no 
mention of these processes in the theoretical work on ethnic conflict, 
or the dominant structuralist approach to comparative revolution. One is 
left, in both cases, with the distinct impression that structural changes … 
give rise to contention without regard to these intervening interpretive 
processes.69
Although his primary focus is on social movement emergence, McAdam’s 
criticism is applicable to the literature on inter-movement relations. We 
know, for example, movement vs. counter-movement hostilities increase 
when the state enables but does not satisfy challengers.70 However, we 
are still in need of grasping what McAdam calls “intervening interpretive 
processes.” Structural changes and political opportunities matter, but we 
also need to know how these changes are impacting local contexts through 
cultural mechanisms and interpretive processes. Regarding the Kurdish 
case examined here, changes in the Turkish political context after the 
69 McAdam 1999: xxi. Emphases added.
70 See Meyer and Staggenborg 1996.
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European Union reforms are crucial in explaining rival movements’ ability 
to compete with one another, though they are not enough to explain which 
mechanisms, processes, and activists engage with their rivals.
Although there is a growing literature that challenges the dominant 
structuralist research paradigm in social movement theory,71 processes 
of meaning-making among activists are under-examined. As Charles 
Kurzman nicely captures,
While the cultural turn conquered social movement studies, some of its 
most radical implications were lost in the process. Meaning-making was 
assimilated into an analytic framework of causes and effects that was 
built for earlier conceptual tools. In effect, meaning-making has been 
turned into a set of independent variables. Does a group have a strong 
sense of solidarity? Check. Does the movement have a message that 
resonates with core values? Check. Does the repertoire of protest match 
the structure of political opportunities? Check.72
This book analyzes how the process of meaning-making is in constant 
play when social movement activists compete for recognition, prestige, 
and political power.
Committed to an interpretive approach, I argue that inter-movement 
rivalry, like all patterns of social movement relations, is socially constructed, 
inter-subjectively understood, institutionally supported, and collectively 
reproduced among movement activists. The patterns of movement relations 
cannot be reduced to individual activists’ perceptions and behavior; instead, 
they become an interpretive system that shapes agent behavior.73
As readers will notice in the following chapters, by giving up brutal 
violent engagement, the movements under study have constructed a culture 
71 Most notable works include Polletta 1997, 1999, 2004, 2006; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; 
Goldstone 2004; Mees 2004; Van Dyke, Soule, and Taylor 2004; Armstrong and Bernstein 2008; 
Bernstein 2008, 2013.
72 Kurzman 2008: 10.
73 The assumptions are well supported by scholars of social movements. Russell Curtis and 
Louis Zurcher (1974), for example, explained why social environments are signif icant for the 
operation of social movements. Despite their somewhat mechanical description, the authors 
make a distinction between “a hostile environment” and “a reinforcing environment.” Building 
on their study, Bert Klandermans (1990) introduces the concepts of alliance and conflict systems 
to underline the importance of social movement activists’ environment. Donatella Della Porta 
and Dieter Rucht (1995) further support these classif ications and f ind that cooperation and 
competition appear to be major strategies for activists in an alliance system; whereas, bargaining 
and confrontation are basic strategies for activists in a conflict system.
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of rivalry after democratic reforms implemented by the Turkish government 
(2002-2004). As Alexander Wendt notes:
The Lockean culture has a different logic from the Hobbesian because 
it is based on a different role structure, rivalry rather than enmity. Like 
enemies, rivals are constituted by representations about Self and Other 
with respect to violence, but these representations are less threatening: 
unlike enemies, rivals expect each other to act as if they recognize their 
sovereignty, their “life and liberty,” as a right, and therefore not to try to 
conquer or dominate them.74
The Kurdish case corroborates Wendt’s claim. Although some hostilities are 
still ongoing, Kurdish civil society has become an open space for competi-
tion, and it is by no means comparable with the martial law era of the 1990s 
when the Kurdish ethno-nationalists and Hizbullah were involved in a 
violent struggle. Both sides have come to an inter-subjective respect for 
each other’s right to exist.75
I suggest that engagements of rival activists constitute a pattern of social 
relationship that helps transformation of violent conflict. Rival movements 
construct competition zones, what James Jasper calls “arenas,” in order to 
enhance their influence on the larger society.76 I identify three primary 
mechanisms, which I call “processes of rivalry.” These processes are resem-
blance, niche building, and strategic subversion.
Resemblance, the first process introduced in the book, refers to development 
of similar organizations that are run by the competing movements in the civil 
society. As rivals become aware of the new opportunities to expand their 
influence, they develop similar civic initiatives, and therefore, they resemble 
each other in the long run. David Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg observed 
a similar process between opposing movements. The authors rightly argue 
that “once a movement enters a particular venue, if there is a possibility of 
contest, an opposing movement is virtually forced to act in the same arena.”77 
In Turkey’s predominantly Kurdish Southeast region, the rival movements 
primarily resemble each other through charity organizations, all of which were 
established about the same time (i.e. soon after pro-Kurdish reforms in 2004).
74 Wendt 1999: 279.
75 See, for example, the public statements of Abdullah Öcalan, the leader of Kurdistan Workers’ 
Party, about Hizbullah and the Gülen movement HDN 2010; Bugün 2011.
76 See Jasper 2004, 2006.
77 Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1649.
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The second process, i.e. niche building, which occurs simultaneously, 
seems to contradict the f irst one. Niche building refers to the rival activists’ 
efforts to specialize in certain f ields that are not easily available to their 
competitors because of (a) lack of material resources, (b) an ideological 
misf it, and/or (c) reluctance to be represented in the particular f ield due 
to what I call activists’ phronesis. In fact, through the lens of a strategic 
perspective, a niche building strategy never contradicts the processes of 
resembling. Instead of a structuralist perspective that assumes a direct 
link between available resources and organizational niche building,78 a 
multi-institutional politics perspective would locate these social movement 
organizations and available material resources within the larger cultural 
engagements they develop over time.
As James Jasper rightly notes, “(F)rom the structural perspective, it 
is sometimes diff icult to see how players move among arenas, trying to 
enter those where their capabilities will yield the greatest advantages, or 
to see how new goals emerge and inspire players to form around them.”79 
Thus, neither access to the f ields of competition nor resources should be 
taken for granted. Activists’ constant interpretation of their positioning 
vis-à-vis their rivals suggests a relational sociology framework that def ines 
the ontological stance of the multi-institutional politics perspective.80 Niche 
building provides activists further visibility in public and strengthens a 
social movement’s positioning vis-à-vis its rivals, and even, at times, gener-
ates resources. Women’s associations of the Kurdish ethno-nationalists, 
religious public events of Hizbullah, and education centers of the Gülen 
movement are examples of niche building efforts in the region.
Finally, social movements challenge their competitors through symbolic 
activism, or what I call strategic subversion. Strategic subversion refers to 
activists’ collective attempt to claim symbolic resources such as religious 
repertoires and local historical f igures in order to both strengthen their 
own prestige and harm the reputations of their competitors. Activists’ moral 
performance and emotional strategies are crucial in symbolic contestation.81 
Moreover, building a moral authority is especially signif icant in ethnic 
politics. Through strategic subversion processes, the pro-ethnic activists 
become what Gary Alan Fine calls “reputational entrepreneurs.”82
78 See, for example, Minkoff 1999; Levitsky 2007.
79 Jasper 2015: 12; see also Jasper 2011b.
80 For “relational sociology,” see Emirbayer 1997; Mische 2011.
81 For moral performance, see Eyerman 2006. For a comprehensive review of emotions and 
social movement strategies, see Jasper 2011a. 
82 Fine 2006: 405.
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Overall, the aforementioned processes together have shaped the nature 
of the intractable ethnic conflict in Turkey’s Southeast. Pro-ethnic actors’ 
strategies as well as identities are changed. As they engage in civil competi-
tion, their perception of “other” has become altered. Their relations have 
become visible to the public eye for the first time in modern Turkey’s history, 
and this very reflective consciousness has paved the way toward a conflict 
transformation.
Organization of the Book
The book consists of nine chapters including this introduction. Putting 
the Kurdish issue in national and global perspective, Chapter 2 aims to 
give readers a historical background of the pro-ethnic actors under study, 
namely the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement, Hizbullah, and the Gülen/
Hizmet movement. Chapter 3 analyzes critical events that have radically 
shaped Kurdish politics since 1999: (1) the capture of PKK leader Abdullah 
Öcalan (2) initiation of Turkey’s European Union membership negotiations, 
(3) the events of 9/11 and the War on Iraq, and (4) the rise of the Justice 
and Development Party (AKP) and its electoral victory in 2002. These two 
chapters set the stage for the ethnographic analysis to follow.
Chapter 4 outlines how rival Kurdish activists have constructed civil 
society competition and thus planted the seeds of conflict transformation 
in the region. The competition “arenas” in the emerging Kurdish civil society 
are linked with social movements’ resources, ideological boundaries, and 
Kurdish activists’ phronesis (practical know-how). In arenas where competi-
tion is feasible, rival activists resemble each other in their strategic path. 
If the competition is restrained in certain arenas, it enables some Kurdish 
activists to carve out their niche. When actors are in a symbolic f ight, they 
engage in subversive techniques to construct their self-image through de-
legitimizing their rivals. I call these processes resemblance, niche building, 
and strategic subversion, which are examined in later chapters.
Chapter 5 explores how the PKK, Hizbullah, and the Gülen movements 
resemble one another through charity organizations while they strongly 
emphasize their differences through niche building. Criticizing mainstream 
approaches, such as with political clientelism theory, I argue that rival 
charity activism should be analyzed as a mechanism of reputation work in 
claiming Kurdish civil society. At the same time, the rivals are especially 
active in certain f ields that are not easily available to their competitors. 
Each movement has different emphases in the civil society competition: the 
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PKK privileges its women’s organizations, Hizbullah focuses on religious 
associations, and the Gülen specializes in educational institutions.
In Chapters 6, 7, and 8, I examine how rival activists transform Kurdish 
civil society as a result of their reputation work in the symbolic realm. I 
specif ically discuss the importance of “symbolic localization” in transform-
ing the conflict. As an overarching concept, symbolic localization refers to 
the process of identity change as local, cultural repertoires are embraced by 
radical activists. The PKK’s increasing engagement with Islamic culture and 
Hizbullah’s localization through Kurdish language are remarkably signif i-
cant developments. These three chapters describe how rival activists have 
become involved in strategic subversion, a process in which the claiming 
party reconstructs its identity through de-legitimizing its rivals’ identities.
Chapter 6 analyzes the competition to def ine “Kurdish Islam” in the 
region. This chapter demonstrates how the PKK has experienced a dis-
cursive as well as ideological transformation in its relationship with local 
Islamic culture. Local Islamic f igures such as Said Nursi have become 
cultural spaces for contestation among rival Kurdish activists. Chapter 7 
sheds light on pro-Islamic activists’ various projects involving the Kurdish 
language and the increasing “war on words” in the civic sphere. Kurdish 
ethno-nationalists, as a reaction, call for mass protests for education in the 
mother tongue. This type of civil society competition has brought more 
transformations for pro-Islamic actors as they further localized in their 
ethnic tone.
Chapter 8 examines competing narratives of the Turkish “deep state,” 
also known as Ergenekon. The Ergenekon investigation has initiated a 
public awareness of the illegal state operations in the region. As victims of 
the secularist military regime, the pro-Islamic AKP and Gülen supported 
the investigation, and thus, Turkish citizens have begun to hear intrigu-
ing stories about so-called “terrorists” for the f irst time. Having roots in 
both Turkish and Kurdish constituencies, these pro-Islamic actors have 
diminished the long imposed off icial “narrative violence” on the Kurdish 
issue. From Hizbullah’s novels to the PKK’s public memory projects, pro-
Kurdish narratives were an essential part of reputation work: rival activists 
re-constructed their self-image through “distinction” among other Kurds. 
This chapter shows how narratives play a remarkable role in symbolic 
localization of competitor Kurdish activists.
In Conclusion, I discuss how a Multi-Institutional Politics (MIP) approach 
provides better conceptual tools compared to classical approaches in study-
ing ethnic mobilization, violence, and conflict transformation.
2 Kurdish Movements in the Southeast
I leave it to God’s wisdom
The Kurds in this world’s state
Why are they deprived of their rights?
Why they all are doomed?
See, from the Arabs to the Georgians
Everything is Kurdish and, as with a citadel,
The Turks and the Persians besiege them
From four sides at once
And they both make the Kurdish people
Into a target for Fate’s arrow
– Ehmedê Xanî (1651-1707)1
Until recently, all elementary school children in Turkey used to recite a 
nationalist oath every morning. Written way back in 1933, “Our Pledge” 
was also chanted by Kurdish students. “I am a Turk; I am honest; I am 
hard-working,” begins the oath with an interesting ending: “Let my entire 
being serve as a gift to Turkish existence. How happy is the one who says 
I’m a Turk!”2
The motto, “How happy is the one who says I’m a Turk,” uttered by the 
father of the modern Turkish Republic, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, is very 
telling about the nature of nationalist indoctrination.3 The Republican 
1 Quoted from Kreyenbroek and Allison 1996: 10.
2 Andımız, Our Pledge, was written by Reşit Galip, who served as a minister of education 
(1932-33). The f inal sentence, “Happy is the one who says I’m a Turk!” which belongs to Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, was later added to the student oath. Atatürk f irst expressed the dictum in his 
10th Year Address (Onuncu Yıl Nutku), a famous address given for the 10th anniversary of the 
foundation of the Republic (Oct. 29, 1933). After eight decades, in October 2013, the Turkish 
government decided to remove the pledge from the curriculum. 
3 With a population between 25 and 30 million, Kurds are the largest ethnic minority in 
the Middle East. Turkey remains the home of almost 50% of all Kurds while the other half are 
dispersed across Iraq, Iran, and Syria. It should be noted that the debates around the Kurdish 
population are politically contested. Since no census data on Kurdish demographics is avail-
able, scholars are divided over the issue. McDowall (1997) and Romano (2006) note that Kurds 
constitute 23% of Turkey’s population, which means almost 17 million. On the other hand, Yavuz 
and Özcan (2006) endorse Andrews’s (2002) study, which estimates the Kurdish population at 
about 6 million, making 9% of the total population in Turkey. I f ind Sener Aktürk’s (2011) study 
that estimates Kurds as constituting 15.7% of the total population more realistic. KONDA, a 
Turkish poll agency, supports this view, giving an estimate of around 14.7% (KONDA 2011).
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elite established the new regime on the basis of secular nationalism. 
Their understanding of secularism, however, was a peculiar one; that is, 
subduing Islamic identity for the regime’s interests instead of eradicating 
it totally. Those who lived in Turkey were off icially regarded as “Turks” 
unless they were non-Muslims. The only off icial minority in the country, 
i.e. non-Muslim segments of society, was forced to migrate to Greece and 
Bulgaria (in exchange for the Muslim population who were then considered 
to be Turks) in the early years of the Republic. Although the founders of the 
modern Republic were ardent supporters of secularism, they utilized the 
common Islamic background of various ethnic groups in order to construct 
a modern Turkish identity. Thus, all Muslims including Kurds, Arabs, and 
Circassians were off icially declared “Turks.”4
In constructing a chauvinist historiography, the new Republican elite 
developed the Turkish Historical Thesis (Türk Tarih Tezi) and the Sun 
Language Theory (Güneş Dil Teorisi), both taught as objective facts in high 
schools in the 1930s. The Turkish Historical Thesis suggested that all major 
civilizations have their roots in Central Asia, the land of Turks. Likewise, 
the Sun Language Theory proposed that Turkish is the source for all major 
languages in the world. Although these nationalist theories are no longer in 
use, their legacy has remarkably shaped both Turkish and Kurdish ethnic 
identities.5
As late as the 1980s, the very existence of Kurds was denied by Turkish 
state officials who used to refer to Kurds as “mountain Turks.”6 The post-1980 
military government intensif ied propaganda campaigns about the Turkish-
ness of the Kurds through various publications such as Anadolunun İlk Türk 
Sakinleri: Kürtler [The f irst Turkish inhabitants of Anatolia: the Kurds] 
and Türkistanlı bir Türk Boyu: Kürtler [A Turkish tribe from Turkistan: the 
Kurds].7 “What separatists call Kurds are the Turkish people who used to 
live in the mountains,” stated the White Book that was published by the 
Turkish General Staff after the 1980 coup. “Kurd is the sound that emerged 
when these people walked on the snow.”8 Until 1991, speaking Kurdish in 
public could have resulted in f ines or prison sentences since public expres-
sions of Kurdish identity were equated with “separatism” or “terrorism.” 
4 Yıldız 2001: 133. For the founding father Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s thoughts on Kurds, see 
Yeğen 1996, 1999; Mango 1999. For his policy toward the key Kurdish city Diyarbakır, see Çağlayan 
2014. 
5 Hirschler 2001: 147; Beşikçi 1977; Ersanlı 2003.
6 For a very early work on this expression, see Elphinston 1946.
7 These works, respectively, are Seferoğlu 1982 and Taneri 1983.
8 See Dündar 2009.
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Diyarbakır Prison, notorious for inhumane tortures, had become a type of 
concentration camp for Kurdish activists after the 1980 coup. Many of the 
detainees joined the PKK rebels after their release.9
Under these political circumstances, it is not hard to understand why 
Kurdish ethnic and Islamic movements arose in the Southeast. The PKK-led 
Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement, Hizbullah, and the Gülen movement 
have long been three major grassroots actors in the region.
The Kurdish Ethno-Nationalist Movement
Kurdistan Workers’ Party, generally known by its acronym PKK, has been 
the leading organization for Kurdish ethno-nationalism. Founded as a 
Marxist revolutionary group in 1978, the PKK launched a guerrilla war 
against the Turkish State during the 1980s. In three decades, the f ight 
left more than 40,000 people dead, tens of thousands were injured and 
9 For stories of torture, see Cemal 2004: 15-34.
Figure 2.1  One of the major inner-city roads in Diyarbakır where Ataturk’s dictum 
“How happy is the one who says I’m a Turk” was launched by Turkish 
military after the 1980 coup. The sign was removed on November 7, 2013.
Photograph by author, July 16, 2009
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kidnapped, and hundreds of thousands were forced to migrate to larger 
cities in Turkey.10
The PKK’s cause for Kurdish freedoms has rapidly grown bigger than 
itself. In the early 1990s, pro-Kurdish parties began to emerge as non-violent 
elements for Kurdish ethno-nationalism. Especially after the imprison-
ment of the PKK’s charismatic leader Abdullah Öcalan, the movement has 
signif icantly become active in the political realm.11
The Turkish Constitutional Court repeatedly banned pro-Kurdish parties 
from politics for allegedly being the PKK’s propaganda arm. Until recently, 
the political platform was the Peace and Democracy Party, BDP, which 
became the flagship political organization after the closure of its predeces-
sor, the Democratic Society Party, DTP, by the Constitutional Court on 
December 11, 2009. The DTP replaced the Democratic People’s Party, DEHAP, 
which had earlier replaced the People’s Democracy Party, HADEP. The chain 
goes back to the People’s Labor Party, HEP, which was formed in 1990.12 In 
2014, upon Öcalan’s request to strengthen Kurds’ political alliance with the 
Turkish left, the Peace and Democracy Party (BDP) split into two distinct 
groups: the Democratic Regions’ Party (DBP), which competes in local 
elections and represents the municipalities, and the People’s Democratic 
Party (HDP), which contests nationwide general elections.
Although the PKK and the pro-Kurdish political parties are independent 
in terms of their organizational structures, the majority of the Kurdish 
parties’ members have maintained their close relationship with the PKK 
because the pro-Kurdish constituency still perceive these parties as “sur-
rogate PKK.”13 In my interviews with three Kurdish party deputies in the 
Turkish Grand National Assembly in Ankara, along with my observations 
of some deputies’ speeches in Diyarbakır public demonstrations, I notice 
two different narratives concerning the PKK. In Ankara, they argue that 
the State should strategically recognize the PKK in order to achieve peace 
and democracy in the region; whereas in Diyarbakır, they cherish the PKK’s 
10 There is a massive literature on the PKK movement from a variety of different perspectives. 
Most often cited works include White 2000; Romano 2006; and Marcus 2007. For a most recent 
book exclusively on the PKK, see White 2015. 
11 The Kurdish ethno-nationalist organizations includes the Kurdistan Students Association, 
the Free Youth Organization, the Free Women’s Organization, the Human Rights Association 
(İHD), and a myriad of media outlets, including Gündem daily, Roj TV, İMC TV, and Fırat News 
Agency. All of these organizations are closely tied to the PKK.
12 For an in-depth account on f irst pro-Kurdish parties in Turkey, see Watts 1999. Throughout 
the book, I often use the term “pro-Kurdish party” for all the parties aforementioned in order 
to help non-specialized readers.
13 Watts 2006: 127.
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at times violent struggle, claiming that the guerillas have deserved to be 
taken into account due to their unyielding f ight. Many politicians often 
face criminal charges because of their public speeches.14
Originally formed as a student-based clandestine organization, the PKK 
initially called for an independent Kurdish socialist state by employing violent 
measures against ‘collaborators’ with the Turkish regime, i.e. Kurdish notables 
and tribal leaders with a stake in the existing political system.15 The PKK has 
been led by newly urbanized and university-educated Kurds who do not have 
tribal ties. In this sense, the PKK insurgency has been fundamentally different 
from the tribal resistance of Kurdish leaders, who use kinship ties and state 
resources to get elected to the parliament and to maintain their support base.
Thus, unlike tribe-based “occasional Kurds,” who have no major problems 
with the State other than ref ining their status in society, the PKK move-
ment is “blurred by regional, sectarian and class identities, engaging a dual 
rebellion – against both the traditional structure of Kurdish society and the 
Kemalist state system.”16 The PKK has striven for a radical goal: to establish 
an independent state for the Kurdish nation, or alternatively, to form a 
binational Turkish-Kurdish federation.
14 İHD 2008: 226-37.
15 Van Bruinessen 2004: 12. See also, İmset 1992.
16 Yavuz and Özcan 2006: 106.
Figure 2.2  A typical pro-Kurdish party rally in which PKK flags and Öcalan figures 
are cherished
Photo by the author, diyarbakır, July 15, 2009
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In the past decade, the PKK has redefined itself in the emerging Kurdish 
civil society. The pro-Kurdish parties have increasingly become powerful 
voices for Kurds, demanding constitutional changes for the recognition of 
Kurdish identity and cultural citizenship. The continuous success of the 
pro-Kurdish parties in local elections paved the way for many activists 
to become public off icials. The control of many local municipalities in 
Southeast Turkey further empowered Kurdish ethno-nationalism, introduc-
ing new spaces of opportunity and resources.
Hizbullah in Turkey
In addition to the PKK, Hizbullah (The party of God) has long been a 
revolutionary movement in the region.17 The 1979 Iranian revolution, the 
development of the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood’s Kurdish branch, the 1982 
Hama rebellion in Syria, and global Islamic revivalism all contributed to 
the formation of Hizbullah in Diyarbakır in the early 1980s.18 Unlike the 
renowned Lebanese Hizbullah, the group is a Sunni movement, often called 
Cemaat (the Community) by its members.19
Hizbullah emerged as an influential pro-Kurdish movement only after 
its f ight against the PKK in the early 1990s. Although there were many 
Islamic groups, including Suf i mystic orders and brotherhoods, in the 
region,20 Hizbullah powerfully organized in high schools and mosques. The 
17 Hizbullah in Turkey is totally different from Hizbullah that operates in Lebanon. Some 
scholars called the movement “Kurdish Hizbullah” (Yavuz and Özcan 2006; Uslu 2007), whereas 
some others used “Turkish Hizbullah” in their writings (Aras and Bacık 2002; Levitsky 2003; 
Laçiner 2007). I avoid naming the movement Kurdish Hizbullah since another Hizbullah pres-
ence exists among the Iraqi Kurds and it may give a false impression that the movement is a 
Kurdish separatist organization. Also, Turkish Hizbullah would not be appropriate because 
the overwhelming majority of activists are of Kurdish origin. Therefore, throughout the book, 
I stick to their plain name “Hizbullah.” 
18 A Hizbullah member told me that the Hama rebellion had a strong influence on Turkey’s Sunni 
Kurds who have close relatives living in the region. Author’s interview, Diyarbakır, July 25, 2009.
19 Tutar 2009. Çakır (2007: 1) notes that Hizbullah followers never called themselves “Hizbul-
lah.” My interview data, however, dissents with this argument. In the words of an activist, “the 
Kurdish public in general” named the organization in the 1990s because of “their appreciation 
of the group’s unyielding stance against the PKK.” Later, he added, the organization members 
accept the name enthusiastically. Moreover, Hizbullah’s military leader Cemal Tutar’s court 
defense indicates that the movement followers have long called themselves Hizbullah. See, 
Tutar 2009. 
20 The Kurds’ strong attachment to Islamic culture is well documented. See, for example, 
Van Bruinessen 1992, 2000; Akyol 2006; Çiçek 2008; Tan 2009. Major moderate Kurdish-Islamic 
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group’s armed struggle with the PKK in Kurdish cities such as Diyarbakır, 
Mardin, and Batman led to a common perception that it was supported by 
the Turkish State.21 Calling the PKK pejoratively Partiya Kafirin Kurdistan 
[Kurdistan Infidel Party], Hizbullah charged the Kurdish ethno-nationalists 
with serving Communism, murdering Muslims, and dividing the Kurdish 
Muslim community. Between 1991 and 1996, the bloody conflict between 
the two groups resulted in more than 1,000 casualties.22
In 1998, Hizbullah started to abduct, interrogate, and even murder those 
who left the movement as well as those who might be potential enemies.23 
The notorious murders of İzzettin Yıldırım (the leader of a small Kurdish-
Islamic Nur group) and Konca Kuriş (a vocal Muslim feminist) tarnished 
Hizbullah’s reputation as an Islamist movement f ighting only against the 
PKK. Soon afterwards, Hizbullah’s top leader, Hüseyin Velioğlu, was killed in 
a police raid. Most Hizbullah activists either succeeded in escaping to other 
countries or were arrested on terrorism charges. These developments led 
Hizbullah to renounce violence and transform itself into a civic movement. 
After a few years of silence and shock, the movement activists began to 
establish civil society organizations in 2004.
Strikingly, both Hizbullah’s leader, Hüseyin Velioğlu, and the PKK’s leader, 
Abdullah Öcalan, were radicalized in Ankara instead of in their home towns.24 
Similar to the Kurdish ethno-nationalist Marxism, Hizbollah’s Islamism did 
groups include traditional Islamic brotherhood networks such as Naqshbandi orders and Nur 
community. These groups emphasize their religious identity f irst and foremost, whereas they 
express their Kurdish identity when confronted with the imposition of Turkish-ness (Yavuz 
and Özcan 2006: 106). Such groups have long supported the center-right parties, most recently 
the AKP, primarily because of their disapproval of leftist Kurdish nationalism led by the PKK.
21 For Hizbullah’s organizing structures among youth-illustrated with personal anecdotes-, 
see Kurt’s 2015 recent monograph. There is strong evidence that the Turkish military supported 
Hizbullah against the PKK. Illegal operations of the Turkish military off icers, however, included 
false-f lag operations of both Hizbullah and the PKK, indicating that the Turkish counterter-
rorism units inf iltrated both sides, and as a result, benef it from the ongoing bloody conflict in 
order to strengthen the OHAL regime, i.e. the military rule in the region. See chapter 8 for the 
illegal operations of the state. 
22 Aras and Bacık 2002: 150. See also, Çakır 2001: 93-95. One of the Hizbullah leaders, who 
served ten years in prison, told me that the PKK threatened them and they had no other way out 
other than defend themselves. Yet, he also confessed that Hizbullah interrogated and executed 
those who were spying. The author’s interview, Istanbul, June 5, 2009. 
23 According to the Turkish police reports, the number of these individuals reached 60, and 
the majority of these operations were held in the year 1999. For details, see Bal 2006.
24 Perhaps more strikingly, both were college students in the Department of Political Science 
at Ankara University, popularly known as Mülkiye because of its prestigious education to train 
civil servants such as governors and public inspectors. 
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not stem from local Kurdish culture, long perceived as alien to the region. 
Since the movement did not publish any documents before 2004, there is 
little evidence of its ideological training in early years. The police intelligence 
records that were secretly collected from Hizbullah sermons indicate that the 
group utilized teachings of anti-Western f igures such as Ayatollah Ruhollah 
Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb, Ali Shariati, and Abul Ala Maududi.25
In the past decade, movement activists have increasingly become more 
transparent as well as more pro-Kurdish, calling themselves mustazaf, i.e. 
the oppressed. Their charity organization, Mustazaf-Der (Association for the 
Oppressed), became the f irst public face of the movement until its closure 
in 2012 by a court order due to its alleged link with outlawed Hizbullah.26 
After the closure, the movement took the path of legal political activism, 
establishing Hür Dava Partisi, Free Cause Party, which is often called by its 
acronym HÜDA-PAR due to its literal meaning: The Party of God, a Kurdish 
expression for the word Hizbullah in Arabic.
Only a year after its establishment, HÜDA-PAR participated in the 2014 
local elections. Receiving 92,000 votes, the party emerged as the third major 
political party, following BDP/DBP and AKP, in the region. Despite not win-
ning any mayoral post, the party signaled that it can attract conservative 
Kurdish votes.27 Such a level of success in their first election experience further 
encouraged Hizbullah activists to pursue party politics. Electoral competition 
has defined emerging new norms in engagement between Hizbullah and the 
PKK: before the elections, HÜDA-PAR members claimed that their electoral 
offices and party officials were under attack by PKK militants.28
The legalization of Hizbullah, however, has led some radical Islamists 
disenchanted with the movement to join the Islamic State, also known 
as Daesh. The leader of the Islamic State in Turkey, Halis Bayuncuk, for 
25 Uslu 2007.
26 Despite its recent commitment to non-violence, Hizbullah is still considered a terrorist 
organization by Turkish authorities, and thus, remains under close police surveillance. The 
movement’s publications and online websites still include many references to their original 
name, Hizbullah, and my interviewees from the Mustazaf-Der did not deny their link with 
the Hizbullah movement. Based on f ield observations, my impression was that the movement 
activists formally deny the link but informally revived the reputation of the original name, 
Hizbullah.
27 In Batman, the birthplace of Hizbullah, HÜDA-PAR bought off electorates from both pro-
Islamic AKP and pro-Kurdish BDP, receiving 7.8% in total votes. Similarly, in Bingöl and Bitlis, 
major provinces in Eastern Anatolia, HÜDA-PAR challenged its rivals remarkably. For an analysis 
of HÜDA-PAR’s electoral strength, see Balcı and Efe 2014: 20-21. 
28 Author’s interview with Aydın Gök, the party’s mayor candidate for the city, Batman, June 1, 
2013.
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example, is an ethnic Kurd whose father is serving a life sentence for being 
among the leaders of Hizbullah. He left Hizbullah to join al-Qaeda in Turkey, 
and later, the Islamic State. As the Syrian war escalated across Turkish 
borders, a large number of Kurds joined not only PKK-aff iliate YPG but also 
the Islamic State – two groups that were actively f ighting against each other. 
According to one estimate, f ifty per cent of Daesh (ISIL) Turkish f ighters 
are ethnically Kurds.29
The Gülen/Hizmet Movement
The development of the Gülen movement, also known as Hizmet movement, 
in Kurdish-populated cities goes back to the late 1980s. The movement’s 
activists are gathered around ideas of Fethullah Gülen (b. 1941), a preacher, 
writer, and poet.30 The Gülen movement emerged in the late 1970s as a 
branch of the Nur movement whose leader, Said Nursi (1876-1960), was 
Kurdish in origin. Nursi was an ardent critic of the aggressive secularism 
in the formative years of the Turkish Republic.31 Following the steps of 
Nursi – who suggested establishing schools to f ight against ignorance in 
the Islamic world – Fethullah Gülen has led a mass education movement 
in every corner of Turkey.32
The Gülen movement consists of autonomous units including associa-
tions of workers and businessmen, private schools, and media outlets such 
as Samanyolu TV, Burç FM, and Zaman daily. The movement established 
cultural organizations, lobby groups, college student bodies, and hundreds 
of educational centers in 160 countries around the globe.33 Gülen activists 
29 Tezcür and Çiftçi 2014.
30 The literature on the Gülen movement grows fast. For most comprehensive studies, see 
Turam 2007; Ebaugh 2010; Yavuz 2012; Hendrick 2013; Tittensor 2014. For comprehensive inter-
views with Fethullah Gülen in English, see Saritoprak and Unal 2005; Sevindi 2008.
31 Most of Nursi’s students were Turkish, not Kurdish. The secularist establishment severely 
punished Nursi and his followers during the one-party rule (1923-1950) due to their alleged 
activism against the regime. Yet, Nursi’s books, Risale-i Nur Collection, which focus on essentials 
of Islamic belief and are non-political in nature, increasingly became popular in the country. 
Nursi’s magnum opus, the Risale-i Nur, was an attempt to combine modern sciences and the 
traditional Islamic beliefs and values. See AbuRabi 2003, 2008. The Nur community’s openness 
to modernity and its commitment to non-violence have resonated with Suf i interpretation of 
Islam in Anatolia. See Akbulut-Kuru and Kuru 2008; Şahin 2011.
32 In his writings, Gülen calls his project “the golden generation” or “generations of hope.” See 
Gülen 2004: 128-36. 
33 After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, the movement began to open hundreds of 
private high schools in newly established Turkic countries in Central Asia. In the past decade, 
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have long tried to form a common ground to bring members of academia, 
the business elite, popular artists, and opinion leaders – including minority 
representatives such as Orthodox Christian bishops and Alevi leaders – 
under the umbrella of some fashionable causes such as dialogue, tolerance, 
democracy, and civic liberties in Turkey.34
The f irst Hizmet institutions were university exam prep centers (der-
shane) in Diyarbakır and Urfa in 1988. Hizmet’s educational initiatives 
were f inanced by local businessmen who developed friendship ties through 
weekly tea conversations (sohbet). Conducting rare research on the Gülen 
movement in the city of Mardin, Mehmet Kalyoncu explains how these soh-
bet meetings were crucial in recruiting from the local Kurdish population:
Between 1988 and 1991, periodic sohbet meetings served as vehicles of 
outreach. These meetings took place in the participants’ houses on a rotat-
ing basis, and through them more people were brought to understand 
the necessity of doing something to combat deprivations in the city, 
especially in the f ield of education. Most of them agreed that the state was 
unable to provide the necessary education services not only in Mardin but 
in all of southeastern Turkey. In fact, some of them even thought that the 
ultra-secular state deliberately deprived the region of schools and other 
basic services to punish the region’s Kurdish population.35
In addition to prep centers, Hizmet volunteers established private high 
schools in the early 1990s. The main curriculum and the philosophy of 
these schools were following the path of earlier Hizmet schools in western 
Turkey such as Yamanlar and Fatih.36 These expansive projects were often 
followed by successful establishment of local sohbet networks, which have 
reached wealthier Kurdish businessmen in Istanbul for funds. The Atak 
high school in Mardin, for example, was the product of a few visits by a local 
Mardinian businessman to Dr. Vahid Atak, owner of a private hospital and 
several shoe factories in Istanbul.37 In early years, most teachers at Hizmet 
education facilities were ethnically Turkish but, as Kurdish volunteers of 
the movement has expanded its project to include countries in Africa, Europe, and the Far East. 
For studies on Gülen schools, see Agai 2002; Dohrn 2013; Tee and Shankland 2013.
34 The movement activists annually organize Abant Meetings in which prominent writers, 
journalists, scholars, and artists gather to discuss Turkey’s social problems. See, Uğur 2013.
35 Kalyoncu 2008: 45.
36 For pedagogical aspects of Hizmet schools, see Agai 2002: 27-47.
37 Kalyoncu 2008: 61.
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Figure 2.3  At a Hizmet prep school in Batman, students check their test scores
Photo by the author, June 1, 2013
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the Hizmet movement increased in numbers, Kurdish teachers replaced 
them.38
The 1990s witnessed a rapid proliferation of sohbet groups in every Kurd-
ish city and town, but only after the European Union reform initiatives 
(2002-2004) have Gülen activists become more visible in Kurdish civil 
society. A decrease of PKK violence enabled them to engage in large public 
projects such as charity organizations, village development associations, 
reading halls for poor students, and women’s fraternity clubs. Opening 
democratic channels not only helped civic association development but also 
strengthened Hizmet’s reach to ordinary Kurds. In Nusaybin, for example, 
Hizmet’s prep school (Sur Dershanesi) had only 15 students in 1996. The 
number of students increased exponentially in the 2000s, reaching 280 in 
2004, 480 in 2005, and 900 in 2006.39
The Gülen movement strongly supported the AKP’s reformist policy 
against Turkish militarism until the fallout between the two groups in 2013. 
The movement organized two major conferences on the Kurdish issue to 
promote liberal and reformist perspectives, preceding the AKP govern-
ment’s “Kurdish Opening.”40 Similarly, a few months before constitutional 
amendments that endorsed establishment of Kurdish-instruction private 
schools, Fethullah Gülen gave an interview to Rudaw to declare his support 
for education in the mother tongue.
Critics, however, f ind the movement’s perspective of the Kurdish issue 
assimilationist. A leading expert points out that students attending Hizmet 
schools do not learn “Kurdish language, culture, history or politics, but 
38 Kalyoncu notes that teachers’ Western origin has in fact proven to be an advantage instead 
of being an issue of concern. The author quotes from Hayri Bey, “Most of us were quite impressed 
to see teachers, who were originally ethnic Turks from modern western cities like Istanbul and 
Izmir, coming to the underdeveloped Southeast and preparing ethnic Kurdish and Arab students 
for the university admissions test.” Kalyoncu 2008: 48. 
39 Kalyoncu 2008: 70.
40 The conference in Erbil gathered more than 200 intellectuals from both Turkish and Kurdish 
origins. One of the themes of the conference focused on Turkey’s long-standing fear of naming 
“Kurdistan.” The off icial discourse has long resisted the usage of “Kurdistan,” perceiving such 
naming as an existential threat to Turkey’s unity. Upon criticism by some Kurdish participants, 
Ali Bulaç, a Zaman columnist, responded, “I am in the capital city of the Federation of the 
Kurdish Region in Iraq, and I’m not someone who minds stating this.” The f inal declaration of 
the Abant Platform termed the region “Kurdistan Regional Government.” Only a week later, 
Turkey’s President Abdullah Gül paid a visit to Erbil and called the region “Kurdistan,” becoming 
the f irst off icial to utter the term. Although Gül later denied using the term “Kurdistan” under 
heavy criticism, he added: “What shall I say? We do not refuse to say Macedonia because Greece 
refuses to do so.” See, Demir 2012: 95. 
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rather risk assimilated to a Turkish ethnic identity.”41 For most Hizmet 
volunteers, educating Kurdish youth and providing civic channels for 
economic development are seen as panacea for the root causes of ethnic 
tension. Pro-Kurdish nationalist organizations f ind this perspective prob-
lematic, reminiscent of the Turkish State’s traditional underestimation of 
the signif icance of ethnic recognition.
In recent years, Hizmet activism in Iraqi Kurdistan has become more 
visible, inviting competition in domestic politics. In 2014, the Kurdish 
regional government turned down then-Prime Minister Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan’s request to close Hizmet schools, pointing out that the schools 
offer high-quality education and the country’s elite send their children to 
these institutions.42
Locating the Pro-Islamic AKP
Readers may wonder where the ruling Justice and Development Party (AKP) 
f it into the larger analysis. Similar to Kurdish nationalism, political Islam 
has been defined as the foremost danger for the modern Turkish Republic 
in the off icial state discourse. The secularist elite has long interpreted 
secularism in a radical fashion, similar to French laïcité.43
The idea that irtica, i.e. religious radicalism, threatens the foundations 
of the state has been inculcated from generation to generation thanks to 
off icial education and the State’s overwhelming monopoly of knowledge. 
The Turkish Armed Forces have claimed a guardianship role to secure 
secularism and democracy from the so-called irtica threat. The rhetoric of 
irtica has legitimized serial military coups in 1960, 1971, 1980, and 1997.44
41 Romano 2014. 
42 Today’s Zaman 2014. Currently there are seventeen private schools and a university, Ishik 
University, aff iliated with the movement. Radio Dewran broadcasting in three languages (i.e. 
Kurdish, Arabic, and Turkish) is also run by Hizmet volunteers. For details, see Çakır 2013; 
Pandya 2014. 
43 See, Kuru 2007, 2009.
44 Renowned historian Ernest Gellner (1997: 243) succinctly depicts the issue as the following: 
“The basic dilemma was, so far as I could see, that the Kemalist heritage was committed to 
the Western sociopolitical system, but if that system was implemented, then sooner or later 
people who f lirted with religion and betrayed the Kemalist tradition would win the elections. 
Either you give up democracy and in doing so contradict the principles you are supposed to 
be applying, or else you implement it, in which case you allow people to win who will, in turn, 
betray it. Under the impact of this dilemma, a new cyclical political system emerged, which for a 
time seemed to be institutionalized. It was quite different from the Ibn Khaldunian cycle. First, 
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The roots of the AKP go back to the National Outlook Movement that has 
been, f irst and foremost, a political Islamic movement in Turkey. Since the 
1970s, the movement’s party, the National Salvation Party (MSP), received 
11.8% and 8.6% of the votes in the 1973 and 1977 elections respectively and 
succeeded in joining in all coalition governments between 1973 and 1980.45 
The 1980 military coup banned the MSP from politics as it did all other 
parties. After the normalization of politics in 1983, the leader Erbakan 
established the Welfare Party, Refah Partisi (RP), which was subsequently 
banned after the February 28 military intervention, known as the “post-
modern coup,” in 1997.
The secularist regime also banned the movement’s successor party, 
the Virtue Party (FP) for allegedly being the center of so-called irtica, i.e. 
the army, the guardian of this new democratic tradition, allows free elections to take place. A 
party wins that would betray the Kemalist tradition, so the army steps in and hangs its leader. 
Then, after a time, it hands the government back again, and so on. I think it was Mark Twain 
who said, ‘Giving up smoking is easy, I’ve done it so many times.’ The Turkish army could say, 
‘Reestablishing democracy is easy, we have done it so many times.’ And so this cycle appeared 
as if it were institutionalized.” 
45 Dağı 2005: 24. The National Salvation Party was established after the 1971 military coup 
as the successor of Milli Nizam Partisi, the National Order Party, of the movement, which was 
founded in 1970.
Figure 2.4  Kurdish supporters of the AKP in an election rally
Photo by the author, urfa, May 21, 2011
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Islamist threat.46 The closure led to a great split within the movement: those 
who follow the traditional Erbakan line established the Felicity Party (SP), 
and those who have gathered around the new young leader, Recep Tayyip 
Erdoğan, formed the Justice and Development Party (AKP).47 Only a year 
later, in 2002, the AKP won a landslide victory in the general nationwide 
election, rising to power.
The AKP government swiftly undertook serious reforms to redefine the 
Kurdish issue thanks to the EU membership process. The AKP’s support for 
EU-induced democratization was partly due to its weak position against the 
secularist military establishment. It was the second major electoral victory 
in 2007 that actually enabled the AKP to break the monopoly of the Turkish 
military on def ining the Kurdish issue. The party got enormous support 
from the Kurdish populace, who perceived the AKP as the underdog against 
the military – just like Kurds themselves.
The most ambitious attempt of the AKP, perhaps, was to reach PKK 
militants for a possible disarmament deal. The peace talks between the 
government and the guerillas go back to secret Oslo meetings in 2009 
then popularly known as the “Oslo Process.” The meetings included PKK 
representatives, some members of the Kurdish diaspora, and Turkish 
off icials. Soon after the negotiations, a group of PKK f ighters from the 
mountains entered Turkey as a “peace envoy,” signaling the opportunity for 
a settlement. Yet the group’s crossing the border was “a highly orchestrated 
publicity stunt” including celebrations, parades, and political speeches 
praising the PKK, popularly known as “the Habur Incident.”48
Under f ire from the Turkish nationalist parties, the AKP government 
ordered the group members to be detained. Despite being later released, the 
majority of them faced arrest and prosecution within a year. The government 
started to pressure the PKK by crushing its urban activist network, Group of 
Communities in Kurdistan (KCK). More than 1,500 activists including many 
politicians were detained on charges of being members of KCK. The Oslo 
46 The eminent reason for the closure was the Merve Kavakçı incident in the Turkish Parliament 
in 1999. For an analysis of the Kavakçı affair as a critical turning point in Turkey, see Gürbüz 
and Bernstein 2012.
47 The AKP has consciously presented itself as the Conservative Democracy movement and 
thus rejected its roots with the National Outlook movement. Therefore, the SP is still the only 
party representing the National Outlook. 
48 Eccarius-Kelly 2011: 193. “From the perspective of the PKK,” notes Vera Eccarius-Kelly, “the 
government’s top-down Kurdish Initiative presented a direct challenge to its inf luence and 
legitimacy in the region and needed to be stopped. The arrival of the ‘peace groups’ allowed 
the PKK to reshape its image, demonstrating to Kurdish constituents a serious desire to engage 
in a negotiated arrangement with the government.” Pp. 194-95. 
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process did not last long, and both the AKP and the PKK blamed each other 
for the collapse in mid-2011 when the meetings were revealed to the public. 
The outcome was bloody. The year 2012 was recorded as the most violent 
year in the f ighting between the Turkish State and the PKK since 1999.49
The AKP government initiated a new campaign by reaching out to the 
jailed PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan. Newroz (Kurdish New Year) celebrations 
in March 2013 marked the beginning of a new era of yet another ceasef ire, 
often referred to as the “Solution Process” or the “Peace Process.” It was un-
precedented this time, however, because the Turkish government publicly 
declared off icial negotiations with the guerillas.
The AKP’s increasing authoritarianism, however, led both pro-Kurdish 
and pro-Turkish organizations to believe that the peace process was a trick 
to deceive the public in order to win the critical elections in 2014 and 2015, 
and thus, secure the path for Erdoğan’s dream of a presidential system. The 
pro-Kurdish party leader Selahattin Demirtaş stated that it is not realistic 
to expect conflict resolution with the AKP even if negotiations would be 
made for f ifty years. AKP leaders, on the other hand, blamed the Gülen 
movement for sabotaging the talks and even collaborating with the PKK 
to weaken the government.50
For a long time, the Gülen movement was a skeptical partner of the AKP 
government. Soon after the peace process was publicly declared by the 
government, Fethullah Gülen expressed his full support. Gülen quoted the 
Quranic verse, “There is benefit in peace” and stated that nations might need 
to accept some bitter peace agreements. The uneasiness, however, remained 
strong in the Hizmet community. In the words of a leading activist,
Hocaefendi [“the teacher,” referring to Fethullah Gülen] said “There is 
benef it in peace” and he never backed away from that. That, in other 
words, is the cornerstone of our approach. But we also have reservations. 
Hocaefendi believes that while peace with the PKK is a good initiative, 
the State should also have Plan B, C, D and even E. Because he thinks 
that the PKK is not that trustworthy, and that there are ill-willed powers 
in the region that might interfere in the process.51
49 For comparative numbers, see Tezcür 2013: 70. Understanding emotional resentment in the 
Turkish public at large, then-Prime Minister Erdoğan had always denied the Oslo talks, even 
stating that those who claimed the existence of negotiation talks between the AKP and PKK 
were “despicable” (şerefsiz) appealing to “mean slanders.” See, Milliyet 2011.
50 Cumhuriyet 2015; TimeTurk 2014.
51 Mustafa Akyol’s interview with an anonymous activist. See, Akyol 2013. 
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For Hizmet members, official talks with the PKK on disarmament were fine, 
but negotiating Kurdish cultural rights – referred to as “essential human 
rights” by Fethullah Gülen – should not be on the table. They feared that 
such a deal would make the PKK the sole representative of Kurds and the 
single defender of Kurdish rights. For Hizmet activists, it was reassuring 
to hear the PKK’s claim that violence is indispensable to be heard by the 
Turkish State.52
As Daesh (ISIL) advanced in Syria and Iraq, the AKP government’s nego-
tiations with the PKK were in a deadlock. The PKK successfully mobilized its 
f ighters, defending Syrian and Iraqi Kurds as partners of the United States 
and the allies. The brutal siege of Kobane, a Kurdish town in northern Syria, 
intensif ied Kurdish nationalist sentiments across the borders. President 
Erdoğan’s Kobane policy met with mass pro-Kurdish protests, putting the 
PKK and Hizbullah on opposite sides once again. The PKK militants targeted 
HÜDA-PAR, Hizbullah’s legal party, claiming that they were supporting the 
Islamic State with the help of the AKP government. The clashes resulted 
in injuries and deaths on both sides, an unprecedented development since 
the mid-1990s. The peace process effectively ended after a suicide bombing 
appearantly conducted by Daesh (ISIL) militants in the border town of Suruç 
in July 2015, killing thirty-two pro-Kurdish party (HDP) activists. Massive 
violence erupted in Kurdish towns, causing the Turkish State and the PKK 
to resume the conflict once again.
Despite perilous confrontations in turbulent times, a closer look at the 
historical trajectory of Kurdish ethno-nationalist and Islamic movements 
reveals a deep transformation in their relationship. The PKK and Hizbullah 
militants were in an armed conflict in the early 1990s. Since Turkey’s Euro-
pean Union membership negotiations, however, these two movements have 
become highly active in the civic sphere – not only competing with each 
other but also with an ever more challenging rival, the Gülen movement. 
What follows is the story of a broader structural transformation in the past 
decade. The changing political context has paved the way for organizational 
competition in an emerging Kurdish civil society.
52 Fethullah Gülen was more explicit in his interview with BBC where he stated that Abdullah 
Öcalan was uneasy with the Hizmet’s educational activism in the region: “They didn’t want our 
activities to prevent young people joining the militants in the mountains. Their politics is to 
keep enmity between Kurdish and Turkish people.” See BBC 2014.

3 Exogenous Shocks on the Eve of the 
Millennium
On February 15, 1999, the Turkish Armed Forces captured Abdullah 
Öcalan, the PKK’s founder and charismatic leader. Öcalan’s capture led 
to major pro-Kurdish protests including mass hunger strikes in 147 Kurdish 
associations all over the world, public demonstrations, and marches to 
embassies in many European cities. Seventy-four people set themselves 
on f ire to protest assaults on Öcalan, indicating how he acquired an 
unprecedented role in contemporary Kurdish politics. Sixteen of them 
burned to death.1
Although suicide attacks by PKK members were not a new means of 
political protest, organization of self-immolation campaigns was a novel 
ethno-nationalist tactic.2 The majority of the self-immolation protests were 
conducted by pro-Kurdish political prisoners in Turkey; however, a consider-
able number of everyday activists also joined the campaign at this time, 
including an eleven-year-old Kurdish girl in Iran and a f ifty-six-year-old 
housewife from Istanbul.3
Context matters to strategic choices. Political institutions and discursive 
contexts play signif icant roles in shaping the dynamic interaction between 
players and arenas. Activists interpret their environs and larger political 
milieu and shape their strategies accordingly. As Jack Goldstone notes, 
“Much of the dynamism behind social changes comes from the constant 
tension in social life between individual innovation and socially-imposed 
convention.” We should not mistake, however, structural conventions as 
explanans of ethnic activists’ behavior; instead, we need “to constantly be 
alert to the possibilities of innovation within and against convention, even 
while granting conventions and institutions their role as the baseline set of 
1 Total number also includes pre-capture period when the PKK leader was on the loose. 
The PKK’s self-immolation campaign was launched after Öcalan’s interview with Med-TV on 
October 19, 1998, where the PKK leader condemned “great international conspiracy” against 
him. For the complete list of self-immolations, see Özcan 2006: 279.
2 There was also a PKK campaign of suicide attacks to protest Öcalan’s capture. In a few 
months, seven suicide attacks occurred, leaving four people killed and seventy wounded. For 
detailed accounts of these attacks, see University of Chicago’s Project on Security and Terrorism 
database, http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/search_new.php
3 Özcan 2006: 12.
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expectations, practices, and understandings in which action is embedded.”4 
Social action, said Pierre Bourdieu, is “saturated with history.”5
Such a relational approach would move from “causes” to “events” in 
reading the critical junctures in social mobilization.6 I argue that the trans-
formation of ethnic conflict in Turkey needs to be studied as an outcome 
of social movement competition as well as exogenous shocks. The culture 
of social movement rivalry does not emerge in a vacuum.
What follows is a quick overview of the Turkish political environment 
during the past decade. Four critical events constituted major exogenous 
shocks: (a) The arrest of the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan, (b) the initiation 
of the talks between Turkey and the European Union for membership 
prospects, (c) the war on international terror after the 9/11 attacks in the 
US, and as a consequence, the establishment of Iraqi Kurdistan as a semi-
independent state, and (d) the electoral victory of the AKP and introduction 
of reforms on the Kurdish issue. These exogenous shocks have dramatically 
shaped the context for social movement competition in the Southeast.
Abdullah Öcalan: The Role of the PKK Leader in Shaping Kurdish 
Politics
The arrest of the PKK leader came as a shock to Kurdish ethno-nationalists. 
Internal disputes among the guerilla f ighters led some PKK members to 
quit the movement.7 The PKK was quick in declaring a ceasef ire unilater-
ally. Nonetheless, Öcalan’s appeal has continued to be strong in the PKK 
movement.
The ethno-nationalists have long revered Öcalan, calling him institu-
tional terms such as Önderlik, i.e. “leadership” of the party, with an implica-
tion that he is something more than a mere human being. Conducted a 
year after his arrest, Ali Kemal Özcan’s survey indicated that Öcalan was 
still perceived as the main reason for collective success. Among 185 PKK 
4 Goldstone 2010: 366.
5 Bourdieu 1993: 74.
6 An event may be regarded as an “exogenous shock” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 206) or as 
“a product of the endogenous incoherence of an aggregation or assemblage of multiple orders” 
(Clemens 2007: 542). In any case, the focus on events is useful in understanding ethnic conflict 
transformation because it rests on an increasing consensus among historical sociologists to 
consider “episodes rather than systems” (Clemens 2007: 542) as the primary unit of analysis. 
On “causes” and “events” from a theoretical perspective, see Sewell 1992; Abbott 2001.
7 For details, see Marcus 2007: 288.
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members who were asked what the most fundamental cause of the PKK’s 
success was, ninety-three responded “the leader.”8
The charismatic quality of Abdullah Öcalan convinced the Turkish 
state authorities to benefit from his influence instead of applying a capital 
punishment.9 High military officials including representatives of the chief of 
the General Staff visited him in İmralı Prison, which was established solely 
for Öcalan on a small island (Island of İmralı) in the Marmara Sea. The 
interrogation process was actually a negotiation. The PKK leader persuaded 
the authorities that he could be useful in communicating with the guerillas 
in the mountains. For Öcalan, the aim of the PKK would not be to form an 
independent Kurdistan; instead, a “democratic Republic” that recognizes 
Kurdish cultural rights would be a path to pursue in satisfying the PKK 
rebels. He called this vision “democratic Republic thesis.” After internal 
discussion within the Turkish state apparatus, the off icials asked if he 
could convince the PKK f ighters to believe in his new vision despite the 
fact that he was captured. “They will be with me,” Öcalan answered without 
hesitating.10
8 Other responses include ideology (19.5%), discipline (10.3%), armed struggle (7.6%), and 
lifestyle (4.3%). See, Özcan 2006: 263.
9 Marcus 2007: 283.
10 Kapmaz 2011: 18-20.
Figure 3.1  Image of the PKK’s jailed leader Abdullah Öcalan at a public rally
Photo by the author, diyarbakır, July 15, 2009
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Öcalan’s remaining influence paved the way for stronger – but non-violent 
– pro-Kurdish activism in the political realm. By encouraging legal political 
activism, Öcalan developed direct channels with the pro-Kurdish party 
off icials. He has also continued to be the idol of the revolutionary cause for 
the PKK guerilla f ighters. Thus, as the pro-Kurdish party has successfully 
advanced and gained Kurdish votes in the past decade, Öcalan’s “arbiter” 
role in the larger pro-Kurdish movement has been deeply engrained.
Öcalan articulated the “democratic Republic thesis” in his prison writings. 
Öcalan’s talks from his cell were regularly recorded by his lawyers and 
widely shared among the Kurdish constituency, popularly called Görüşme 
Notları, i.e. the Meeting Notes. Expecting strategic outcomes, the Turkish 
authorities have allowed Öcalan to communicate in various ways that could 
reach the Kurdish grassroots.11 Öcalan’s thesis of “democratic Republic” was 
crystallized after the pro-Islamic AKP came to power in 2002. The Turkish 
military was highly concerned about the AKP’s Islamic roots, and Öcalan 
played the secularism card to get the sympathy of the secularist elite. In the 
sections to follow, I examine the rapid transformation in the Kurdish ethno-
nationalist discourse as well as its repercussions within the movement.
Seeking Alliance with the Turkish Secularist Elite
As a movement that has deep Marxist roots, the PKK never capitalized on 
its secularist identity to f ind common ground with the Turkish State until 
the AKP came to power and started to implement pro-Kurdish reforms 
(2002-2004). Led by Abdullah Öcalan, the PKK has revisited its stance 
against the off icial secularist ideology – known as Kemalism due to its 
roots in the thought of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of the modern 
Turkish Republic. In the traditional PKK discourse, Atatürk (which literally 
means “the father of Turks”) was an “opportunist” tyrant, and the Kemalist 
ideology was the basis of “proto-fascist dictatorship” and “wild, Hitlerian, 
and fascist administration.”12 With Öcalan’s suggestion of the “democratic 
Republic,” however, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk is radically reinterpreted.
In his recent writings, Öcalan consistently refers to him as Mustafa Kemal 
instead of Atatürk, i.e. “Father of Turks,” which holds negative connota-
tions for Kurds. Öcalan praised Mustafa Kemal Atatürk for his vision of a 
democratic Republic very early on:
11 The PKK-aff iliated online platforms such as http://www.rojaciwan.com/ and http://www.
f iratnews.com/ provide the Meeting Notes in full version. Öcalan fully articulated the demo-
cratic Republic thesis in his books. See Öcalan 2003, 2007.
12 Öcalan 1999.
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Mustafa Kemal had his own way of seeking independence because he 
regarded both republicanism and democracy as essential … Mustafa 
Kemal was Robespierrian. Robespierre was a democratic republican who 
tried to establish the (French) Republic. Robespierre was a Jacobin and a 
French bourgeoisie democrat … Similarly to Robespierre, Mustafa Kemal 
was trying to establish and defend the Republic; yet, he was surrounded 
by his personnel who were linked to the British. These people, after 
making him ineffective, created a political theology that killed Mustafa 
Kemal’s spirit about the year 1924 … Indeed, both Mustafa Kemal and 
Robespierre were working to found a democratic republic. Mustafa Kemal 
was not allowed to give life to his republican views.13
By portraying Mustafa Kemal as Robespierrian, Öcalan salutes the Turkish 
secularist elite. Defending the French model of secularism, laïcité, Turkey’s 
Kemalists are presenting themselves as especially sympathetic to French 
revolutionaries.
Öcalan’s effort to reinterpret Mustafa Kemal was supported by pro-
Kurdish party off icials’ frequent secularist statements. For instance, 
prominent DTP deputy Hasip Kaplan declared:
Everyone should know the following very well: In the case of our absence, 
Sharia (Islamic Law) would dominate in the Southeast. We are those 
who are the real guardians of laicism! Our discourse of secularism is in 
tandem with the secularist discourse of the Turkish Armed Forces. In 
terms of laicism, the DTP plays a role of guarantor in East and Southeast 
Turkey. If the DTP is closed or it becomes inactivate, religious radicalism 
would spread in the region.14
The PKK commander Murat Karayılan agreed: “Although overthrowing 
the PKK is impossible, let’s say the PKK was defeated and f inished. Do 
you know what happens to the region? The Southeast becomes the center 
of religious radicalism.” Karayılan singled out two groups as evidence of 
radical religious tendencies: Hizbullah and the Gülen movement.15 The 
PKK’s strategic secular identity deployment aimed to build legitimacy in 
the eyes of the Turkish secular bureaucratic elite who have strong concerns 
13 Öcalan 2009b. Also see, Öcalan 2009a.
14 Yeni Aktüel 2007. 
15 Cemal 2009.
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about the pro-Islamic party in power (AKP) and other Islamic movements, 
primarily the Gülen movement and Hizbullah.
Building Legitimacy in the Broader Public
The PKK’s changing discourse drew criticism from Kurdish ethno-nation-
alists. Some PKK members accused Abdullah Öcalan of selling out to the 
state elite in order to save himself.16 Some critics have left the movement 
and formed alternative online platforms such as Nasname and Kurdistan 
Aktüel.17 In these virtual platforms, one could f ind intellectual criticisms of 
the PKK and its leader Abdullah Öcalan from various Marxist and social-
ist perspectives. Interviews with İsmail Beşikçi and other independent 
radical leftists are frequently featured. Authors strongly criticize the PKK’s 
renunciation of independent Kurdistan.18
In May 2004, Osman Öcalan, the brother of the PKK leader, and a group of 
high-ranking commanders left the PKK and formed an organization called 
Partiya Welatparêzên Demokrat (PWD). The PWD harshly criticized the 
PKK’s blind submission to its captive leader and the authoritarian culture 
within the movement.19 The split within the movement, however, was not 
devastating. The PKK and the Kurdish political parties united strongly 
around the leadership of Abdullah Öcalan. In order to save its organizational 
strength and reputation, the PKK reemployed arms against the Turkish State 
in June 2004. At the same time, the PKK remained faithful to Öcalan’s 
“democratic Republic” discourse, signaling that a separate Kurdish state 
may not be the ultimate goal if the Turkish State is open to negotiations.
The growing success of pro-Kurdish political parties in local elections 
helped to sustain the two-fold strategy of the ethno-nationalist movement: 
16 Marcus 2007: 286-91.
17 See www.nasname.com and www.kurdistan-aktuel.org. These online platforms publish 
articles in both Turkish and Kurdish. 
18 See, for example, Demircan 2009. For an analysis of Beşikçi’s remarkable works, see Van 
Bruinessen 2005. İsmail Beşikçi’s views on self-determination and an independent Kurdish 
state are widely circulated as well as his criticism of the PKK leader. “Abdullah Öcalan,” remarks 
Beşikçi, “recently said that ‘I am a free individual, and therefore, I oppose the nature of the state 
as an institution since the state as a construct is a means of oppression.’ He also says that ‘I have 
nothing to do establishing a state’ … Although Öcalan often repeats his opposition to the state 
as an institution; he never had a word against a real, materialized state that oppresses Kurds 
each moment every single day … It seems that Öcalan has no problem with the Turkish, Arab, 
and Iranian states. He only does not want Kurds having their own state, which is the very policy 
of Turkey, Iran, Iraq, and Syria.” See, http://www.nasname.com/tr/4638.html, Accessed April 9, 
2011. 
19 Tezcür 2010b: 781.
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on the one hand, the PKK employed arms against the authorities; on the 
other hand, pro-Kurdish political parties have increasingly become involved 
in non-violent civil society activism, further penetrating to the Kurdish 
grassroots. Gradually gaining control of many municipalities in Kurdish 
provinces and towns, Kurdish ethno-nationalists mobilized more resources 
and formed an imaginary “as-if Kurdistan.”20
The EU Factor: Turkey’s Membership Process and De-
Securitization
Turkey’s recognition as a candidate country for the European Union at 
the Helsinki summit in December 1999 ushered in a new era of Turkish-
European relations. The Helsinki decision gave Turkey a serious prospect 
for the f irst time. Earlier, the EU’s previous welcoming of Eastern European 
countries and its apparent reluctant approach to Turkey’s long-standing bid 
alienated many Turks who support the westward orientation of the country. 
Many believed that Europe is an ethno-religious club that will never accept 
a predominantly Muslim country. Although the Helsinki summit did not 
confer any special right to Turkey, it gave the most serious hope for full 
membership. Accordingly, Turkey has undertaken signif icant reforms to 
harmonize its policies to meet the EU criteria.21
The EU membership process led to a paradigm shift in public discourses 
on the Kurdish issue. One of the essential measures for joining the EU was 
the protection of minority rights, specif ically in reference to Kurds in the 
country. According to the Turkish off icial view, however, Kurds were not a 
minority in Turkey; instead, all ethnic groups including Kurds are entitled 
to the same rights based on Turkish citizenship. The EU process empowered 
pro-Kurdish voices to challenge the State and provided both political and 
discursive opportunities for changes in institutional practices. Between 2001 
and 2004, several EU harmonization packages were introduced, gradually 
diminishing the Turkish military’s monopoly in defining the Kurdish issue.22
Table 3.1 presents constitutional and legislative changes regarding 
Kurdish cultural rights in Turkey. In October 2001, the Turkish Parliament 
accepted the f irst constitutional change package that amended thirty-
four articles including the third paragraph of Article 26, which asserted 
20 Watts 2010: 143.
21 Kirişci 2011: 335.
22 Balcı 2008: 100-105.
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that “no language prohibited by law shall be used in the expression and 
dissemination of thought,” and the second paragraph of Article 28, which 
stated that “publication shall not be made in any language prohibited by 
law” were abolished.23
The constitutional changes were followed by several “harmonizing pack-
ages” in order to adopt new laws, bylaws, and administrative ordinances 
in line with the European Union requirements. Thus, the ban on the use 
of Kurdish in speech, publication, and broadcasting ended.24 In addition 
23 Sarigil 2007: 184.
24 These initial reforms, however, were restrictive. For example, private TV and radio stations 
were not allowed to broadcast in Kurdish as late as December 2005; and also, these private 
channels were allowed only forty-f ive minutes a day of Kurdish broadcasting. These restrictions 
Table 3.1  Constitutional and legislative reforms regarding Kurdish cultural rights
Type Title Date Reform
Constitutional october 2001 The ban on using languages 
and dialects (other than Turk-
ish) in disseminating thoughts 
(in daily life) was removed
Constitutional october 2001 The statement that “publica-
tion shall not be made in any 
language prohibited by law” 
was removed
Legislative 2nd harmonizing 
Package
March 2002 Restrictions on the use of 
Kurdish in the press were 
removed
Legislative 3rd harmonizing 
Package
august 2002 Radio and television broad-
casts (public and private) in 
Kurdish were legalized and 
the establishment of Kurdish 
private language courses was 
allowed 
Legislative 4th harmonizing 
Package
January 2003 associations can use 
foreign languages (including 
Kurdish) in their non-official 
correspondence 
Legislative 6th harmonizing 
Package
June 2003 The civil Registry law was 
amended to permit parents 
to name their children as 
they desire (including Kurdish 
names)
adapted from sarigil 2007: 184-85
exogenous shocKs on The eve of The MillenniuM 57
to reforms in cultural rights, the EU membership reforms included the 
abolition of the state security courts, reforms to ensure civilian control over 
the National Security Council, the abolition of the death penalty, and most 
importantly, the eradication of the Emergency Rule Law in the Southeast.25
The lifting of the Emergency Rule Law deserves particular attention in 
order to grasp recent changes in Kurdish politics. After the military coup 
in 1980, majority of Kurdish cities were governed under martial law. The 
martial law was lifted in July 1987; however, soon after, the Turkish State 
authorities declared Olağanüstü Hal (OHAL), Emergency Rule Law, as a 
reaction to the rise of the PKK. At its peak in the mid-1990s, OHAL was in 
effect in thirteen provinces (Figure 3.2).
Thus, not off icially but practically, Kurdish-populated provinces were 
separated from other provinces in Turkey. Granted extraordinary powers, a 
regional governor ruled the entire OHAL region from his post in Diyarbakır. 
The governor could (a) evacuate and resettle civilian areas in the interests of 
the region’s security, (b) detain suspects without charge for up to ten days, 
(c) prohibit publications deemed to be provocative, (d) empower security 
authorities to search homes and party off ices without a warrant, and (e) 
restrict public meetings.26 Despite being lifted in some provinces in the late 
were eliminated after the formation of the TRT Şeş, the off icial Kurdish TV channel, in 2009. 
Likewise, teaching Kurdish in universities remained illegal until early 2009.
25 Watts 2010: 88-89.
26 See, Jacoby 2005: 649; Barkey and Fuller 1998: 134; Watts 2010: 89.
Figure 3.2  OHAL, Emergency Rule Law, region (1987-2002). The provinces that 
were highly securitized are colored dark.
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1990s, the OHAL regime remained in effect in Southeastern provinces of 
Diyarbakır, Şırnak, Hakkari, and Tunceli until 2002.
The total eradication of the OHAL ushered in a new era in the South-
east in which “autocratic militarism” had been in effect for more than 
two decades. De-securitization has opened up new civil spaces wherein 
various social movements operate and through which diverse cultural 
ref lections of Kurdish-ness could emerge, especially in urban centers 
such as Diyarbakır. Examples of emerging cultural spaces for expressing 
Kurdish identity include dengbêj (traditional male singers reciting Kurdish 
poems) performances, newroz (Kurdish new year) celebrations, Kurdish 
f ilm festivals, f ine art houses, youth centers, women’s fraternity clubs, and 
Kurdish language schools.
Changing International Political Environment
The EU-led reforms coincided with a major change in the international 
context – the 9/11 attacks and subsequent invasion of Iraq by American 
forces. In the post-September 11 world, PKK guerillas felt vulnerable due 
to increasing cooperation between the US and Turkey on international 
terrorism. The PKK rebels’ claim to be Kurdish freedom f ighters fell on 
deaf ears as Western nations increasingly became less tolerant of armed 
struggle which is widely denounced as ‘terrorism.’
Grasping the new reality, the PKK adopted a new organizational name, 
KADEK, in April 2002. Yet, the KADEK was also listed as a terrorist organiza-
tion soon after its formation. As a result, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists 
decided to dissolve the KADEK in order to establish a broader platform 
that would emphasize civil society activism in urban spaces. In their press 
release, KADEK leaders stated:
The substantial democratic openings expressed in the organization’s 
program were only inadequately ref lected in its inner structure; the 
personal continuity in the upper echelons fueled spitefully dismissive 
notions that the KADEK was a mere continuation of the PKK. This, in 
turn, tainted international overtures and negatively affected the democ-
ratization process envisaged … It is on these grounds that the Congress 
for Democracy and Freedom in Kurdistan (KADEK) is being dissolved in 
order to make way for a new, more democratic organizational structure 
that allows for broader participation. This new structure shall be repre-
sentative of the Kurdish people’s interests, legitimate under international 
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criteria, and conducive to the pursuit of democratic and lawful political 
articulation with a view to negotiating a peaceful settlement with the 
dominant nation states.27
The final outcome was the formation of Kongra-Gel, the People’s Democracy 
Congress, in November 2003.
The PKK’s aforementioned strategies to employ a democracy/human-
rights centered discourse enabled non-violent elements in the pro-Kurdish 
movement to increasingly gain power at the expense of the armed wing. 
An unprecedented contention occurred on the eve of the local elections in 
2004, when the PKK leadership and the pro-Kurdish DEHAP party leader-
ship had a dispute over the candidacy of the outgoing pro-Kurdish mayor 
of Diyarbakır, Feridun Çelik, who maintained that he would run as an 
independent against the wishes of the party.28 Although the PKK leadership 
initially supported Feridun Çelik, DEHAP’s administration chose a human 
rights activist, Osman Baydemir, as its candidate, and soon after, Çelik 
withdrew his candidacy.29
Another signif icant global factor that shaped the PKK’s policies was 
the formation of the Kurdish Regional Government (KRG) in northern 
Iraq due to the American invasion of Iraq and subsequent support by the 
US authorities. The KRG has operated as a “quasi-state” in the region and 
pursued a strategy of cooperation with regional governments in the Middle 
East in order to assure “external patronage, international recognition, and 
open borders” instead of defending pan-Kurdish nationalism.30 Thus, under 
pressure from regional states as well as Iraqi authorities in Baghdad, the 
KRG took severe measures by closing PKK-aff iliated off ices in the cities, 
blockading routes to the Qandil Mountains where the PKK is based, and 
adopting a public position against PKK activities.
Considering the fact that Northern Iraq had been a strategic landscape 
to house PKK f ighters, these developments were worrisome for the PKK 
leadership. At the same time, having a relatively independent new Kurdish 
homeland in Iraq has strengthened pro-Kurdish party activism through 
reinforcing the Kurdish ethno-nationalist imagination in Turkey: Iraqi 
Kurdish artists, musicians, and intellectuals are often invited to organize 
27 Quoted in Romano 2006: 181.
28 Watts 2010: 88.
29 Demir 2005: 527-28.
30 Natali 2010: 122.
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fairs, art exhibitions, workshops, and panel discussions.31 In essence, on 
the one hand, the formation of a Kurdish quasi-state introduced further 
challenges to PKK guerillas f ighting against the Turkish State while on 
the other hand, it had a positive impact on pro-Kurdish political activism. 
The transnational context, thus, has strongly favored the Kurdish ethno-
nationalist movement’s non-violent elements.
The Rise of the AKP: Radical Shifts in Turkish Politics
One of the major factors that enabled the EU membership reforms was the 
increasing success of the pro-Islamic party, the AKP. After coming to power 
in the general elections of 2002, the AKP tried to consolidate its position 
against the Turkish secularist military elite who regarded Islamism as the 
most dangerous enemy against the state regime. As a party that has roots in 
political Islamism, the AKP government was met with concerns in domestic 
and international contexts. The AKP needed to show its “sincerity” about 
pro-western democracy to gain political legitimacy, primarily from the USA 
and European powers. Therefore, the European Union reform packages were 
a golden chance for the AKP government. The AKP strongly supported the 
democratization reforms, which weakened the secularist military elite and 
provided international support for its rule.
As presented earlier (Table 3.1), almost all key pro-Kurdish reforms took 
place between the years 2002 and 2004 when the AKP government was 
in power. The AKP’s policies paid off well in the general elections in 2007 
(Figures 3.3 and 3.4). The pro-Islamic party outperformed the pro-Kurdish 
DTP in Kurdish-populated provinces, winning about 44% of the total vote 
versus the DTP’s 38%.
As Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.4 indicate, while the AKP has dramatically 
increased its vote in every single Kurdish province, the pro-Kurdish party 
(DEHAP in 2002, DTP in 2007) has lost votes in many provinces including 
key provinces such as Diyarbakır and Van.32
Thus, the AKP’s Islamic discourse, with its commitment to the EU de-
mocratization process, appeared to resonate with the Kurdish public – a 
31 Watts 2010: 173.
32 Data on elections in Turkey between 1954 and 2007 is available at www.belgenet.net. In 
the Tables, 2002 election results in Siirt province reflect the f irst election, which was cancelled 
later. Since the pro-Kurdish DEHAP party did not participate in the second election in 2003, I 
consider that the f irst election would provide a way to compare the AKP and the pro-Kurdish 
parties.
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predominantly religious polity. The 2007 election defeat has become a turn-
ing point for Kurdish ethno-nationalists in transforming their traditionally 
bitter relations with the local culture of Kurds. They have gradually become 
strong actors in def ining “Kurdish Islam.”
Moreover, as described in the previous chapter, the Gülen/Hizmet activ-
ists have become highly visible in the Kurdish public sphere and have gained 
influence with the grassroots, especially after the pro-Kurdish reform pe-
riod (2002-2004). Since the Gülen movement does not have its own political 
party, its grassroots influence among Kurds was translated into pro-AKP 
votes. Given the fact that both the AKP and Hizmet have Turkish-Islamic 
roots, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists perceived them as one joint camp 
that works against their movement.33 This perception was widely shared 
33 Olson 2009: 61.
Figure 3.3  The AKP’s comparative performance in Kurdish provinces (the general 
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until the AKP government declared open war against Hizmet after the 
corruption scandal in December 2013. The ethno-nationalists claimed that 
the AKP and the Gülen movement are puppets of American imperialism 
to transform the Middle East. For the PKK commander Murat Karayılan,
Fethullahists [i.e. Fethullah Gülen movement supporters] are trying to 
settle into the state hierarchy; this is why they have become close to the 
Justice and Development Party (AKP). They have gained power. They 
are getting support from the United States as well. The USA puts forth 
the Fethullahists to the Muslim World … They say ‘We are also against 
the PKK; we’re also pro-state,’ and therefore, they inf iltrate the state … 
They’re (widespread) among the AKP supporters.34
34 Cemal 2009.
Figure 3.4  The pro-Kurdish party’s comparative performance in Kurdish provinces 
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In the same interview, Karayılan accuses Hizbullah of being co-opted by 
Iran and working to eliminate the pro-Kurdish movement.
The next chapter provides a closer look at the changing dynamics at 
the local grassroots level and describes how these rival movements have 
engaged in civil society activism.
Table 3.2  Historical timeline of the social movement competition process 
(analyzed in the forthcoming chapters)
Years
1978 The establishment of the Kurdistan Workers’ Party, PKK
1979 The establishment of hizbullah
1980 The military coup d’état and the implementation of martial law 
1984 The beginning of PKK attacks on Turkish authorities
1987 institutionalization of the emergency Rule law (ohal) 
1988
1991-1996
The establishment of private hizmet prep schools in the region
years of bloody conflict between the PKK and hizbullah
1996 The establishment of private hizmet high schools in diyarbakır
1999 The capture of abdullah Öcalan, the PKK leader
1999 start of Turkey’s eu negotiation talks 
2000 Police operation against hizbullah and killing of hüseyin velioğlu, the 
hizbullah leader
2002-2004 democratic reforms passed by the pro-islamic aKP
2004 Beginning of the gülen movement’s charity organization activities 
2004 The establishment of Mustazaf-Der, hizbullah’s charity organization
2004 Public circulation of written publications of hizbullah for the first time 
2005 hizmet activists’ opening of reading center chains for poor students in 
slums 
2006 The mass public demonstration to protest ‘the danish cartoons’ organized 
by hizbullah 
2006 The establishment of sarmaşık, the Kurdish ethno-nationalist charity 
organization 
2007 The ethno-nationalists’ founding of diaydeR, Kurdish imams’ association
2007 The electoral victory of the pro-islamic aKP
2008 Women’s honor campaign, organized by ethno-nationalists
2008 founding of Doğru Haber, hizbullah’s weekly newspaper
2009 The aKP government’s secret meetings with PKK leaders, known as the oslo 
Process
2009 The aKP’s declaration of “democratic opening,” popularly called “Kurdish 
opening”
2009 utilization of said nursi figures in ethno-nationalist rallies
2009 Mass public rally to protest israel’s attack on the gaza strip organized by 
hizbullah
2011 The beginning of the ethno-nationalists’ civil friday Prayers campaign 
2012 The closure of Mustazaf-der, hizbullah’s charity organization
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Years
2013 The establishment of hÜda-PaR, legal political party of hizbullah
2013 newroz declaration by the PKK and beginning of a long ceasefire, known as 
“Peace Process”
2013 The eruption of the corruption scandal and beginning of the aKP-gülen rift
2014 Mass Kobane protests and violent engagement between PKK and hizbullah 
militants
2015 Joint declaration of aKP and pro-Kurdish hdP calling the PKK’s farewell to 
arms
2015 invigoration of violence after hdP’s electoral victory (and aKP’s defeat) in 
general elections, signaling the end of the Peace Process
4 Civic Competition and Conflict 
Transformation
To explain social action is akin to explaining why a grand master allowed a 
knight to exchange for a pawn (in a chess game), as opposed to considering this 
an error on the order of 3 – 1 = 2 (the difference in points between the two). We 
cannot say in advance how far we must go in our quest to determine the context 
that led to this move, but this indeterminacy is simply the minimal f lexibility 
required to understand complexity.
– John Levi Martin
A quick glimpse at the numbers shows that there has been a de-escalation 
of ethnic conflict in Turkey. The number of off icially called “terrorist” 
attacks has dramatically decreased in the past decade (Figure 4.1). The 
PKK f ighters killed or captured by Turkish security forces are now far 
fewer when we compare the current numbers with the ones in the 1990s 
(Figure 4.2). Similarly, civilian deaths and fatalities of security forces have 
become limited (Figure 4.3). These f igures highlight (a) a dramatic decrease 
of ethnic violence in the early 2000s (b) a revival of violent contention after 
2004, primarily due to rearmament of the PKK in 2004, and (c) a controlled 
ethnic violence in the recent past decade, f luctuating but never as deadly 
as it was previously in the 1990s.
An organizational perspective may be useful to explain the PKK’s 
radicalization after the EU-led reforms (2002-2004) in Turkey. Why did the 
PKK start to attack the Turkish State – breaking the long truce declared 
in 1999 – at a time when the Turkish State had taken the most promising 
democratic steps in its modern history? After all, is not democratization “the 
coff in of revolutionary movements”?1 In his insightful study, Güneş Tezcür 
explains the PKK’s radicalization by pointing out the PKK’s increasing 
organizational concerns after the reform period. The PKK is the leading 
organization of the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement; and yet, as an 
armed guerilla organization, the PKK has private organizational interests 
and goals. These interests and goals may not f it the larger movement’s 
priorities in the long term. Tezcür rightly notes that the AKP’s growing 
1 Goodwin and Skocpol 1989: 495.
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Figure 4.2  The number of PKK fighters killed or captured by Turkish security 
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appeal within the Kurdish constituency has caused fear and reaction in 
revolutionary circles.2
The organizational perspective, however, remains limited in its un-
derstanding of competition because it specif ically focuses on electoral 
competition. If we miss the larger picture of competition in Kurdish civil 
society, we may not grasp the third pattern above, the controlled ethnic 
violence in the past decade. How did the ethnic violence in Turkey turn into 
a controlled violence? Despite not being resolved, the conflict has appeared 
transformed, and the pro-Kurdish activists have become moderate in their 
tone. Why did this change happen?
In explaining the conflict transformation in Turkey, I follow Andrew 
Abbott’s perspective as he reminds us that “interactional f ields” lie “at the 
heart of sociology.”
What we should require of explanation is that it gives us an account 
of how such interactional f ields work. This account will not be purely 
causal. For nearly all of these literatures give a large place to free action, 
often to strategic choice in particular. Second, it will include temporal 
2 Tezcür 2010b: 775.










































sources: The general staff of the Republic of Turkey; the general directorate of security; 2009 
annual Report of the Turkish armed forces’ gendarmerie commandership. Post-2009 figures are 
gathered from the Kurdish insurgency violent events dataset, presented in Tezcur 2013: 70
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effects of many sizes, for in each of these areas a past of many depths 
shapes the present. Third, it will also include a complex understanding 
of social structure, for that too pervades interactional f ields at many 
scales … [Such works] don’t predict what will happen, indeed they 
suggest that interactional f ields are probably too complex for us to 
predict. But they do show various internal patterns; they do sketch 
‘rules of the game;’ they do portray the limits and possibilities of action 
in such systems.3
Thus, I focus on the interactional f ields in which pro-ethnic and pro-Islamic 
Kurdish activists are actively involved, constructing “social movement 
competition.”
Ethno-religious conflicts are often seen as intractable conflicts in which 
contention leads to “constant production of new causes.”4 Scholars suggest 
that the parties involved in an intractable conflict should f ind new ways 
of thinking, framing, and constructing the “other” in order to stop the vi-
cious circle.5 In the words of a leading expert, conflict transformation is 
a mode “to envision and respond to the ebb and flow of social conflict as 
life-giving opportunities for creating constructive change processes that 
reduce violence, increase justice in direct interaction and social structures, 
and respond to real-life problems in human relationships.”6 In this sense, 
conflict transformation is a socially constructed endeavor. Instead of a call 
for full stop in ethnic and religious conflicts, it is an effort to channel what 
Johan Galtung calls “positive conflict energy” to transform social relations.7 
Social movement activists may become agents in channeling conflict energy 
to the civic sphere.
In the past decade, competitor movements have mobilized to shape 
Kurdish civil society through publications, public lectures, communica-
tive civil initiatives, and more importantly, civic organizations. As they 
engage with these new endeavors in a changing political context, they have 
generated and reproduced social norms that regulate their competition. 
These ‘rules of the game’ have been constitutive of the emerging f ields of 
competition.
3 Abbott 2001: 124.
4 Agnew 1989: 51-52
5 Boudreau and Polkinghorn 2008: 175. See, also, Lederach 2003; Kriesberg 2007; Ryan 2007.
6 Lederach 2003: 14.
7 Galtung 1995: 51.
civic coMPeTiTion and conflic T TRansfoRMaTion 69
Emerging Arenas of Competition in the Kurdish Civic Sphere
For Turkey’s Kurds, the post-martial law era has been an era of non-gov-
ernmental organizations (NGOs): civic associations, charity organizations, 
reading centers for youth, health service organizations for the poor, women’s 
neighborhood clubs, educational institutes, and Kurdish language study 
circles. It is hardly a secret that the majority of these undertakings are 
competitor social movement ventures that have been established in recent 
years – especially after 2004, the year the EU-induced reforms were realized. 
Therefore, rival movement activists have started to challenge each other 
through Kurdish civil society activism.
Legal changes in accordance with the EU membership regulations have 
encouraged building NGOs in the region. Until 2003, the associations were 
under scrutiny by the General Headquarters of the Police Department. 
Figure 4.4 indicates how police raids and off icial bans on NGOs, political 
associations, and publishers were very common before the EU membership 
process.
New regulations have not only made the governorships in each city build 
their own departments to oversee associations, but they also simplify the 
paperwork process. This democratic step enabled many Kurdish political 
activists to actively contribute to associations since the off icial security 
check requirement was repealed.
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Figure 4.5  Pace of establishing associations in Diyarbakır, 1935-2010. Numbers 
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Figure 4.6  Pace of establishing associations in Diyarbakır, 2001-2010. Numbers 
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In order to fully comprehend the impact of the recent changes, we need 
to place the associations in Turkey’s historical, political, and legal context. 
The introduction of a multiparty system in the 1950s and the modif ication 
of laws regarding associations in 1972 had a positive impact on the growth of 
associations in the nation including Diyarbakır, the largest city in the South-
east.8 Figure 4.5 indicates a sharp decline after 1980, when the military coup 
took place. The laws of October 7 1983 that regulate associations (known as 
Dernekler Kanunu) were particularly restrictive. Under the emergency state 
and martial law conditions, the establishment of associations was subject to 
approval by military authorities. Due to the OHAL (Martial Law Conditions) 
zones in most Kurdish cities during the 1980s and 1990s, associations in 
the Southeast were under heavy State surveillance until the EU-induced 
regulations were implemented. The formation of associations skyrocketed 
in the post-martial law era – which ended in 2002 in Diyarbakır – especially 
after the European Union membership reforms were enacted (2002-2004). 
The number of civic associations in Diyarbakır increased rapidly, reaching 
714 in 2010. Through civic associations, the major rival movements in the 
Southeast started to transform Kurdish civil society.
Arenas of Competition and Strategy-Making
Scholars define contentious spaces for activism in a number of ways includ-
ing “arenas,”“conflict arenas,” and “strategic action f ields.”9 In James Jasper’s 
description, “Arenas are sets of resources and rules that channel contention 
into certain kinds of actions and offer rewards and outcomes.”10 To put 
it simply, social movement activists are encouraged, through formal or 
informal ways, to be involved in certain types of actions such as build-
ing charity organizations, helping local communities, utilizing religious 
symbols, and appealing to scientif ic authorities.
Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam highlight how these arenas of com-
petition are socially constructed through activists’ engagements with 
one another: “One can conceive of emerging f ields as a social space where 
rules do not yet exist, but where actors, by virtue of emerging, dependent 
8 In 1950, there were about 2,000 associations in Turkey; the number reached 45,000 in 1972. 
See Toksöz 1983: 377; Hersant and Toumarkine 2005.
9 For these terms see respectively, Jasper 2004; McAdam 1982: 65-116; Fligstein and McAdam 
2011.
10 Jasper 2004: 5.
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interests, are being forced increasingly to take one another into account 
in their actions.”11
As perceptive agents, activists are well aware of the emerging arenas for 
competition, and accordingly, make strategic moves. In Jasper’s account,
Protestors may launch action within a certain arena (the media or courts, 
for instance), but they also think about other possible arenas for future 
contestation. They ask themselves what new arenas their opponents can 
force them into, and what resources and skills they and other players 
control for maneuvering in those arenas.12
In a similar vein, “Once a movement enters a particular venue,” note David 
Meyer and Suzanne Staggenborg, “if there is a possibility of contest, an 
opposing movement is virtually forced to act in the same arena.”13
These important observations invite further questions: How do activists 
perceive the “possibility of contest”? What does “possibility” mean for them? 
In other words, how do rival activists decide if they can compete – or if 
they would like to compete at all – in particular arenas? I suggest three 
major factors that signif icantly influence Kurdish activists in deciding to 
become involved in a particular arena of competition: mobilizing resources, 
ideological boundaries, and activists’ phronesis.
11 Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 11. Fligstein and McAdam (2011: 3) defines strategic actions f ields 
as “a meso-level social order where actors (who can be individual or collective) interact with 
knowledge of one another under a set of common understandings about the purposes of the f ield, 
the relationships in the f ield (including who has power and why), and the f ield’s rules.” Inspired 
by Bourdieu, they rightly highlight that social actors are players developing inter-subjective 
understanding and “feel for the game” (Bourdieu 1990: 66): “if two or more organizations or 
groups are attempting to attain ends that are suff iciently similar that they are compelled to 
take one another’s actions into account in their behavior, then we can say that we are observ-
ing an attempt at f ield formation” (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 167). Fligstein and McAdam’s 
insightful account, however, suffers from some assumptions based on the polity model, or 
“incumbent versus challenger” approach. In their comprehensive review, Jack Goldstone and 
Bert Useem (2012) explain how the theory of strategic action f ields locates social actors in “the 
challenger-incumbent model of social relations” and why it is severely problematic. Fligstein 
and McAdam (2012: 167) concede that their approach to a f ield membership is a “narrower” 
one, diverting from a broader view embraced by Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992). The narrower 
approach views “f ields as composed of actors who are orienting themselves to each other but 
also a def ined set of policy goals”; therefore, they could be seen as “policy domain” (Fligstein 
and McAdam 2012: 167).
12 Jasper 2004: 5.
13 Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1649.
civic coMPeTiTion and conflic T TRansfoRMaTion 73
i) Resources: In order to compete in a particular arena, rivals f irst and 
foremost have to possess an adequate level of resources. Activists are not 
only in need of personnel, money, time, energy, and skills but symbolic 
resources such as reputation and prestige.14
ii) Ideology: Ideologies are “prescriptions or maps that tell the individual 
how to look at events and people,” and thus, they serve “both as a clue 
to understanding and as a guide to action, developing in the mind of its 
adherents an image of the process by which desired changes can best be 
achieved.”15 Activists who are committed to secular or religious belief 
systems construct certain boundaries that def ine their own action as 
legitimate or unacceptable. For example, the Kurdish ethno-nationalism’s 
historical development as a radical socialist movement and Hizbullah’s 
roots in Islamist philosophy shape each group’s decisions to invest in some 
arenas and avoid others.
iii) Phronesis: Another factor that shapes actors’ decision whether to 
become involved in an arena of competition is their “practical know-how.” 
Aristotle’s term phronesis, i.e. practical wisdom and everyday habits, is 
useful in understanding activists’ way of addressing social problems and 
challenges in a particular context.16 Phronesis refers to practical wisdom 
based on experience. Values, emotions, and everyday habits are part of 
everyday life experience of movement activists. Activists’ biographies are 
not only important for their recruitment processes in social movements 
but also for their protest lifestyle.
Inspired by Bourdieu’s notion of habitus, Nick Crossley suggested the 
term “activists’ habitus” to explain variations in “the taste for contention.”17 
As James Jasper explains,
Tactics are rarely, if ever, neutral means about which protestors do not care. 
Tactics represent important routines, emotionally and morally salient in 
14 For symbolic resources, see Benford and Zurcher 1990.
15 See, Turner and Killian 1972: 270. Wilson 1973: 91-92 respectively. Despite its signif icance, 
the role of ideology is neglected in recent social movement scholarship because of inconsistent 
and contradictory usage of the concept “ideology” among early scholars – what Pamela Oliver 
and Hank Johnston (2000: 42) called “the pejorative legacy of ideology.”
16 Jasper 1997: 244. Activists’ know-how might be conceptualized as “repertoire” (Tilly 1995) 
but Jasper (1997: 240) warns us to avoid the structuralist trap here: “Protestors do not simply 
apply existing repertoires; they innovate with them and deploy different combinations at 
different times. Repertoires, tactical choices within them, and strategic applications of tactics 
are affected by internal movement culture and individual biographies as well as by external 
opportunities and the moves made by other players.”
17 Crossley 2003: 51-52.
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these people’s lives. Just as their ideologies do, their activities express 
protestors’ political identities and moral visions. To participate in NRC 
hearings or to block traff ic in the street outside is to say different things 
about one’s personal identity, a movement’s identity, attitudes toward 
governmental authority, and much else.18
Structuralist accounts often reduce tactical tastes to structural position. 
Tastes in tactics, in fact, are deeply embedded in morality, emotion, and 
cognition.
Pro-Islamic Gülen/Hizmet movement activists in the Southeast, for 
example, do not want to present their organizations as pro-Islamic. De-
spite the fact that they perceive themselves as a pious religious movement, 
Hizmet participants avoid opening NGOs solely for religious purposes and 
refrain from organizing public rallies for Islamic causes. In his ethnographic 
study of Turkish-Islamic communities in Europe, Ahmet Yükleyen points 
out remarkable differences between the Gülen and the National Outlook 
movements regarding their taste in tactics. The National Outlook highly 
emphasizes visible pro-Islamic events, whereas Gülen activists often avoid 
Islamic symbolism in public.19
Moreover, forms of civic organization are closely tied to phronesis of 
Kurdish activists. “Organizations are a form of tactic,” argues Jasper, “reflect-
ing cognitive frames, moral tastes, and practical know-how.” Organizational 
forms and names reveal identities, worldviews, and know-how of activists.20
Resources, ideology, and phronesis together have shaped the competition 
processes in the Kurdish civic sphere: f irst, strategic resemblance through 
charity organizations; second, strategic distinction through niche activism 
in various f ields; and third, strategic subversion through symbolic contesta-
tion over local f igures and historical narratives.
Table 4.1 presents how rival movement activists challenge each other. 
The nature of competition is socially constructed through the interpretive 
processes of rivalry. Unlike opposing movements, rival movements develop 
specific norms that regulate their relationship. In arenas where competition 
is feasible, the rivals resemble one another through charity organizations; 
18 Jasper 1997: 237. Emphases in the original. Jasper (1997: 238) contends that framing literature 
has been successful in explaining cognitive aspects, but emotional and moral dimensions are 
largely omitted by social movement scholars. The notion of phronesis might be useful in shedding 
light on these underdeveloped dimensions.
19 Yükleyen 2012: 25. Similarly, Bekim Agai (2005) points out that prioritizing education over 
religious representation in public is a general organizational strategy of the Hizmet movement. 
20 Jasper 1997: 244. Clemens 1996: 207; Ghaziani 2011: 99.
civic coMPeTiTion and conflic T TRansfoRMaTion 75
whereas in arenas in which competition is restrained because of resources 
or ideology or activist phronesis, the rivals engage in niche building for 
differentiation. In arenas where competition is highly symbolic in nature, 
however, the rivals engage in subversive tactics and aim to articulate their 
authentic Kurdish ethnicity through cultural repertoires such as local 
historical f igures and narratives about the state.
The f irst two mechanisms, in fact, are two interrelated processes, what 
we might call resemblance and niche building. On the one hand, rival move-
ments vie for the support of local Kurds through charity organizations as 
long as competition is feasible, which is determined by three major factors 
(i.e. available resources, ideological openness, and supportive phronesis). On 
the other hand, the rivals seek to construct their specif ic niche in certain 
arenas where their competitors cannot possibly challenge them, e.g. the 
Kurdish ethno-nationalists’ strong emphasis on women’s organizations is 
most meaningful when we consider the conservative ideological stance 
of Hizbullah and the Gülen movement, who are reluctant to participate 
in the f ield of women’s self-determination activism. Likewise, the Gülen 
movement’s specialization in educational centers and Hizbullah’s particular 
focus on religious associations are indeed related: Hizmet activists often 
avoid having a public image through religious organizations, and thus, the 
religious f ield becomes wide open for Hizbullah. Also, Hizbullah lacks the 
resources for educational mobilization.
The third process, strategic subversion, occurs when the rival activists 
engage in contests in symbolic spaces. Unlike the f irst two mechanisms, 
symbolic contestations could simultaneously occur in various institutional 
settings of Kurdish civil society and constitute a symbolic f ield of competi-
tion. Strategic subversion refers to activists’ collective attempt to claim 
symbolic resources such as religious repertoires and local historical f igures 
in order to both strengthen their own prestige and harm the reputations 
of their competitors.
A major symbolic contestation occurs in Kurdish Islamic space, which 
has become an arena of competition especially after the increasing activism 
Table 4.1  Processes of rivalry in the Kurdish civil society
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of the pro-Islamic ruling party, AKP, and the Gülen movement, which were 
traditionally in the Turkish Islamic space (Figure 4.7). Defending secular 
Kurdish identity, Kurdish ethno-nationalists operate in the Kurdish na-
tionalist space; yet, they increasingly move towards the Kurdish Islamic 
symbolic space. Until the pro-Kurdish reforms in 2004, Hizbullah heavily 
emphasized its Islamic identity and never capitalized on ethnic Kurdish 
identity. In recent years, however, Hizbullah has increasingly become closer 
to Kurdish ethno-nationalists in terms of its emphasis on ethnic identity.
Thus, the rival movements in the Southeast have increasingly become 
active in defining Kurdish Islam and local historical f igures. These strategic 
engagements, however, have always been relational; simultaneously rein-
forcing their prestige (re-construction) and de-legitimizing their competitors 
(de-legitimization).





















5 Resemblance and Difference
Constructing Kurdish Civil Society
Some 2,500 years ago, Greek phalanx warfare was based on the confronta-
tion of two lines of soldiers on a battlef ield, each armed with a shield on the 
left arm and a spear or sword in the right hand. John Levi Martin explains 
how these “rules” were deliberately undone precisely because they were 
accepted as the rules of warfare:
These two lines would slowly rotate in a counterclockwise direction … 
each soldier’s right side was protected only by the shield of the man to his 
right. As each instinctively moved closer to the right, the line shifted; to 
keep the lines aligned, the right f lanks would move forward. Captains, 
aware of this ‘law,’ tended to put the most valiant f ighters on the right 
side, as they would lead the aggression into the enemy’s side. But the 
most interesting thing about this ‘law,’ of course, was that it was not a 
law at all, though it was repeated for generations. Then the Thebans, 
though vastly out-numbered, won a major battle over Sparta at Luectra 
by concentrating their forces on the left instead of the right and breaking 
through this side of the Spartan phalanx.1
The Spartan case illustrates the signif icance of agency in shaping the rules 
of a particular social game.
In transforming their deadly f ight into a culture of relatively benign 
competition, Kurdish activists discovered an unprecedented means in 
the region: establishment of non-governmental organizations. These civic 
spheres of influence have begun to emerge as new “competition arenas.” 
Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam propose four elements of structure for 
emergence of such f ields:
1 a common understanding of what is at stake in the f ield,
2 a set of players with known positions in the f ield,
3 a common understanding of the rules in the f ield,
4 and f inally, a way for actors to interpret the actions of others and frame 
their own as the ‘game’ is being played.
1 Martin 2003: 32.
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In the Kurdish case, these elements remain fluid and are still under con-
struction. Kurdish ethno-nationalists or pro-Islamic activists are not yet 
clear about the nature of the “rules” in the civil society competition: “A 
common understanding about the nature of the ‘rules’ in the f ield means 
that actors understand what tactics are possible, legitimate, and interpret-
able for each of the roles in the f ield. This is different from knowing what is 
generally at stake. This is the cultural understanding of which moves make 
sense as interaction in the f ield plays out.”2
Through the theoretical lenses of Fligstein and McAdam, Kurdish civil 
society could be seen as an “emerging f ield” that has many “arenas” of 
competition. The authors suggest a kind of analytical awareness useful in 
studying such cases:
One of the tasks facing scholars is to f igure out at the emergence of a 
strategic action f ield what are the realistic projects3 that might actually 
happen … Where things are f luid, our approach forces the analyst to 
consider all of the possible alternatives in that situation. If there are 
multiple collective projects available, then the analyst must focus on 
what they are and consider how the actors involved choose to engage 
in strategic action. While resources available to actors in emergent situ-
ations matter a lot, the ability to engage in creative forms of collective 
action that involve expansion of collective identities can be pivotal.4
Following these valuable suggestions, we may wonder why certain “col-
lective projects” such as the establishment of charity organizations have 
rapidly become an arena of social movement competition in Southeastern 
Turkey.
2 Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 170.
3 The authors see these projects as an outcome of social negotiation: “Before a single set of 
rules governing action emerges, one can speak of competing def initions of the situation. These 
varying cultural conceptions can be viewed as projects that given sets of actors are trying to 
create and impose on other actors. During the emergence of a strategic action f ield, there may be 
much confusion about these projects. It is up to the analyst to try and f igure out which cultural 
conceptions might end up dominating.” Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 171.
4 Here, Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 172) suggest a process analysis over a structuralism: 
“Taken together, our view forces the analyst to do more than just tell the story of how the 
winners were inevitable. Instead, the analyst must carefully specify the players, consider their 
resource endowments, understand the nature of the collective projects at stake, and study what 
courses of actions were possible and then successful or unsuccessful. This will force the analyst 
to uncover surprising or subtle results.” 
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Within only two years, between 2004 and 2006, all major social move-
ments have formed public aid associations. On the other hand, a process of 
differentiation occurred in these years: Kurdish ethno-nationalists, Hizbul-
lah, and Hizmet increasingly claimed certain civic enterprises as their own 
“turf,” and therefore, challenge one another through niche specialization 
and professionalism.5 As Jasper acutely observes, “Switching arenas is a 
common way to surprise opponents, avoid defeats, and increase the value of 
the skills and resources you control. An outcome in one arena is sometimes 
only a starting point for action in another.”6
I argue that these two simultaneous processes, i.e. resemblance and 
differentiation, are closely linked in Turkey’s Southeast. In what follows, I 
provide a map of competition arenas by analyzing charity organizations, 
educational initiatives, women’s associations, and religious institutions 
(Figure 5.1). As argued in a previous chapter, competitor actors’ involvement 
is highly related with dynamics of resources, ideology, and group phronesis. 
This chapter, however, adds an interactive dynamic and aims to illuminate 
the logic of social movement resemblance and difference.
5 On specif ic forms of movement activity or niches in order to develop expertise and organi-
zational professionalism, see Minkoff 1999; Levitsky 2007. 
6 Jasper 2004: 5.
Figure 5.1  Arenas of competition and situation of the actors
Actors Resources Ideology Phronesis Involvement
ethnonationalist + + + High
Charity hizmet + + + High
hizbullah + + + High
ethnonationalist +/− + + Moderate
Education hizmet + + + High
hizbullah − + + Low
ethnonationalist + + + High
Women hizmet + +/− − Low
hizbullah + − − None
ethnonationalist + − − None
Religion hizmet + + − Low
hizbullah + + + High
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Why Charity Organizations?
Applying political clientelism theory to social movement organizations in 
the Middle East, some scholars argue that social movement associations 
that target disadvantaged populations aim to recruit new members and 
establish “networks of patronage and clientship, communal membership 
and loyalty, and possibly political allegiance.”7 The political clientelism 
approach is useful in explaining the charity activism of political parties 
used to gain political support.
This perspective, however, tells less about the dynamics of social move-
ment competition to build legitimacy and reputation. Thus, the political 
clientelism perspective overemphasizes material exchange mechanisms at 
the expense of the cultural dynamics of mobilization such as reputation 
building. In other words, this exclusively economistic approach, which 
claims that movement-organized charity associations treat people as simple 
objects of control, disregards the social movements’ emotional engagement 
with their constituency to develop legitimacy and reputation.
Criticizing the political clientelism perspective, Janine Clark’s com-
parative study in Jordan, Egypt, and Yemen documented that social move-
ment organizations for social welfare construct an amorphous horizontal 
network instead of cross-class vertical ties. Thus, rather than recruiting 
poor masses, social movements’ service sectors “play an important role 
in the strengthening of horizontal networks” that bind middle-class 
individuals.8
Similarly, research on Hizbullah’s non-profit organizations in Lebanon 
depicts how social services such as charity foundations, free hospitals, 
scholarships to students, and f inancial aid to the families of “martyrs” are 
very significant in constructing public legitimacy and reputation.9 Likewise, 
despite the pressure from Western nations, Hamas’ provision of free social 
services such as housing, food, health care, and schooling to needy Palestin-
ians has provided international recognition and legitimacy on behalf of 
Palestinians, especially in Muslim-populated countries.10
I argue that social movement charity organizations in Southeast Tur-
key should not be conceptualized as separate entities that seek political 
7 Zubaida 1992: 9; see also, Al-Sayyid 1993. For the political clientalism perspective, see 
Schmidt et al. 1977; Gellner and Waterbury 1977. For criticisms of the perspective, see Auyero 
1999; Wang and Kurzman 2007; Auyero, Lapegna, and Poma 2009. 
8 Clark 2004: 4.
9 Flanigan and Abdel-Samad 2009; Khatib et al. 2014.
10 Crooke and Shields 2005; Brynen 2008.
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allegiance. Instead, the charity activism is a form of reputation work, and 
the charity organizations are public relations departments of Kurdish social 
movements. I def ine reputation work as activists’ collective attempts to 
shape their public image. Concerned about their public representation, 
Kurdish activists are actors in a f ield of rivalry where strategic calcula-
tions are not made in a rigid economistic way but through inter-subjective 
understanding of rival actors, and therefore, “Once a movement enters a 
particular venue … an opposing movement is virtually forced to act in the 
same arena.”11
Questions remain, however, about why charity organizations and not 
others are rapidly emerging as PR units? As argued earlier, activists’ drive 
to enter various f ields of competition arenas is the result of decision-making 
processes in which they are primarily concerned with available resources, 
their group ideology, and their phronesis: (i) As major social movements in 
the region, the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement, the Gülen, and Hizbul-
lah have the ability to allocate remarkable resources for donations. (ii) The 
Kurdish ethno-nationalists’ leftist ideology, as well as Islamic worldviews 
of the Gülen movement and Hizbullah, clearly encourages social welfare 
programs. (iii) Having long histories of public assistance, these three groups 
are able to mobilize masses in a natural f low as the Kurdish community 
has experienced turbulent times after migration waves to the cities. Ac-
cordingly, this is an outcome of common sense and a practically viable 
project. Framing themselves as helping hands, the rival activists are not only 
winning the minds and hearts of the local Kurds but are also developing 
legitimacy in the eyes of Turkish state off icials and the general public in 
Turkey. Thus, the rivals’ concern for building reputation and legitimacy goes 
beyond the economistic approach of the political clientelism perspective.
Exogenous Shocks: Increasing Poverty and the Emergence of 
Kurdish Slums
Context is crucial in analyzing competition arenas. Understanding the compe-
tition in the Southeast entails a vigilant analysis of Kurdish migration waves. 
Hundreds of thousands migrated from rural areas to urban centers during the 
bloody fight between the PKK and the Turkish State in the early 1990s. Most of 
these migrations were dictated by state agencies in order to eliminate logistical 
support for the PKK. As of 1994, 1,046 villages had been evacuated as a result 
11 Meyer and Staggenborg 1996: 1649.
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of the State’s displacement policy, 812 of them as a result of PKK pressure, 
seventy-five due to security reasons, and thirty-four for economic causes.12
Kurdish migrants have become the new urban poor in Turkey. There is no 
reliable empirical data available for the total number of migrants. The most 
comprehensive off icial document on the issue is the report of the Turkish 
parliamentary investigation committee, published in 1998. The report notes 
that, up to 1997, the number of migrant people was 378,335.13 And yet a pro-
Kurdish nationalist immigrant rights organization, Migrants’ Association for 
Social Cooperation and Culture (Göç-Der), claims that the number may be as 
high as three million, “when the definition of the displaced is broadened to 
encompass those forced to leave their homes by armed clashes, the destruc-
tion of f ields and pastures, army-imposed food embargoes and threats by 
state security forces, state-employed ‘village guards’ and the PKK.”14
If we consider only the 1990 and 2000 census results of the largest Kurd-
ish city, i.e. Diyarbakır, the urban population rose by about 37%, from 
595,440 to 817,692.15 As a result of the massive migration that occurred 
between 1990 and 1995, ninety-six nearby villages expanded and became 
the shantytowns of Diyarbakır. Ghettoization has become a fact of everyday 
life in the city where 40% of the population is below the poverty line ac-
cording to UNICEF’s records in 2000.16 According to a study conducted by 
the Diyarbakır Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the unemployment 
rate reached as high as 70% in the city in the early 2000s.17
My field observations in Diyarbakır were eye-opening beyond the statisti-
cal data. I met with Welat, a Koma Civaken Kurdistan (KCK) activist, in 
order to learn more about the ethno-nationalist organizations in the city.18 
He took me to his friend’s house for a meal. It did not take too long before 
our conversation’s focal point became the f inancial struggles of Kurds. 
Welat reported his exchange with a Kurdish migrant who had ten children: 
12 Şimşek 2006: 45.
13 The report also notes that the eviction of villagers was “unlawful” as being “de facto action 
carried out by the security forces” (Quoted in Yükseker 2007a: 147). For other reports on the 
issue, see Kurban et al. 2007; KMD 2010.
14 Day 2008: 24. Based on a recent survey conducted by KONDA, Erdem Yörük (2012: 521) gives 
a similar estimate. 
15 Yükseker 2007b: 175.
16 Uslu 2009: 196.
17 Another survey (Yükseker 2007a: 153-54) shows how the migrants have low levels of educa-
tion (61% of women and 28.5% of men are illiterate) and experience (87% earned their livelihood 
from agriculture before the migration). As uneducated farmers, the migrants have competed 
for unskilled jobs where employment opportunities have been tight.
18 All names are pseudo names throughout the book to maintain conf identiality.
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“Knowing the hard conditions he lives in, I asked him why he made so 
many children. He reacted like, ‘How could I know that we’d be miserable 
like this? In a typical village, you think that you would need many kids for 
helping you out as some would go to farming, others put animals out to 
pasture, and so forth’.”19 In Diyarbakır, unemployed youth and porter kids 
are ubiquitous and are to be seen every day.
Increasing poverty in Kurdish cities has become a nationwide problem. 
Unlike in other regions in Turkey, governing institutions and political 
parties are highly involved in donations and public assistance programs.20 
Unsurprisingly, activists of all social movements are encouraged to take 
part in this effort. By doing so, they get recognition from the authorities 
as well as support from the grassroots. After the EU-initiated pro-Kurdish 
reforms (2002-2004), Hizbullah, the Gülen/Hizmet, and the Kurdish ethno-
nationalist movement have rushed to form charity organizations.21
19 Author’s personal communication. Diyarbakır, July 12, 2009.
20 Yörük 2012: 523.
21 In order to get full support from outside sources, these rival movements establish official 
associations as their charity organizations. In Turkey, funding of associations is mainly through 
donations. Only those associations that are recognized Kamuya Yararlı Dernekler, i.e. asso-
ciations that are categorized as being of benef it to the general public, can receive the state’s 
subsidies. European Union funds are also available if the associations can prove their public 
utility. Similarly, funds from local municipalities could be easily allocated to associations, 
providing that they benef it the public at large. Electoral success of the pro-Kurdish parties in 
Figure 5.2  Child labor is an everyday reality in Diyarbakır
Photo by the author, July 22, 2009
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Constructing Competition through Resemblance: The Charity 
Initiatives
The Gülen movement’s nationwide charity organization Kimse Yok Mu 
began opening branches in the Southeast in 2004.22 In 2006, after severe 
flooding struck cities in the region, Kimse Yok Mu distributed the equivalent 
of almost 2 million euros worth of supplies. Hizmet activists especially 
regard the Islamic Feasts as occasions for charity distribution. Kimse Yok Mu 
annually sets up Ramadan tents and distributes meat packages during the 
Feast of Sacrif ice, a global Islamic ritual known as Eid Al Adha. Launching 
a major campaign, the organization aided about 17,000 families in 2006 and 
60,000 families in 2007 in celebration of the Feast of Sacrif ice.23
One particular feature of the Feast aid is striking: local Kurdish Hizmet 
activists invite Turkish Hizmet activists from the western regions of Turkey 
to attend the Feast observation and make donations to the families directly. 
Each year, thousands of Turkish activists distribute meat packages during 
the Feast of Sacrif ice, visiting the region for the f irst time in their lives.24
Alpay, a local representative of Kimse Yok Mu, told me that this is a helpful 
way to make bridges between Kurds and Turks. Alpay narrated a story of a 
businessman from Istanbul who was so prejudiced against Kurds that he 
was not employing them in his factory. As a donor to Hizmet initiatives 
in Istanbul, he was invited to participate in one of the Feast of Sacrif ice 
campaigns by Kimse Yok Mu. After visiting the region for the f irst time and 
distributing meat packages, the businessman regretted that he was a bigot.
Hizmet activists call these aid campaigns “brotherhood” events. In 2007, 
launching the second annual campaign, Deputy President Eyüp Tok held a 
press conference. He stated:
local elections has led Kurdish ethno-nationalist activists to become off icials in local municipali-
ties (Watts 2010), and thus, enabled them to allocate these resources in their charity activism.
22 Kimse Yok Mu has its origins in a show with the same name on Samanyolu TV, the movement’s 
TV station, in 2002. Kimse Yok Mu literally means “Isn’t anyone out there (to help)?” Although 
the organization’s primary focus is relief rather than poverty alleviation, it has paid attention to 
victims of endemic poverty in the Southeast. Kimse Yok Mu branches had rapidly mushroomed 
all over Turkey by 2007. 
23 Hizmet volunteers organize similar campaigns worldwide. By the Feast of Sacrif ice 2008, 
over 1.5 million people in more than f ifty countries were recipients of meat packages (Michel 
2008).
24 At the initial phase of the campaign in December 2006, for example, 18,073 people from 
western Turkey visited the region as Kimse Yok Mu volunteers (Koç 2013: 191). 
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There is a very meaningful demonstration of solidarity now occurring 
in these cities thanks to our foundation. Some 2,000 İstanbul residents 
will come to the Southeast this year during the Feast of the Sacrif ice and 
pass out meat to the poorer families. The name of our foundation already 
explains what we aim for: solidarity and assistance. I believe we will be 
able to give a wonderful message of unity and togetherness this year, as 
we did last year.25
An economistic approach would fail to comprehend the Hizmet way of 
providing charity: channeling donors themselves to the region instead 
of their contributions. It makes sense, however, when we consider the 
movement’s broader agenda that promotes Turkish-Kurdish unity around 
Islam. Moreover, the Gülen movement appears to aim at strengthening the 
emotional attachment between its Turkish and Kurdish activists as some 
within the group become increasingly uneasy with the pro-Kurdish reforms. 
These trips serve as an eye-opening self-education experience especially 
among those who have a Turkish nationalist background.26
25 Today’s Zaman 2007.
26 The Gülen movement recruited large number of Nationalist Action Party, MHP, supporters 
after the 1980 military intervention. The opening of schools in Turkic states in Central Asia in 
mid-1990s triggered this trend. See, Turam 2004: 361. 
Figure 5.3 Kimse Yok Mu activists from western Turkey in the slums of Diyarbakır
courtesy of Kimse Yok Mu
86 Rival KuRdish MoveMenTs in TuRKey 
The charity activism has been crucial in providing a public message that 
Hizmet is becoming a major social actor in the region. There is a need to 
highlight an indirect political outcome: until the recent rift between the two 
groups, the AKP government benefited the movement’s charity activism 
because of the movement’s long-term support for the AKP policies in the 
Southeast. In fact, like all political parties, the AKP makes donations to the 
poor especially before election periods. Yet, Hizmet activists’ persistent 
charity efforts benefited the AKP since it was framed as a sign of Islamic 
brotherhood. It further contributed to the association of these two groups 
as a unif ied Turkish-Islamic front in the eyes of Kurdish ethno-nationalists 
until 2014.27
The competition in charity activism escalated, especially after the 2007 
general elections which were interpreted as a major success for the AKP. 
“Kurds are deceived by the AKP’s propaganda,” said the co-chairman of the 
pro-Kurdish party, Ahmet Türk, in his evaluation of the election results. 
“The AKP gives assistance to Kurds in order to make them beggars … We 
see some efforts to break people’s resistance in the region through using 
religion. All of these efforts are organized in accordance with a certain plan. 
We are confronted with a policy to deceive the public.”28 In a similar vein, 
the other co-chairman, Emine Ayna, exhorted her audience at a political 
rally by asserting that the AKP “exploits” the Kurdish people’s religious 
feelings “through relying on the Gülen movement.”29
Soon after the 2007 election, however, Kurdish ethno-nationalists’ charity 
efforts began to resemble those of their pro-Islamic rivals in such a way that 
some criticized the ethno-nationalists for doing “almost everything they 
denounced before.”30 These actions include the distribution of food packages 
and organizing free breaking-fast (iftar) dinners during the sacred month of 
Ramadan and dispensing meat packages during the Islamic Feast of Sacrifice.31
Among the major ethno-nationalist initiatives is Sarmaşık, the Associa-
tion for Fighting against Poverty and Providing Sustained Development. 
Founded in 2006, the head of its executive board is Osman Baydemir, a 
popular pro-Kurdish party member and then-mayor of the Diyarbakır 
27 Olson 2009: 63-65. Up until the recent tensions, the two actors, the AKP and the Gülen, were 
seen as unif ied. In October 2013, attending Kimse Yok Mu’s 7th annual campaign in the city of 
Batman, Minister of Finance Mehmet Şimşek spoke highly of the organization and distributed 
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Metropolitan Municipality. The organization’s food bank provides monthly 
supplies to more than 2,000 households that consist of seven family mem-
bers on average. Similar to other Kurdish ethno-nationalist organizations, 
Sarmaşık substantially relies on funds from the Diyarbakır Metropolitan 
Municipality.
Sarmaşık’s representative Afran believes that there is a systematic State 
campaign to make Kurds impoverished. “Giving assistance is not a solution,” 
he said in our conversation:
Unless you have a sensible social policy agenda, it just creates more 
dependent personalities and further pushes people into poverty. That’s 
why we have been against the logic of hayır (i.e. Islamic charity). And 
yet, we felt the need to do something because there are hungry people 
suffering out there.32
Afran criticized the AKP and other Islamic groups for exploiting Kurds 
through “the logic of hayır.” Pointing out the fact that his family lineage has 
both Sunni and Alevi roots, Afran said that he is not against AKP’s Islamic 
identity and no one can remain oblivious to religion in “Kurdish geography.” 
He elaborated his criticism of Islamic charity logic: “It is not a sustainable 
model … Free distribution of food packages in Ramadan? Those who are 
not needy also rush to get them! Is this a development model?”
Afran was also critical of pro-Kurdish party municipalities that emulated 
the Islamic groups by distributing food packages during Ramadan. He men-
tioned that the municipalities felt the pressure from local people who spoke 
highly of Diyarbakır Governorship assistance and requested similar aid. 
Local Kurds perceive benefits by the Governorship of Diyarbakır as AKP’s 
helping hands. “What the Governorship is doing is wrong,” he contends. 
“Should we follow their path?” A year after my conversations with Afran, the 
Governorship of Diyarbakır sued the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, 
claiming that the funding of Sarmaşık is illegal. The court f inally decided 
to suspend the funds from the Municipality on the grounds that Sarmaşık 
is not recognized by the Council of Ministers as an association that works 
for public benefit.33
Another major ethno-nationalist organization is Gün Işığı, an association 
opened by Bağlar Municipality in 2007. Specialized in clothing, Gün Işığı 
helps about 30,000 people. Gilyaz, the association’s representative, claimed 
32 Author’s interview. Diyarbakır, July 16, 2009.
33 Referans 2010.
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that Kurds are suff iciently politicized and smart enough to accept the aid 
from the AKP but not promise their vote in return. According to Gilyaz, 
some other Islamic groups help “their own people” but not the Kurdish 
public at large. Gün Işığı, instead, makes family visits to its beneficiaries 
during the year and gets in close touch with them.
Although she did not clearly spell this out, Gilyaz was perhaps indicating 
Hizbullah. The f irst civic association of Hizbullah, Mustazaf-Der, Solidarity 
Association for the Oppressed, was established in 2004. The opening of 
Mustazaf-Der provided the group’s activists with both a legal umbrella 
and a new opportunity to renew its public image. Instead of operating as 
a regular charity organization, Mustazaf-Der was the key institution for 
the movement through organizing political and cultural rallies, events, 
and celebrations until its closure by the state authorities in 2012.34 Thus 
Hizbullah’s establishment of the charity organization was meant to develop 
its reputation and legitimacy within its potential constituency.
Mustazaf-Der emulated Kimse Yok Mu in distributing meat and supplies 
during the religious feasts and the month of Ramadan. In Diyarbakır alone, 
about 6,000 to 8,000 families are supported during the Feast of Sacrif ice 
34 The legal reasoning for closure indicated that Mustazaf-Der was directly linked with Hizbul-
lah which is considered a terrorist organization in Turkey. See, TimeTurk 2012.
Figure 5.4  Headquarters of Sarmaşık, the Association for Fighting Against Poverty 
and Providing Sustained Development
Photo by the author, diyarbakır, July 17, 2009
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annually.35 The association provided regular monthly f inancial support 
to thousands of poor families and students, as well as to those who would 
like to marry. In its charity activism, Mustazaf-Der prioritizes the families 
and relatives of detained or maimed Hizbullah activists or those who were 
murdered in the f ight against the PKK in the 1990s. Given the fact that the 
movement’s thousands of members were convicted or imprisoned in 2000, 
the charity association has provided an “organizational opportunity” by 
symbolizing the revival of Hizbullah in the public eye.36
In fact, pro-Islamic movements and ethno-nationalists resemble each 
other in their selectivity of target populations. Similar to Hizbullah, the 
Kurdish ethno-nationalist charity organizations prioritize the families of 
PKK guerillas in the mountains and the families of those who died for the 
cause (martyrs). These families are called değer ailesi, family of value, within 
the movement. The families of those who are imprisoned (or were jailed 
for some time) or maimed have also been prioritized in charity activism.37 
In this sense, the charity activism should not be seen as a simple tool to 
make political allegiance with the pro-Kurdish party; instead, it signif ies 
the emotional engagement of the activists within it.
The rival social movements are also similar in utilizing charity to sustain 
long- term emotional allegiances with their constituency at large. The mother 
of a student at Hizmet’s educational center Gülpembe reported that a major-
ity of students’ families have become included in Kimse Yok Mu’s assistance 
list and receive aid in various forms.38 Likewise, Kurdish ethno-nationalist 
neighborhood organizations work closely with Sarmaşık, channeling aid to 
those families whose children are enrolled in their youth centers.
“Education is Our Job”: The Gülen Movement Goes to Slums
Adalet Binici, a 14-year-old Kurdish girl in eighth grade, became the 
champion in last year’s Level Determination Examination (SBS), a high 
school placement test administered by the Turkish government to over 
a million students nationwide, thanks to the supplementary education 
and training provided by a prep school run by the Hizmet movement that 
35 İLKHA 2009b.
36 Kurzman 1998: 23.
37 Author’s interviews with two members of TUHAD-DER, Solidarity Association for Families 
of Detainees and Convicted, and MEYA-DER, Mesopotamia Solidarity Association for Those Who 
Lost Their Relatives. July 17, 2009. See also, Öcalan 2011c.
38 Author’s interview. Diyarbakır, July 22, 2009.
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is inspired by education-savvy Islamic scholar Fethullah Gülen. Coming 
from a poor family of seven, she did not even have her own room to study 
in, so she spent most of her after-school time at the prep school studying 
and preparing for this very competitive exam.39
The newspaper account above is a typical report on achievements of Hizmet 
activists. Having a worldwide education-centered network, the Gülen 
movement easily mobilizes large numbers of businessmen and experienced 
teachers to establish and sustain a variety of educational institutions includ-
ing private boarding schools, prep centers for YGS/LYS (university entrance 
exams) and OKS (high school entrance exam),40 and reading salons (Okuma 
Salonları).
Although the opening of the private schools and the exam prep centers 
goes back to the early 1990s, the movement’s interest in founding reading 
salons is a recent development. Unlike other educational institutions, 
reading salons are built in poor suburbs and are totally free.41 The reading 
salons, in fact, operate as prep centers in almost every aspect: they are set 
up as separate buildings having multiple classrooms including computer 
labs, and their full-time teachers provide the tests/documents that are used 
in the private OKS prep schools of the movement.
These free education services are widely interpreted as an attempt to 
block Kurdish ethno-nationalist recruitment from slums. In the words of 
an activist,
The only permanent solution (to the Kurdish issue) is conquering hearts 
and encouraging education for new generations. That is the way to win 
our people in the region … Is there any way that parents want their 
children to go to the mountains (to join the PKK rebels)? Of course not. 
39 Bozkurt 2014.
40 In Turkey, placements to universities and selective high schools are based on nationwide 
competitive tests. As competition has increased, attending a private prep school has become 
a norm among students. Having thousands of teacher activists, the Gülen movement owns a 
signif icant share in this giant business. As the rift increased between the AKP government 
and the movement, the Prime Minister called for a shutdown of all private schools. The AKP’s 
decision is largely seen as a blow to the Gülen movement’s recruitment channels. The movement 
has lately been able to get in touch with 200,000 students per year through its prep schools only. 
The movement-aff iliated media protested this decision by highlighting the benef its of the prep 
schools in Kurdish-populated regions of the country, pointing out that these enterprises operate 
as a bulwark against the PKK. See, for example, Zaman 2013b.
41 The reading salons are off icially established by EHİDER (Eğitim ve Halkla İlişkileri 
Geliştirme Derneği), the Association for Developing Education and Public Relations.
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Instead, they excitedly let their kids go to the education volunteers they 
trust. That is the way to destroy the path to the mountains.42
Immense resource allocation for the reading salons also signals Hizmet’s 
grand strategy against the PKK. Since 2006, the movement has established 
twenty-one reading salons in Diyarbakır (in the city center as well as 
in outlying districts) alone, serving 3,000 students annually. One of the 
directors of these salons indicated that maintenance of one single reading 
salon requires almost 100,000 YTL (about $55,000 at the time) annual-
ly.43 In addition to full-time teachers, some volunteer teachers in public 
schools work on their weekends. The reading salons are not only active 
in the Eastern and Southeastern provinces, but also Kurdish-populated 
suburbs in cities in the west. As early as 2007, the movement had reached 
140,000 students across the country by establishing reading salons in 
slums.44
In Kurdish nationalist circles, opening such reading salons has widely 
been interpreted as an insidious attack to diminish the PKK. The PKK 
repeatedly warned it would punish not only those who lease their homes 
and buildings to Hizmet members but also those who send their children 
to Hizmet schools.45 Some militants attacked the Hizmet institutions in 
various places.46
In general, however, Kurdish ethno-nationalists avoid direct confronta-
tion. The director of a bombed dorm, for instance, told me that they never 
received any threats from the militants and that the attack was more about 
the political climate regarding the 2011 general election in Turkey.47 Another 
Hizmet educator thinks that the ethno-nationalists avoid open aggression 
since the Gülen movement has gained increasing public support in the 
region, and violent attacks against unarmed teachers like him would only 
provide further support.48
42 Gülerce 2007.
43 Author’s interview. Diyarbakır, July 22, 2009.
44 Yeni Aktüel 2007.
45 ANF 2009, 2010a; Taraf 2010.
46 See, Ongun 2010; Birch 2010. Fire bombings of several Gülen institutions including two 
reading salons in Bağlar/Diyarbakır (Mehmet Kayalar Okuma Salonu and Selahaddin Eyyubi 
Okuma Salonu), a university exam prep center in Yenişehir/Diyarbakır, a private high school 
in Hakkari (Hatice Avcı Koleji), and a private dorm for high school students in Cizre are some 
of these occasions. 
47 Author’s interview. Diyarbakır, June 11, 2011.
48 Author’s interview. Diyarbakır, July 23, 2009.
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The PKK leader Öcalan’s message also reiterated that Kurdish ethno-
nationalists consider Hizmet activists rivals instead of deadly enemies. “I 
consider them neither a sect nor a congregation,” said Öcalan in his cell in 
December 2010, “they are more of a nongovernmental organization across 
Turkey and the Middle East.” He added:
Their role is important. They have quite a dynamic power, and we are 
also a dynamic power. If these two dynamic powers engage in mutual 
understanding and cooperation, many fundamental problems in Turkey 
will be solved.
According to Dogu Ergil, Öcalan’s call “stems from the worry that the Gülen 
movement is a serious political rival and can work on the PKK’s grassroots 
to cut off a large number of youths from the organization.”49
As a reaction to Hizmet activism in slums, pro-Kurdish municipalities50 
began opening Education Support Houses (Eğitim Destek Evleri) in 2006. 
Similar to the reading salons, the education houses are built in poor suburbs 
and provide free services. In the f irst year, the education house of Kayapınar 
Municipality – a major municipality in Diyarbakır – served 162 students; at 
the end of 2010, Kayapınar’s f ive education houses reached 1,109 students.51
Kurdish ethno-nationalists mobilize volunteer teachers aff iliated with 
Eğitim-Sen, an educators’ union with strong ties to the pro-Kurdish party.52 
The programs are not solely focused on high school and university entrance 
exams; instead, the students are invited to participate in ethnic awareness 
activities such as Kurdish language classes, Kurdish music courses, Kurdish 
folk dance events, documentary f ilm nights that are followed by group 
discussions, and seminars/lectures on Kurdish rights.53 Their sponsorship of 
49 Ergil 2010.
50 The pro-Kurdish party mayors are in close contact with the PKK’s city organization, known 
as the KCK (Koma Civaken Kurdistan), before being off icially nominated, and after their election, 
the decisions of the municipalities are under scrutiny by the PKK movement. Turkish state 
authorities def ined the KCK as a re-organization of the PKK in a broader vision in 2007, and 
therefore, as a terrorist organization (See KCK Law Indictment prepared by Turkish Republic’s 
Public Prosecutor Diyarbakır Off ice, Indictment no: 2009/786). Inquisition of Osman Baydemir, 
mayor of Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality, by the KCK’s underground court was a striking 
example that hit the news. See, Milliyet 2010.
51 KAYAPINAR 2006: 44, 2010: 18. Education houses that are located in Huzurevleri and 500 
Evler were opened in 2007 and most recent ones were ready at the beginning of 2010.
52 Author’s interview with Amed, the program coordinator of an education house in Kayapınar. 
Diyarbakır, July 18, 2009.
53 BAĞLAR 2010: 54-55.
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two- or three-week long summer schools where the students stay overnight 
is especially important in raising Kurdish ethnic awareness.
Competition in the education f ield attracted the attention of Hizbullah 
activists as well. The movement established two private exam prep centers 
in Bingöl and Diyarbakır. Yet, unlike its rivals, Hizbullah lacks well-educated 
activists in large numbers, and thus, it has serious constraints in terms of 
human resources. In my interviews, I learned that the group lacks some 
other resources as well: “In Diyarbakır, the governorship did not let us open 
reading salons; however, we were able to open them in Mersin and Adana,” 
said Hasan. “We could not do it in Diyarbakır but the Gülen’s association 
opened about twenty salons. How come? How does the State not let us?”54
Namûsa Me Azadîya Me Ye: The Democratic Free Women’s 
Movement
“Women’s organizations are so critical,” said Welat as he spoke about various 
ethno-nationalist associations. “As the president says, ‘Unless women are 
free, Kurds are captive’.” The PKK leader Öcalan, referred to as the president, 
has placed special emphasis on women in his writings and teachings. Having 
Marxist and ethno-nationalist elements, the PKK ideology reconstructed 
“Kurdish women” through a utopian symbolism. In its early stages, the PKK 
narrated the enslavement of Kurds through images of captive women under 
tribal patriarchy. Since the early 1990s, the emancipation of Kurdish women 
has become a dominating discourse in the movement. In these depictions, 
free Kurdish women symbolized free Kurdistan, the motherland.55
The PKK’s call for women’s emancipation, however, is heavily colored 
with Marxist and socialist discourse. The ethno-nationalists’ secularist poli-
cies regarding women appear radical in the Southeast, a highly conservative 
region.56 Islamic adoption of the headscarf, for example, is regarded as 
patriarchal and backward. Exposure of women’s bodies in gender-mixed 
groups is valued and seen as a sign of independence. Among Kurdish Islamic 
circles, these secular features attracted harsh criticism, portraying the 
54 Author’s interview. Diyarbakır, July 25, 2009. Figure 5.1 indicates how resources play a 
signif icant role in the rivalry over education. 
55 Çağlayan 2007: 87.
56 Handan Coşkun, coordinator of the Diyarbakır Metropolitan Municipality’s Women’s 
Problems Centre, maintains that the municipality’s feminism-inspired progressive projects 
are not welcomed in public due to the conservative nature of the Kurdish society in general. 
See Coşkun 2006.
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PKK’s Kurdish secularism as being as ominous as Ataturk’s fervent Turkish 
secularism.
In my interview with Cemal, a Hizbullah activist, I got a sense of how 
gender politics plays a signif icant role in social movement competition:
The terrorist organization is foremost responsible for the cultural 
deterioration here. For instance, when they send two people out for 
their propaganda, they are often a boy and a girl. You often see their 
gender-mixed groups around. I mean, they try to normalize this (kind 
of socialization). Also the case for women’s inappropriate clothes and 
promiscuity: they are the ones who lead this process.57
Referring to ethno-nationalists as “terrorists,” Cemal believes that their 
emphasis on women’s organizations is an insidious plot to transform Kurd-
ish society. As expressed in Hizbullah’s weekly, “If we investigate f inancial 
sources of women’s shelters and various courses that have mushroomed 
in the region since the 1980s – such as sewing, embroidery, hairdressing, 
carpet weaving, and cooking – we f igure out that almost all of them are 
supported by imperialism’s outreach institutions, i.e. Western missionaries, 
major Jewish foundations, and their local collaborators.”58
Although Hizmet activists f ind Hizbullah’s ideology rigid, they also 
believe that there is an agenda behind the ethno-nationalists’ initiatives 
for women. Gülen-aff iliated media claims that some leftist-secularist 
organizations systematically provide scholarship for Kurdish girls in order 
to sympathize with the PKK and to join pro-Kurdish party activism.59 Thus, 
as the argument goes, the Turkish radical left supports the PKK’s secular 
identity over the bodies of Kurdish women.
Compared to Hizbullah, the Gülen movement’s approach to women’s 
issues is more liberal. Whereas Hizmet’s women activists organize seminars 
to celebrate International Women’s Day each year, Hizbullah perceives such 
events as Western imperialist projects.60 When it comes to representations 
of their movement, however, Hizmet activists are in line with Hizbullah’s 
phronesis: they are reluctant to publicize women’s issues in the region where 
a majority of the population is conservative.
57 Author’s interview. Diyarbakır, July 25, 2009.
58 Turan 2009.
59 Zaman 2009.
60 See, for example, Zaman 2008a.
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Hizmet’s only association for women in Diyarbakır is not involved 
in women’s rights issues; instead, it operates as an education-centered 
solidarity organization. Even the association’s title, Sevgi Gülpembe Kadın 
Eğitim ve Dayanışma Derneği, includes both “women” and “education.” A 
representative of the organization defines their goals as educating girls and 
women through activities such as seminars, reading and writing courses, 
and public lectures.61 The association undertakes various educational 
initiatives including state-sponsored projects such as the SODES (Social 
Support Program) project, Providing Self-Esteem to Children through 
Education.
Kurdish ethno-nationalist associations, on the other hand, are highly 
involved in women’s issues by organizing mass demonstrations, rallies, and 
public lectures for women’s economic, political, and sexual freedom. The 
associations organize annual celebrations and mass campaigns on March 8, 
International Women’s Day, and November 25, the International Day for 
the Elimination of Violence against Women. Framing Kurdish women’s 
issues globally, they attract funds from the European Union as well as local 
municipalities. Local women activists work in tandem with global Kurd-
ish ethno-nationalist associations to enhance their influence. Two recent 
examples are the public hearing “A 2020 Perspective for Women in Turkey” 
organized in the European Parliament in 2010 and f irst Middle Eastern 
Women’s Congress in 2013. Progressive actions of the pro-Kurdish party 
such as electing “co-chair” women for political posts are highly respected 
and supported by Turkish feminist organizations as well.62
Thus the f ield of women’s organizations is not a heavily contested arena; 
instead, it becomes the ethno-nationalists’ “turf” for niche building (Fig-
ure 5.2). As the PKK’s legal activism grows, the women’s associations have 
increasingly become the leading organizations of the movement, especially 
in Western Europe.63
One of the recent campaigns was titled Em jin in, ne namûsa tu kesî ne, 
namûsa me azadiya me ye! (We’re Women, not anyone’s Honor. Our Honor 
is Our Freedom!), organized in twenty-eight cities in Turkey. The campaign 
defined freedom of Kurdish women in revolutionary terms, as exemplif ied 
in protest slogans that praise the PKK and its women guerilla f ighters: 
61 Author’s interview. Diyarbakır, July 22, 2009.
62 Bianet 2014.
63 Berkowitz and Mügge 2014: 84; Casier 2010; ANF 2012.
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“Beritanlaşın, Zilanlaşın, Özgürlüğe Yaklaşalım!” (Become like Beritan,64 
Become like Zilan,65 so that we could approach Freedom!) and “Be Serok 
64 As a woman guerilla, Gülnaz Karataş, alias Beritan, was a PKK militant who threw herself 
over a cliff when her ammunition ran out in the war between the PKK and the PDK (Kurdistan 
Democratic Party in Northern Iraq) in 1992.
65 Zeynep Kınacı, alias Zilan, is a highly signif icant f igure – among the few who is annually 
commemorated by PKK activists. See, ANF 2011b. Turning herself into a human bomb on June 30 
1996, Zilan walked into a Turkish military parade in Dersim and ignited the bomb, killing 
around ten soldiers and seriously wounding another forty-four. Before taking this action, she 
wrote an open letter to Abdullah Öcalan. Below are excerpts from her letter that shed light on 
the psychology of a Kurdish f ighter:
Dear President,
My name is Zeynep Kınacı. I was born in Malatya in 1972. My family comes from the village of 
Elmali. We belong to the Mamureki tribe. I studied tourism and psychology at Inonu University 
in Malatya. Before I joined the liberation movement, I worked at the state clinic in Malatya. I am 
married: my husband comes from the village of Xliya. He also went to the University of Malatya. 
During a clash in Adana, he was captured by the enemy in the winter of 1995. My family was fairly 
well off and I had a liberal upbringing. My interest in the left and Kurdish movement was aroused 
during my university studies, although at the time I was not attracted to any particular movement.
Figure 5.5  First Middle Eastern Women’s Congress in Diyarbakır, organized by 
Kurdish women activists
Photo by the author, June 1, 2013
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Jiyan Nabe” (Without the President No Life!).66 Some campaign slogans were 
on billboards in cities for several weeks and attracted reactions from some 
Islamist circles including Hizbullah.67
I believe that my support for the PKK and the liberation movement had its roots in the fact that my 
family was concerned to preserve their Kurdish identity. We had a number of patriotic friends but 
we were not organized or anything like that. Also, the economic problems which beset my family 
prevented me from discovering my own identity for a long time. But slowly the situation changed, 
so that I was able to make a mature and confident decision to join the liberation movement. In 1994 
I started to fight at the front in Adana for one year. In 1995, I joined the ARGK [Guerrilla] units in the 
Dersim region. It was at this time that I made a big development, both personally and politically...
History shows that no national struggle can be victorious without a leader who devotes his life to 
the people, who feel its pains and its desires, who selflessly recognizes the practical tasks of the 
liberation struggle. A people who were totally alienated, whose political social and cultural values 
were exploited, posed a great challenge for the PKK leadership. Our party has started on the road to 
liberation under extremely difficult circumstances. Its attitude to religion, to questions of identity 
and the family are unique.
The arming of women and women’s conferences and congresses have been organized by our party. 
The life of the party leadership, its courage, dedication to the cause, its intelligence, far-sightedness, 
its closeness and sensitivity to the ordinary people, its methods and experience is incomparable 
by the standard of any movement. Its interpretation and analysis of events is non-dogmatic...
At a time when the enemy is trying to achieve its aim by assassination attempts on our leader, this is the 
only response left. Such an action creates a siege situation for the enemy who lacks any moral grounds 
for their own action and is in a permanent state of confusion and crisis. It will show to friend and foe 
alike our total determination and preparedness to achieve our freedom, even at the price of our lives.
Dear President,
I see myself as a candidate for a voluntary death. I willingly concede that to give our lives is, from 
the standpoint of your unending and tireless work for our liberation, not enough. I hope to be able 
to contribute much more than my life. Through your struggle you have succeeded in bringing our 
people to life. You are the guarantor of the Kurdish nation and a guardian of world humanism. 
Your life gives us love, courage and belief...
I consider this action as a duty. I am convinced that to overcome my weaknesses and the realisation 
of my freedom, this action has to be carried out. I want to follow the examples of our comrades, 
Mazlum, Kemal, Hayri, Ferhat, Bese, Beritan, Berivan and Ronahi...
I want to be part of the total expression of the liberation struggle of our people.
By exploding a bomb against my body I want to protest against the policies of imperialism which 
enslaves women and express my rage and become a symbol of resistance of Kurdish women.
Under the leadership of Apo, the national liberation struggle and the Kurdish people, will at last 
take its richly deserved place in the family of humanity.
My will to live is very strong. My desire is to have a fulfilled life through a strong action.
The reason for my actions is my love for human beings and for life!
Zilan (Zeynep Kınacı), 1996
66 ANF 2008; Ciwanenazad 2009. Kurdish ethno-nationalists call Abdullah Öcalan, the jailed 
leader of the PKK, the President (Başkan in Turkish, Serok in Kurdish), or more respectfully, 
Leadership (Önderlik) as if his persona has an institutional authority.
67 İLKHA 2009a.
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In addition to high PKK symbolism, some public speeches during the 
campaign that explicitly condemned local Islamic culture in a secular leftist 
tone disturbed pro-Islamic Kurds. For example Leyla Zana, a prominent 
Kurdish women’s activist and pro-Kurdish party deputy, maintained that 
Abdullah Öcalan is reminiscent of Atatürk in the sense that he has freed 
women from Islamic “feudal” culture. “In the contemporary age, the one who 
prioritized women in almost all f ields in Turkey and Kurdistan is Abdullah 
Öcalan. Öcalan has said that freedom of women means freedom of society. 
Despite the fact of feudalism and increasing Islamization in Kurdistan, 
Öcalan created opportunities for women’s leadership, and therefore, he is 
the contemporary Atatürk.”68 Hizbullah activists harshly criticized these 
campaigns for women, perceiving them as symbolic attacks on religious 
Kurds.69
The concept namus (honor) strikes a loud chord among Kurds. İsmet, a 
leading Kurdish activist of the Gülen movement, narrates how he criticizes 
the PKK’s recruitment of women in his local lectures:
In Van, there were about 3,000 people who came to listen to my seminar. 
During my talk, I asked them: “What kind of Kurds are you? A genuine 
Kurd is religious, a genuine Kurd is namuslu (one who protects his honor). 
What does it mean to send your daughters to the mountains, leaving 
them alone among males?”70
İsmet’s talks seem to be effective among the conservative constituency. 
In the Gülen’s women’s association, a Kurdish mother told me that she 
would not let her daughter attend summer camps that are organized by pro-
Kurdish party municipalities. “I do not want her to be involved in politics,” 
she added.71 An independent observer claims that these summer camps 
for school children become an opportunity for Kurdish ethno-nationalists 
to recruit youngsters for the movement. In general knowledge quizzes, 
children are asked the names of guerilla martyrs such as Zilan and Delila.72
68 Hürseda 2009.
69 Doğru Haber 2009.
70 He narrated this story in his public lecture to Gülen activists in the United States. I shadowed 
the meeting. New Jersey, December 26, 2009. For a conceptual analysis of the politics of sexuality 
and the public image of guerillas, see Goodwin 1997. 
71 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır. July 22, 2009.
72 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır. July 21, 2009. Delila was a PKK woman f ighter who was 
singled out for her outstanding voice. She died on August 23, 2007, in a clash with the Turkish 
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Having attended these summer camps as a student, Zelal thinks that 
she has been enlightened. Zelal now volunteers for a pro-Kurdish party 
as a member of the youth council and helps f ive younger students in their 
studies. “It’s not so important that they pass their exams,” she said. “What 
really matters is to get these students’ hearts and minds.”73 Zelal’s friend in 
the youth council emphasized how “organized youth” (örgütlü gençlik) are 
enlightened, “unlike youth of the system.”74 Women guerilla f ighters in the 
defense of Kobane against Daesh (ISIL) got the attention of Western media 
in a positive light, providing a boost to similar feelings among Kurdish 
youngsters. The PKK’s secular women image was presented as an alternative 
to Daesh’s horrible attacks in the name of Islam.
Founded after 2007, the youth centers are supported by the pro-Kurdish 
party municipalities and work closely with the women’s wing of the 
ethno-nationalist movement. As an activist who works at a women’s house, 
houses which are also funded by the municipalities, Feride points out the 
importance of their organized action that unites all associations and houses. 
“We, as women’s organizations, have an organized body within the Kurdish 
military in Roboski/Uludere. Her songs are still circulated on YouTube: https://www.youtube.
com/watch?v=fNJYoEtZFQE 
73 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır. July 18, 2009.
74 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır. July18, 2009.
Figure 5.6  A wall in the Arjin Youth Center, founded and funded by Yenişehir 
Municipality in Diyarbakır. The picture of Delila, a woman guerilla 
“martyr,” with a Kurdish poem
Photo by the author, July 21, 2009
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movement. All those who are working for women’s institutions are united 
under the title of Democratic Free Women’s Movement. This type of organ-
ized body, of course, brings great benefits.”75
In our conversation, Feride frequently underlined state violence and 
how women are mobilized to protest it. “Violence within the family often 
becomes secondary,” she remarked. “These women ask how they could f ile a 
complaint about their family members when those who should solve these 
very issues [i.e. the State off icials] are in fact murderers of these women’s 
spouses or sons.” In this regard, Feride aims to challenge mainstream stig-
matization of the PKK members and their families. Deceased PKK members 
should be perceived as victims of State violence; instead, the mainstream 
discourse portrays them as PKK rebels or “terrorists” who are “wiped out” 
75 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır. July 16, 2009. The PKK also formed an armed umbrella 
organization for women, Kurdistan Women’s Freedom Party, Partiya Azadiya Jinen Kurdistane, 
in 2004. 
Figure 5.7  The Roboski (Uludere) monument in Diyarbakır
courtesy of photojournalist İsmail avcı 
© İsmail avcı
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by the authorities.76 Through this frame, the women’s organizations aim 
to challenge the dominant political discourse by depicting women vs. the 
state and mothers vs. the state.
Kurdish women activists join with the larger leftist activism to force the 
Turkish State to face its dirty years. Reminiscent of the Mothers of the Disap-
peared in Argentina,77 afflicted Kurdish mothers are mobilized to make sit-in 
protests on Saturdays each week. Most “Saturday mothers” – as people call 
them – lost their children during the martial law era when the Turkish Armed 
Forces frequently interrogated alleged PKK sympathizers in the region.
The symbolism of “mothers” has proven to be quite powerful emotionally: 
when making a declaration of peace talks with the PKK, known as “Kurdish 
Opening,” then- Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan frequently said, 
“Let mothers not cry anymore!” Later, in 2011, Erdoğan accepted a group 
of “Saturday mothers” in his off ice, promising that the government would 
help f ind the perpetrators and bring them to justice.
As the Kurdish Opening failed and violence escalated between the 
Turkish State and the PKK, the mothers vs. the state framing was utilized 
more often by the ethno-nationalist activists. For example, the pro-Kurdish 
party recently erected a statue of a howling Kurdish mother under attack in 
memory of the Roboski incident when Turkish jets fired on a group of Kurdish 
smugglers and killed thirty-four civilians, acting on the information that PKK 
militants were crossing the border. At the opening of the Roboski monument 
in December 2013, the Kurdish women activists criticized the prime minister, 
pointing out that poor mothers are still crying due to military operations.78
Religious Public Symbolism: Hizbullah Finds Its Niche
Public and religious. These two words capture Hizbullah’s civil society 
activism in the region. Hizbullah activists not only have resources but 
76 The issue of collective violence (whether state violence or PKK violence) is quite controver-
sial because of the illegal state operations -what is popularly known as “deep state”- during the 
dirty war years in the 1990s. The Turkish general public, for example, interpreted Bloody Newroz 
in 1992 (where at least seventy people were killed, 150 wounded) as an act of PKK terrorism; 
whereas Kurdish public opinion strongly believed that it was an example of indiscriminate 
state violence against the Kurds (Akçura 2009: 228-38). More recently, scholars have noted the 
role of para-military groups operated under the name of JITEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence and 
Anti-Terror Struggle), an illegal unit within the Turkish Armed Forces, in provoking tensions 
under the martial law (Kaya 2009). For details, see chapter 8.
77 For details of the Argentina case, see Kurtz 2010.
78 DIHA 2014.
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also an ideological commitment to be highly active in the f ield of religious 
institutions. One would also expect the Gülen movement to be an active 
competitor in this f ield because of its Islamic ideology; yet, as noted earlier, 
Gülen activists’ phronesis, the way they conduct their educational activism, 
is quite different. They consciously avoid presenting themselves through 
religious associations. On the other hand, Kurdish ethno-nationalists’ 
Marxist roots have been an ideological barrier for them regarding public 
symbolism of religious identity. Thus, the f ield of religious institutions has 
become a natural and uncontested space for the Hizbullah activists to build 
their niches (Figure 5.8).
All Hizbullah-aff iliated associations in Turkey are gathered under an 
umbrella organization named Platform for Lovers of the Prophet (Pe-
ygamber Sevdalıları Platformu). There are also sub-platforms under the 
main one, such as the Platform for Prayer Volunteers (Namaz Gönüllüleri 
Platformu) and the Platform for Understanding the Quran (Kur’anı Anlama 
Platformu).79 The titles of the organizations themselves indicate Hizbullah’s 
willingness to represent Islamic identity in public. Organizational names 
are indeed “an effective lens through which to study collective identity” 
because naming organizations is a part of the identity construction process 
and boundary work.80
The Platform’s most effective events are annual public celebrations dur-
ing the week of the Prophet Muhammad’s birthday (according to the lunar 
calendar). Unlike numerous Islamic celebrations in small congregations, 
Hizbullah is the only movement that gathers hundreds of thousands in city 
centers for public rallies. In 2006, the movement’s organization of a mass 
rally in Diyarbakır to protest the Danish cartoons that insulted the Prophet 
drew about half a million Kurds, and this particular event triggered the 
annual meetings for the Prophet.81 Annual rallies are held in twenty-f ive 
cities and sixty-f ive districts all over Turkey.82 These mass gatherings are 
particularly important for Hizbullah activists because of their constant 
public stigmatization as “terrorists” in the Turkish media.
The celebrations have a dual function and target both activists and the 
public. For the activists themselves, the gatherings are clear indications 
79 The Mustazaf-Der recently announced that a new platform is under progress to initiate a 
campaign for hijab (Tesettür Seferberliği). See, Doğru Haber 2011.
80 Ghaziani 2011: 106.
81 The Platform also organized mass rallies for Gaza and Palestine to protest Israel’s three 
week bombing and invasion of the Gaza Strip in early 2009.
82 The information is received from Mustazaf-Der website declarations: http://www.
mustazafder.org/bildiriler.asp Accessed July 10, 2011.
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of popular support, and therefore provide a bright future prospect; for the 
public, these peaceful celebrations around the most unifying f igure, i.e. the 
Prophet, are a sign of moderate Islam instead of radicalism. “From now on,” 
wrote a leading activist after a mass gathering in Diyarbakır, “when one 
utters the word Diyarbakır, the f irst thing that comes to peoples’ minds 
would be Diyar-ı Muhammad (city of Muhammad), Diyar-ı Islam (city of 
Islam), and Diyar-ı Iman (city of Belief) … This is not only an incredibly 
unbelievable event in terms of participant numbers but also in terms of 
quality in dedication, belief, and ecstasy.”83
Strategically, the Platform’s celebrations aim to suppress the move-
ment’s differences from the majority and therefore gain public legitimacy. 
Organizing each annual celebration makes them more united within the 
group because of the collective work for preparations months before.84 
Hizbullah’s celebrations, however, were also successful in drawing many 
outsiders among Kurds.85 In 2014, years after in-group debates, Kurdish 
ethno-nationalists decided to organize their own celebrations for the 
83 Göktaş 2009.
84 For celebration and suppression strategies of social movements, see Bernstein 1997. For 
collective identity making through public symbolism, see Ghaziani’s (2008) analysis on LGBT 
marches to Washington, DC.
85 Hizbullah also started to organize public essay contests and exams about the Prophet’s 
life, knowing that similar exams and consequent award ceremonies are conducted by Gülen 
activists. See, ILKHA 2014.
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Prophet, advising their larger constituency not to attend Hizbullah 
events.86
In 2010, Hizbullah activists put another annual public event in their 
agenda: memorial meetings for Sheikh Said, a prominent Kurdish religious 
leader who revolted against Ataturk’s secularist regime in 1925. Having 
both ethnic and religious sentiments, Sheikh Said’s rebellion is considered 
as the f irst mass revolt against the modern Turkish Republic. The young 
Turkish State hanged Sheikh Said and his friends in Dağkapı Square, a 
famous square in the center of Diyarbakır. Their request for an off icial 
permit to hold a public meeting in Dağkapı Square for the eighty-sixth 
anniversary of the execution was denied. The following year, thousands of 
Hizbullah activists gathered in another public square, Batıkent Meydanı, 
and chanted slogans such as, “God is Greatest!”, “Sheikh Said, the Guide!”, 
and “Long Live Hellf ire for Tyrants!”. Hizbullah leaders gave speeches 
86 Milliyet 2014.
Figure 5.9  Annual celebration of the Prophet’s birthday, organized by Hizbullah 
activists, April 19, 2015
courtesy of photojournalist İsmail avcı 
© İsmail avcı
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in both Kurdish and Turkish, criticizing secularist as well as nationalist 
policies of the State.
Hizbullah’s symbolic claim of Sheikh Said has attracted criticism from 
the Sheikh Said family. One of the grandsons of Sheikh Said explained to 
me in detail:
Hizbullah is a modernist movement. I mean, it is a movement that tries to 
shape the society in accordance with a top-down project, which conflicts 
with the society’s nature … It is a movement against the Tarikats (Suf i 
Orders) and tradition. Yet, among the conservative Kurds, tradition and 
the Suf i orders are extremely powerful … In the month of Ramadan and 
Eid Celebrations, the majority of the religious Kurds go to the tombs. 
They rush to visit the graves of their Sheikhs or the tombs of Compan-
ions of the Prophet. What did Hizbullah say: These practices are pagan 
rituals; it is Shirk (polytheism). Many times, in funeral gatherings and 
other instances, I witnessed that the people’s hearts were broken as they 
(Hizbullah followers) expressed these ideas. Moreover, the conservative 
Kurds also have nationalist feelings … Hizbullah’s stance had never been 
close to this standpoint either.87
Nonetheless, Hizbullah’s annual mass organizations have become wor-
risome for the ethno-nationalist camp. In 2012, only a year later, the pro-
Kurdish party organized a gathering in Dağkapı Square in memorial of 
Sheikh Said’s execution. Kurdish ethno-nationalists hinted that they will 
make similar memorial events for Sheikh Said each year.88
Civic Activism and Conflict Transformation
Competitor civil society organizations are producers as well as products of 
an emerging inter-movement relationship in the region. For the f irst time in 
Turkey’s modern history, Kurdish civic sphere has become vivid, ushering 
in a new era after a long brutal war under martial law. Rival activists not 
only win the support of the local Kurds but also gain legitimate public voice 
through charity activism. The absence of a social movement in charity 
activism would mean a sign of indifference to the problems of the local 
87 The author’s interview with Muhammet Akar. Diyarbakır, July 9, 2009.
88 See the declaration at Sur Municipality’s website: http://sur.bel.tr/turkce/?p=3280 Accessed 
May 21, 2014.
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population, and therefore, a lack of voice on behalf of Kurds. Thus, social 
movement resemblance in charity activism becomes an institutionalized 
norm. In the words of Fligstein and McAdam, skilled social movement 
activists “will engage in moves that they hope will preserve or improve 
their position in the existing SAF [strategic action f ield]. These constant 
adjustments constitute a form of organizational learning.”89
On the other hand, rival movements invest in different types of associa-
tions and organizations, crafting their niche f ields. These specif ic f ields, 
however, should be seen in the larger f ield of Kurdish civil society in order 
to understand relational dynamics. The very fact that pro-Islamic actors 
are not strong players in the f ield of women’s organizations is signif icant 
in explaining niche activism of Kurdish ethno-nationalists. These moves of 
rival activists to engage “in” or “out” of a f ield are relational strategic choices, 
and consequently further reproduce an emerging culture of competition. 
Thus, when we think about the factors that shape f ield construction, i.e. 
resources, ideology, and phronesis, we need to be aware that these factors 
are not static; they are also in transformation through emerging social 
relations.
A surprising informal comment by Welat, who spent a few days with me 
to help in conducting interviews with various ethno-nationalist organiza-
tions, is enlightening here. Having served more than a year in prison, Welat 
is a neighborhood leader, mahalle eşbaşkanı, of Koma Civaken Kurdistan 
(Union of Communities in Kurdistan), PKK’s umbrella organization in 
metropolitan cities. “The most diff icult issue for us is religion,” he said. “If, 
let’s say, two members of a family save themselves from religion, f ive others 
are still trapped.”
I knew that Welat would not make such comments in a formal interview, 
so I listened to him carefully. “Kurds are the ones who have been most 
exploited by Islam, but interestingly, they are also the ones who embrace 
Islam in the most serious way.” Welat narrated how Diyarbakır was cap-
tured by Islamic forces in the 7th century and colonized for centuries. He 
concluded, “We do not discuss these things any more. That is the solution 
to this problem.” In another instance, Welat’s friend Awaz commented 
informally, “Religion is the opium of the people.”90
Pro-Islamic actors’ rising activism, however, pushed Welat and others 
into coming to terms with religion at a rapid pace. As the next chapter 
thoroughly describes, the PKK’s ideological stance has started to change 
89 Fligstein and McAdam 2011: 14.
90 Author’s personal communication. Diyarbakır, July 17, 2009.
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as ethno-nationalists become active in defining “Kurdish Islam” in various 
platforms. A relational framework, therefore, is needed to capture ideo-
logical transformation and behavioral moderation. As competitor Kurdish 
activists perceive each other as “rivals” through civic activism, they have 
become localized by moderating their stances. Activists’ localization has 
been strengthened in symbolic battles to contest authenticity of being 
genuine Kurds. In what follows, I examine how the PKK has become engaged 
in def ining Kurdish Islam while Hizbullah has discovered the Kurdish 




The most brutal relations of force are always simultaneously symbolic relations.
– Pierre Bourdieu
In the summer of 2007, a group of Kurdish patriots came together to set 
up a religious association for the f irst time in their lives. Ciwan overshad-
owed the meetings and helped them to complete off icial paperwork. As 
an outsider, he promptly recognized larger strategic changes within the 
ethno-nationalist movement. In Ciwan’s words, “The DTP [pro-Kurdish 
party] started to build an unprecedented relationship with some retired 
imams, reserving one delegate place for representation of Islamic leaders 
in its major platform [the Democratic Society Congress].”1
A few months later, the association was established in the largest Kurdish 
city, Diyarbakır. The branches of DİAYDER, Din Adamları Yardımlaşma 
ve Dayanışma Derneği (Religious Leaders’ Assistance and Solidarity As-
sociation) rapidly mushroomed in other Kurdish-populated cities in Turkey 
such as Van, Hakkari, and Şırnak as well as the major cities that witnessed 
massive Kurdish migration, including İstanbul, Mersin, Adana, and İzmir.
In its f irst public statement, DİAYDER’s İstanbul branch revealed the 
dynamics of rivalry to win the hearts and minds of the Kurds:
We want to save our youth from the Fethullah Gülen community … Our 
young people come to İstanbul and fall into traps of Fethullah Gülen or 
MHP [Nationalist Action Party] or some other Islamic parties. We would 
like to save our youth from these groups by educating them.2
Explicit recognition of major Islamic movements was also evident in my 
conversations with DİAYDER imams. I asked Ahmet Bey, founder and 
honorary president of the Association, the reason for building such a 
religious organization for an ethno-nationalist cause. “We established 
this Association to serve all the people living in Diyarbakır,” replied 
Ahmet Bey.
1 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır, July 10, 2009. 
2 Özgür Gündem 2008.
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We practice the right Islam, not having any relation with any Sheikh or 
any sect. Look at Fethullah Gülen … Now, he is all over the world today; 
and yet, I believe, many of his actions distort the Quran. Nowadays, many 
sheiks and (religious) leaders seek material benefit solely. That’s what you 
will never see in DİAYDER.3
Although I never asked about Fethullah Gülen and his movement, Ahmet 
Bey’s reference to the Gülen movement was remarkable. The subtext of 
the quote alone indicates that the ethno-nationalist imam organization 
DİAYDER has attempted to challenge its pro-Islamic “rivals” in the region, 
namely Hizbullah and the Gülen movement, through claims to represent 
authentic Kurdish Islam.
Recently, the Kurdish ethno-nationalists’ growing interest in religious 
public symbolism has introduced a hybrid pro-Kurdish identity that has 
both Marxist and Islamic roots. Challenges, however, abound. An urban 
pro-Kurdish activist in Ankara succinctly summarized the logic of transfor-
mation in our conversation: “Employing a Marxist discourse in the region 
is like dancing without music. The Southeast is extremely conservative.”4
In this chapter, I explore how Kurdish ethno-nationalists strategically 
pursue what I term symbolic localization in harmonizing ideology and 
pragmatic politics. Symbolic localization refers to a discursive process of 
collective reputation work in which social movement activists blend local 
cultural repertoires and their “we” identity in order to build recognition, 
legitimacy, and prestige in the eyes of the local population. Thus, it enables 
activists to ref ine and shape their ideology over time due to its “relational” 
character: meaning is constructed through strategic relations with competi-
tor Kurdish activists.
Revolutionary Ideology as a Discursive Process
Scholars have long emphasized the diff iculty of studying ideology. Ideology 
is a “muddy river,” as Clifford Geertz suggests, and it is perhaps “the most 
elusive concept in the whole of social science.”5 In social movement studies, 
ideology is a “cluster concept,” referring to “a relatively stable and coherent 
set of values, beliefs, and goals associated with a movement or a broader, 
3 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır, July 22, 2009.
4 Author’s personal communication, Ankara, June 23, 2009. 
5 McLellan 1986: 1.
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encompassing social entity.”6 Although the post-Cold War era signaled a 
“cultural turn” in social movement studies, the concept of ideology did not 
receive much attention due to its “pejorative legacy” in classical Marxist 
approaches.7 In the words of a leading scholar,
The problem is that most treatments of social movements that accent 
the influence of ideology rarely unpack and elaborate the character of 
ideology or how it is used and affects the ebb and f low of movement 
activity. Instead, the concept is typically applied or asserted in too blunt 
a fashion, as when it is claimed that social movement activity is ideologi-
cally structured, social movement participants are ideologically driven 
or subscribe to the same set of beliefs and ideas, or that collective action 
frames are simply derived from an extant ideology or existing cultural 
stock.
David Snow’s criticism is clearly directed at the classical social movement 
theorists who argue that activists are strongly resistant to arguments, 
evidence, and larger social forces that challenge their ideologies.8
Paying less attention to movement ideologies, social movement scholars 
developed framing analysis to study change in activists’ cultural reper-
toires.9 While the framing approach is quite useful in articulating the 
processes of strategic performances by activists in the heat of contention, 
its “focus on calculation and persuasion” overshadows how “activists are 
constrained by the discursive f ields they are trying to manipulate.”10 As 
Robert Benford argues, “underlying the descriptive bias in the movement 
framing literature is the tendency to focus on frames as ‘things’ rather 
than on the dynamic processes associated with their social construction, 
negotiation, contestation, and transformation.”11
Following Marc Steinberg, I regard ideology as a discursive process.12 I 
argue that ideologies are always in transformation through social move-
ment discourses, and so the task left to the researcher is to unpack these 
discursive processes in order to capture social change. Pointing out this 
void in the literature, Pamela Oliver and Hank Johnston note that “less has 
6 Sartori 1969: 398. Snow 2004: 396.
7 Oliver and Johnston 2000: 42.
8 Snow 2004: 397. See, for example, Turner and Killian 1972: 249; Wilson 1973: 108-24.
9 Snow et al. 1986; Benford and Snow 2000.
10 Steinberg 1999: 742; Jansen 2007: 957.
11 Benford 1997: 415.
12 Steinberg 1993.
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been written about the processes that occur when a group of committed 
activists reconstructs their ideology.”13 To f ill the void, we may consider 
ideologies as discursive processes in which activists’ mundane theories 
about the social world are judged, evaluated, discussed, and transformed. 
This dynamic view of ideology in action is best reflected in the scholarship 
of the dialogic perspective to social sciences.14
Proponents of the dialogic perspective regard the domain of ideology 
in relation to the domain of signs and semiotic practices. It is through 
discourses that social movement activists “identify and locate themselves 
in the matrix of relationships and institutions of their social world”; there-
fore, activists’ discourses are often “reflexive with these relationships and 
institutions.”15 In this sense, discourses are contextually dependent forms 
of action, and so are ideologies. Ideologies take shape under historical/
contextual circumstances, and they operate through shifting discourses 
that are deeply embedded in social relations. As Steinberg argues,
From a dialogic perspective the analysis of ideology centers on discursive 
domination and resistance, hegemony and counterhegemony … Because 
of this emphasis on domination and resistance, we analyze ideologies 
most appropriately in essentially relational terms … (A) dialogic model 
depicts ideologies as always somewhat disorderly in their structures and 
fundamentally multivocal in their potential for producing meaning; they 
have no inherent systematicity … The flux and multiplicity of meaning 
are due to both the very constitution of the signifying practices through 
which they are produced and to the relationships between the many 
formations available to actors.16
In such a relational sociology perspective, ideologies are neither blinkers 
that are put on by activists nor what Karl Marx called the “nightmare weigh-
ing on the brain of the living”; instead, they are shaped and transformed in 
social relations through semiotic practices.17 “Ideology,” maintained Gerald 
Platt and Rhys Williams, “is an assemblage of ideas about the construc-
tion of activities and circumstances oriented to achieve interests and life 
13 Oliver and Johnston 2000: 48.
14 Prominent works include Bakhtin 1981, 1986; Todorov 1984; Steinberg 1998, 1999.
15 Steinberg 1993: 316.
16 Ibid., p. 317.
17 Marx 1978: 21.
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experiences.” Thus, it is “a structurally grounded local construction … 
expressed in language discourse that orients moral, cognitive, and emotive 
process.”18
As I illustrate in the following pages, PKK activists articulate their 
worldviews in a relational manner. Activists’ consciousness of the “other” 
strongly shapes their discourse, which in turn leads to a reproduction and 
revision of the group ideology. In the words of Marc Steinberg, the “dynamic 
differentiation and complexity of an ideological formation result from a 
continual negotiation of meanings with formations used by others.” This 
ideological formation generally offers “meanings that conflict with one 
another.”19 Charles Tilly’s notion of “repertoires of contention” grasps the 
nature of social relations here. “Repertoires,” wrote Tilly, “do not descend 
from abstract philosophy or take shape as a result of political propaganda; 
they emerge from struggle.”20
The Kurdish Ethno-Nationalist Movement, Islamic Identity, and 
Symbolic Localization
Similar to many leftist revolutionary organizations, the PKK has put a 
special emphasis on ideology formation. “If you break the link between 
yourself and your ideology,” said the PKK’s leader, Abdullah Öcalan, in his 
lecture to Kurdish revolutionaries, “you will bestialize.” His essay entitled 
“Persistence on Socialism means Persistence on Becoming Human” further 
calls for commitment to the PKK’s ideology:
Instead of saying “our people are ignorant, thoughtless” which is re-
peated in abundance by everybody, we will in general say: Our people 
are ideology-less, without morals, and they have descended to the level 
of bestiality because they have been deprived of these basic concepts … 
If I were to become a great voice, the most fundamental cause of this 
would be improving myself ideologically.21
Having strong socialist and Marxist elements, however, the PKK-led Kurd-
ish ethno-nationalist movement has ideologically been at odds with the 
18 Platt and Williams 2002: 335.
19 Steinberg 1993: 318.
20 Tilly 1995: 26.
21 Quoted in Özcan 2006: 120.
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traditional culture of local Kurds who are predominantly Sunni Muslims.22 In 
this sense, the PKK insurgency has fostered “a dual rebellion – against both 
the traditional structure of Kurdish society and the Kemalist state system.”23
The guerillas regarded the traditional culture as a pacifying social force 
that made Kurds obedient to the Turkish authorities. Öcalan long empha-
sized that Sunni Islam played a strong role in maintaining the enslavement 
of Kurds. In the early PKK discourse, Zoroastrianism is the “genuine” religion 
of the Kurdish nation since Islam was introduced by “colonial” powers.24
In recent years, however, the PKK movement has had to come to terms 
with its traditional rigid stance as the movement’s goal is to win the hearts 
and minds of local Kurds. In the words of a deputy of the pro-Kurdish party, 
“We’ve had some problem with religion in the past because of the party’s 
Marxist origins. We were once more ideological, but we are becoming more 
a party of people, a party that is respectful of everyone’s views.”25
In fact, the first time the PKK changed its hostile language against Islam was 
in the early 1990s. The PKK formed the Union of Kurdistan Pious People in its 
fourth congress on December 26 1990.26 These developments, however, were not 
effective in bringing about an ideological transformation of the PKK since the 
secularist discourse was quite powerful within the movement during the 1990s.
The AKP’s success in drawing Kurdish votes, especially in the 2007 elec-
tion, has made Kurdish ethno-nationalists increasingly concerned about 
Turkish-Islamic activism, especially the Gülen movement, in the region. 
As another pro-Kurdish party deputy states,
We are not against the religion, but the Gülen community, which has been 
systematically supported in the Southeast by the dark powers, pursuing 
an organized effort to develop Turkish-Islamic synthesis. Their aim is 
to transform Kurdish society in accordance with the understanding of 
Turkish-Islam. The Gülen community is trying to form its own Kurds.27
22 From the 1970s onward, pro-Kurdish leftist organizations have relied on Marxist interpreta-
tions of religion and society. As Van Bruinessen (2004) notes, among a dozen different Kurdish 
political associations and underground parties in the 1970s, the majority of them were combining 
nationalism with some type of Marxism. All of these groups had their major support among 
university students as well as the educated urban stratum, and they were very explicit in their 
denunciation of the traditional Islamic culture that prevails in Kurdish-populated regions. 
23 Yavuz and Özcan 2006: 106.
24 Öcalan 2003: 18; Bender 1991: 71-76; Izady 1992: 136.
25 CSM 2009.
26 Çevik 2012: 96.
27 Haber24 2009.
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Threatened by the pro-Islamic AKP’s electoral success in 2007, the Kurd-
ish ethno-nationalists have started to construct a new public image that 
is at peace with Islam. A few examples include Kurdish imams’ public 
speeches in the pro-Kurdish party rallies, Abdullah Öcalan’s request for 
the establishment of a religious science academy in Urfa, the recitations of 
Mevlid – commemoration of the Prophet – in funeral ceremonies of PKK 
fighters, and public recognition of women guerillas who wear headscarves.28
According to the observations of a Kurdish journalist, the ethno-nation-
alists’ everyday interaction with local Kurds increasingly includes Islamic 
vocabulary, i.e., Selamun Aleyküm, İnşaallah, Maşallah etc., especially after 
the 2007 electoral defeat.29 Engagement with the Islamic repertoires also 
includes slogans in the ethno-nationalist rallies. In a public rally in Suruç, 
for example, activists shouted “Ya Allah, Bismillah, Seroke me Abdullah!” 
(O God, In the name of God, Our President is Abdullah).30
In Turkish media, the pragmatic utilization of Islamic discourse is often 
depicted as an insidious and cynical attempt by the PKK. The pro-Islamic 
AKP began to denounce the PKK as a defender of Zoroastrianism for the 
Kurds.31
And yet how were these aforementioned strategic changes perceived by 
the Kurdish leftist revolutionaries? In what follows, I demonstrate that the 
PKK’s ideology was refined to embrace Kurdish Islamic repertoires through 
the symbolic localization process, a process in which Kurdish activists gradu-
ally introduced local Islamic discourses and have constructed their own 
Kurdish-Islamic perspective in a dialectical opposition to Turkish-Islamic 
discourses. Therefore, symbolic localization enabled the PKK movement 
to come to terms with its traditional ideology and reconstruct ideology 
through discursive battles with its rivals in the region, namely the AKP 
and the Gülen movement. The Kurdish ethno-nationalists employed three 
mechanisms for symbolic localization: moral authority building, public 
symbolism, and memory work.
Moral Authority Building
The PKK activists aimed to gain the support of local Kurdish leaders by 
forming alliances with religious authority f igures. Murat Karayılan, the 
PKK commander, publicly visited a signif icant Naqshbandi sheikh, Sheikh 
28 See, respectively, Radikal 2008a; Hürriyet 2008a; Çiçek 2008: 65; ANF 2011a.
29 Author’s interview with Bejan Matur, Istanbul, June 11, 2009.
30 Faraç 2009.
31 Posta 2012.
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Şebendi, a few weeks before the general election in 2011. Such a symbolic 
performance was enough to encourage some Naqshbandi sheikhs to call 
all Kurds to support the pro-Kurdish party candidates.32 Moreover, pro-
Kurdish municipalities began to organize dinner receptions with Islamic 
community leaders from diverse backgrounds.
The formation of an organization for imams, Din Adamları Yardımlaşma 
ve Dayanışma Derneği (DİAYDER), was the most radical step for Kurdish 
ethno-nationalists. I was surprised to learn of these imams’ deep-rooted 
connection with Turkey’s left. Ahmet Bey is one of them:
I personally know the ’68 generation though I was very young at the 
time … Frankly speaking, we were leftist folks. Although I had a madrasa 
(Islamic religious schools) education, we were among the extreme left-
ists … We were following the steps of Deniz Gezmiş and his fellows … 
In 1976, I visited Cumhuriyet ’s [f lagship leftist newspaper in Turkey] 
headquarters in Istanbul to subscribe to the daily. Every day I was getting 
my daily newspaper as well as a number of ideological periodicals until 
the beginning of the Kurdistan Freedom Movement. Only then did I stop 
reading Cumhuriyet.33
Although it is unusual to hear these stories from an imam, Ahmet Bey’s 
life trajectory is typical of a Kurdish ethno-nationalist activist story: active 
participation in leftist movements in the 1970s and an experience of ethnic 
identity consciousness in the 1980s. His religious educational background’s 
engagement with Marxist revolutionary views enabled him to develop a 
peculiar combination of leftist ideals and an Islamic perspective: “I believe 
that someone who joins the Kurdish political movement should not say 
‘I’m a right-wing conservative or leftist or pro-Sharia [i.e., Islamic law] or 
pro-religion’; instead, (it should be as follows) ‘I’m an oppressed one, and, I 
would like to have a decent life like anybody else.’”
Another imam, who interrupted our conversation as Ahmet Bey stood 
up to greet him because of his age and scholarly knowledge, maintained 
that an ethno-nationalist worldview can accord with Islam:
One of our friends, Mele Abdullah, once said, “There is no way to establish 
Kurdistan (i.e., an independent Kurdish state).” We reacted: “O Seyda! 
Why are you talking like this!” He responded: “It’s because only Kurds 
32 Özgür Gündem 2011.
33 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır, July 22, 2009.
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remained in Allah’s hands! All others gave up the religion except Kurds.” 
This is true: After converting to Islam, Kurds have always prioritized their 
religious identity. Although they have had an ethnic consciousness, it 
has always been a secondary issue … Yet our Prophet says, “Whoever is 
killed while he/she is seeking his/her rights (against injustices), he/she is a 
martyr.” I mean, our Prophet never ever said “always seek the hereafter!”. 
In fact, God says, “thou shalt not forget this world.” But Kurds have forgot-
ten the world! On the other hand, our (Islamic) brothers – Turks, Arabs, 
and Iranians – have never shown us mercy.
As reflected in their answers to my questions, the imams tend to amalgam-
ate Islamic knowledge and a Marxist nationalist discourse. The master 
imam’s remark on being a martyr was a clear reference to the PKK guerillas 
who died in their f ight against the Turkish state.
In their activism, however, the ethno-nationalist imams are not only 
becoming involved in framing efforts to combine Islamic theology with 
local Kurdish cultural repertoires, but they also aim to construct their moral 
authority among Kurds. Anthropological studies note that Islamic authority 
making is facilitated through controlling the boundaries of religious knowl-
edge and the social boundaries of community.34 My informants frequently 
emphasized that all members of the Association graduated from madrasa.
Rooted in medieval Islamic society, the madrasa system goes back to 
eleventh-century Baghdad. It soon after emerged in Kurdish-populated 
cities in Southeastern Anatolia. The madrasas were local schools that 
provided not only education in Islamic jurisprudence ( fiqh) but also in 
philosophy, logic, and the rational disciplines. The madrasa system had been 
influential in Kurdish society until the foundation of the modern Turkish 
Republic. After enactment of the 1924 law that standardized the education 
system (Tevhid-i Tedrisat Kanunu), all traditional madrasas were off icially 
banned. Since the madrasa system has been crucial in preserving Kurdish 
national consciousness, scholars interpret these forced closures as a part 
of an assimilation project of the modern Turkish state.35 Despite the off icial 
ban, the madrasa system in Kurdish towns has survived by underground 
local support.36
As graduates of the madrasa system, the DİAYDER imams are highly 
respected in local Kurdish communities. Feeling of belonging is signif icant 
34 Yükleyen 2012: 90-96.
35 See, for example, Zinar 1998; Van Bruinessen 1992, 2000.
36 Yüksel 2009: 364.
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to note: the madrasas are owned and supported by local Kurds, unlike the 
state-sponsored İmam-Hatip schools. Moreover, the off icial ban of the 
madrasa education has made these traditional schools more open to ethno-
nationalist ideas. As renowned Kurdologist Martin Van Bruinessen notes, 
“The ban in fact may have strengthened the association of the madrasa 
with Kurdish identity, which was suppressed at the same time. Kurdish 
mullahs [scholars] were prominent among those who kept an awareness 
of Kurdish identity alive during the years when the state most forcefully 
imposed cultural assimilation.”37
The Association members explained to me how a madrasa graduate 
acquires in-depth knowledge about Islam compared to off icial state-
sponsored İmam-Hatip school graduates. They claim that state-appointed 
imams lack a true understanding of Islam as being “outsider” to the Kurdish 
local culture, and therefore, enlightening Kurds should be on the shoulders 
of the madrasa graduates – the “insider” leaders. In drawing boundaries of 
moral authority, the ethno-nationalists also utilize differences between 
Hanafi and Shafiite schools of jurisprudence in Sunni Islam by pointing out 
the fact that Kurds are predominantly Shafiite, while the majority of the 
state-appointed imams are Turkish and thus follow the Hanafi School.38
Public Symbolism
Civil Friday Prayers are perhaps the best example of the PKK’s symbolic 
localization through collective local rituals, what I call “public symbolism.” 
As the competition escalated between the pro-Islamic activists and the 
Kurdish ethno-nationalists before the 2011 general election, the PKK started 
to call on Kurds to refuse to perform the Friday prayers behind the state-
sponsored imams. Duran Kalkan, a prominent PKK commander, declared, 
“The [Turkish] state has taken religion from the hands of the people and 
made it its own religion. Kurds should open their own places of worship. 
They should f ind and feed their own men of religion … I am inviting Kurds 
to oppose a genocide carried out by the state in the f ield of religion.”39
As a part of the PKK’s civil disobedience campaign before the general 
election in June 2011, the DİAYDER imams led the prayers in public squares 
in many Kurdish-populated cities. In Diyarbakır, the Civil Friday Prayers 
were performed in the infamous Dağkapı Square where Sheikh Said was 
hanged in the early years of the Turkish Republic. Inspired by the Arab 
37 Van Bruinessen 2000: 49.
38 Sarigil and Fazlıoğlu 2013: 561.
39 ANF 2010b.
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Spring, Kurdish ethno-nationalist activists call the square Kurdish Tahrir, 
where they organize mass protests and give short brief ings to the Turkish 
press and international journalists after the prayers.40
The DİAYDER imams preached sermons in Kurdish and talked about 
rights of minorities in Islam, the need for mother tongue education in the 
country, and failures of the AKP government.41 In a sermon at Kurdish 
Tahrir, the DİAYDER president drew a symbolic line through ethnic politics, 
claiming that they oppose “the system’s mosques” as well as those imams 
who indoctrinate “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” among Kurds.42 He added, 
“Kurds might have some def iciency in terms of their politics; however, 
they do not need to learn Islam [from those imams]. We have hundreds of 
scholars who had madrasa education. They can teach religion to everyone. 
No one should attempt to give us religious lectures.”43
40 I shadowed one of these press brief ings in so-called Kurdish Tahrir on June 10, 2011. 
41 Diyarbakır Haber 2011.
42 The expression “Turkish-Islamic synthesis” is a common term that refers to a combination of 
the Directorate of Religious Affairs (DİYANET), the AKP, and the Gülen activism in the region. 
43 Yüksekova Haber 2011.
Figure 6.1  A “Civil Friday Prayer” in Dağkapı Square, Diyarbakır
Photo by the author, June 10, 2011
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After one of the prayers, the BDP deputy Sebahat Tuncel replied to Prime 
Minister Erdoğan’s criticism of the Civil Friday Prayers: “What Erdoğan 
should know well is the fact that it is not important where and how you 
offer namaz [prayer]; what matters is to pray with a strong belief. Beliefs 
are the monopoly of no one.” Tuncel’s speech was frequently interrupted 
by slogans “Ya Allah Bismillah Seroke me Öcalan!” (O God, In the Name of 
God, Our Leader is Öcalan!)44
The Civil Friday Prayers attracted great media attention and continued 
to serve the ethno-nationalist cause after the 2011 general elections.45 The 
DİAYDER imams who led the prayers later appeared on ROJ-TV and other 
pro-Kurdish channels aff iliated with the PKK in order to de-legitimize the 
AKP and the Gülen movement through an Islamic discourse. For instance, 
one of the imams condemned Fethullah Gülen’s criticisms of the PKK and 
called him a hypocrite (münafık) on a ROJ-TV news show.46
As a response, the AKP government decided to make independent 
Kurdish imams aff iliated with the state. The Directorate of Religious 
Affairs (DİYANET) announced that it would recruit about 1,000 Kurdish 
mullahs, i.e., local Kurdish imams who are graduates of the traditional 
madrasa system that is not off icially recognized. It was a conspicuous step 
to counter the Kurdish ethno-nationalists’ increasing engagement with 
Kurdish local imams. In a press conference, then-Deputy Prime Minister 
Bekir Bozdağ openly stated, “These imams are vocal and well-respected 
in their communities, and their words stop or mobilize people. Control of 
these imams by other forces will be prevented thanks to this (new off icial 
recruitment).”47
Memory Work
Pro-Kurdish activists’ frequent utilization of local Islamic repertoires in 
constructing Kurdish collective memory is a signif icant contributor to the 
PKK’s symbolic localization process. Perhaps the most striking example 
of the PKK’s memory work is in the reconstruction of Said Nursi’s identity 
as a Kurdish freedom f ighter. What makes Nursi’s persona an arena of 
competition is his equally great prestige among conservative/religious Turks 
44 Bianet 2011.
45 The Civil Friday Prayers continued until summer 2013, lasting thirty months.
46 The ROJ-TV preferred to use a religious language in presenting the news: “Fethullah Gülen 
is an inf idel!” See, HaberYek 2011.
47 Radikal 2011. Similar dynamics of contention occurred in Nicaragua when the state ap-
paratus and the aff iliated Catholic church were challenged by the liberation theologians like 
Ernesto Cardinale. See, Lewellen 1989. 
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because he is seen as the father of the Nur movement, which later generated 
the Hizmet movement of Fethullah Gülen. Thus, it is not coincidental that 
contests over Said Nursi’s persona started at precisely the time when Hizmet 
emerged as a signif icant actor in the Southeast.
Nursi was a signif icant Kurdish scholar during the late Ottoman Empire, 
and later, an outspoken critic during the early years of the Turkish Republic. 
Nursi defended the implementation of constitutional rights for Ottoman 
citizens based on an Islamic democracy. He was able to convince Sultan 
Reşad to establish a major university for Kurdish youth on the shores of 
Lake Van. Nursi also played a signif icant role in the foundation of modern 
Turkey by supporting the national independence war led by Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, and as a result, he was repeatedly invited to Ankara, the seat of 
the national government.48
The secularist policies of the new Turkish Republic, however, not only 
alienated Nursi but also criminalized him. Nursi’s magnum opus, Risale-i 
Nur – a 6,000-page-long exegesis of the Quran – was outlawed and his 
students faced harsh sentences. Spending twenty-f ive years being exiled, 
detained, or jailed, Nursi was under great pressure for being allegedly an 
enemy of the state. Nursi’s commitment to non-violent resistance as well 
as his philosophy that combines modern sciences and traditional Islamic 
sources received much attention from diverse segments of Turkish society.49 
Since Nursi’s death, his text-based activism has been fragmented into eight 
groups, including a community centered around the preacher Fethullah 
Gülen, popularly known as the Gülen movement.50
The Kurdish ethno-nationalists have long interpreted Said Nursi as “dan-
gerous” to their cause because of his strong condemnation of the Marxist 
left.51 In recent years, however, Said Nursi’s legacy is being reinterpreted. The 
ethno-nationalists often emphasize the scholar’s ethnic origin by calling 
him Said-i Kürdi (Kurdish Said) instead of Said Nursi (Said from the Nurs 
village). Surprising many, the pro-Kurdish party called for an investigation 
into Said Nursi’s lost grave by proposing a bid for the reinstatement of Nursi’s 
48 Vahide 2003: 12. For Nursi’s comprehensive biographies in Turkish, see Badıllı 1998 and 
Şahiner 1998.
49 Nursi’s text-based Islamic movement, called the Nur movement, has grown rapidly in 
post-1950 Turkey, especially among Turkish youth. According to prominent Turkish sociologist 
Şerif Mardin (1989), one cannot understand Islamic activism in Turkey without grasping the 
influence of Said Nursi.
50 Yavuz 2003: 312.
51 White 2000: 36.
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rights in the Turkish Parliament. Some PKK activists even zealously carry 
Nursi posters in Newroz (i.e. Kurdish New Year) celebrations.52
Although some prominent Kurdish Islamic groups such as Med-Zehra 
have long claimed that Said Nursi was misinterpreted by the Turkish 
Islamic Nur community, the PKK’s involvement in the debate over Said 
Nursi’s persona is quite recent. For the Med-Zehra group, Turkish follow-
ers of the Nur movement have developed “racist” misinterpretations of 
Risale-i Nur, i.e. Said Nursi’s magnum opus, and deliberately removed the 
words “Kurds” and “Kurdistan” from his writings. Med-Zehra activists 
believe that Nursi’s Kurdish identity was suppressed and certain of his 
works were overstressed at the expense of some of his earlier works. Sıddık 
Şeyhanzade, the leader of Med-Zehra, claims that there are about 500 
words that have been deliberately altered or removed in the Risale-i Nur. 
In our conversation, he claimed that these actions were undertaken by 
prominent Nur movement leaders because they found some words to be 
“politically incorrect” or “too critical” of the Turkish state regime at the 
time.53
52 Vatan 2008; Hürriyet 2008.
53 The author’s interview with Sıddık Dursun Şeyhanzade. Istanbul, June 8, 2009. Şeyhanzade 
makes similar claims in his books. See, for example, Şeyhanzade 2007: 10-13.
Figure 6.2  News story narrating how Said Nursi’s persona was used by pro-
Kurdish party (DTP) electoral campaign offices, published in 
Hizbullah’s weekly, Doğru Haber. The headline reads, “It’s Now DTP’s 
Turn to Exploit Religion.” Issue no: 49, March 6-12, 2009
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Although the Med-Zehra group’s accusations target the traditional 
Nur movements,54 these allegations are now echoed by the Kurdish 
ethno-nationalists, but with an altered target: Fethullah Gülen and his 
followers. Hizmet activists’ call for Islam is denounced as Turkif ied, so 
“hypocritical” in many ways that it even distorts its intellectual source, 
i.e. Said Nursi, because of his Kurdish roots. Framing the issue as such, the 
ethno-nationalists engage in strategic subversion, def ining Nursi’s “real” 
identity through condemning competitor activism, Hizmet.55
The ethno-nationalists especially criticize Kurdish Hizmet activists for 
their portrayal of a conformist Said Nursi. Instead, they commemorate Nursi 
as a freedom f ighter and as a staunch critic of the state. “We want both 
realities open to the public: the truths about Said-i Kürdi and his graveyard’s 
location,” said Mehmet Karabaş, a pro-Kurdish party deputy, during our 
interview in the Turkish Parliament. “Said-i Kürdi was an opponent. In his 
time, he was an opponent of the Republic, the Kemalism, and the regime.”56 
In the same vein, an ethno-nationalist commentator stated:
Said Kürdi was never afraid, nor did he hesitate to defend his beliefs. He 
always believed God would defend the Quran and that the truth of Islam 
would prevail … [However] Gülen for a long time praised the military, 
and until recently he did not dare criticize the generals. Didn’t Gülen 
know the military’s policy of wrongdoing toward the Kurdish population 
in eastern Turkey? If he knew, why did he keep silent? … When Atatürk 
invited Said Kürdi to Ankara, the Great Assembly welcomed him with 
enthusiasm and an off icial ceremony. Ankara offered him a position 
as minister of religion, but Said Kürdi was displeased at what he saw in 
Ankara and told Atatürk without hesitation that most of the Assembly 
members were ignorant of Islam and do not read the prayers f ive times 
a day. He refused to work with the secularist system.57
In criticizing the Gülen, therefore, ethno-nationalists can construct an 
authentic Kurdish Muslim identity in a new fashion.
Moreover, PKK activists re-constructed Nursi as a voice of the oppressed 
within Islamic discourse. For instance, a biographical novel, Son Derviş 
54 In my interview, Şeyhanzade mentioned a few names of Nur movement leaders without 
any reference to Fethullah Gülen.
55 See, for example, ANF 2007; Mizell 2009; Özgür Gündem 2009.
56 The author’s interview with Mehmet Nezir Karabaş, Turkish Grand National Assembly, 
Ankara, June 24, 2009.
57 See, Mizell 2009.
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(The Last Dervish), describes Nursi as a Batiniyya58 scholar who challenges 
mainstream Islam. “I believe Said-i Kürdi was a major scholar from the 
Batiniyya tradition of Islam,” says Metin Aktaş, the author. “Said-i Kürdi’s 
rebellion against the oppression of Mustafa Pasha, the commander of 
Hamidiye troops and the leader of Miran tribe as a chief landlord, in his 
youth shows his connection with the Batiniyya School. He never accepted 
social injustices, exploitation, or oppression.”59
Aktaş specif ically targets Gülen and some Kurdish Islamic groups when 
he explains how Nursi’s real identity as a Batiniyya scholar signif ies a total 
break from political Islam:
The Batiniyya School of Islam does not give importance to rituals too 
much; it does not reify them. According to Batinis, all rules and rituals 
are subject to change and renewal with only one exception: one’s love 
for the Creator. Today, some followers of Said-i Kürdi say that he believed 
in the unchangeable and non-renewable character of rules ... [Instead] 
Said-i Kürdi was a scholar who devoted his life to social change, reform, 
and justice ... Said-i Kürdi was not a person as we are told, that is, one who 
obeys the rules in rigid ways; rather, he worked for changing lifestyles 
and rules that make our people’s life hard.
Thus, the re-def inition of Nursi as a freedom f ighter is aimed to contest 
the legitimacy of rival Islamic activists. The Gülen movement is accused of 
constructing a “pro-Turkish” Nursi as “market merchandise.”60 In the words 
of the PKK leader, Abdullah Öcalan,
As known, Said Nursi did not rebel against the Republic like Shaikh Said 
did; however, he did not embrace the Republic either. Interestingly though, 
Said Nursi’s Gülenist cadres now are an important power bloc within the 
state ... They do not have anything to do with the real Islam. Genuine Islam 
ended when the children of Hz. Ali, the grandsons of Hz. Muhammad, 
were killed during the Muawiya reign. Since that period, anti-Islam has 
dominated rather than Islam. Anti-Islam equals fake Islam.61
58 Batiniyya refers to smaller and marginal groups in the Islamic community, such as Alevism, 
Ismailism, and some branches of Suf ism, which prefer private esoteric (Batini) interpretations 
of the Qur’an to more public, exoteric level of meanings (Zahiri).
59 Newroz 2009.
60 Kurdistan Post 2010.
61 Öcalan 2009c.
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Symbolic Localization and Conflict Transformation
The PKK’s strategic discursive engagement with local Islamic repertories 
is not a temporary political agenda; rather, it has shaped the ground for 
a gradual ideological transformation among ethno-nationalists. The 
PKK’s ideological transformation is clearly visible in recent writings of the 
movement’s prominent ideologue, Abdullah Öcalan. Öcalan’s late prison 
writings have long discussions on Islamic history and ethics that show the 
unprecedented ideological change in his style. Öcalan thoroughly depicts 
Islam as a revolutionizing force.62 In 2013, the PKK’s public rally for the peace 
negotiations with Turkish state was heavily Islamic in tone.63
Lately, Öcalan called PKK activists to organize major conference series 
on Islam. “Against those who betray Islam,” he said, Kurdish activists should 
have in-depth discussions “similar to the Prophet Muhammad’s consulta-
tion meetings (Şûra) in his city Medina.” Öcalan added that these gatherings 
should be “in accordance with the spirit of the historical f igures such as 
62 Öcalan 2007: 122-47.
63 For the Newroz declaration, see Milat 2013.
Figure 6.3  A store’s façade where an embroidery image of Said Nursi stands 
among those of domestic and global revolutionary figures
Photo by the author, diyarbakır, June 10, 2011
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Sheikh Said.”64 Despite welcoming this message, a pro-Kurdish party deputy, 
Altan Tan, criticized the PKK’s earlier attempts for being intellectually too 
superf icial, calling for serious scholarly engagement with Islam. Altan said 
that Öcalan’s message should spark such further Islamic activism in the PKK 
movement.65 Having Alevi background, another deputy commented that 
their movement has been at peace with Islam for a long time, as long as it’s 
not a tool of oppression in the hands of political elite. Their understanding 
of Islam, she said, is a “democratic” and “cultural” one.66
As a result of in-group discussions, a major conference, Democratic 
Islamic Congress of Kurdistan, was held in Diyarbakır in May 2014. Öcalan’s 
message to the conference highlighted the PKK’s ideological embrace of 
Islam. “My brothers in Islamic faith,” greeted Öcalan, “It is essential not to 
suffocate our movement through a false dichotomy between religious and 
secular. This dichotomy is a product of Western ideological hegemony. It 
is also wrong to squeeze Islam into these categorizations (religious versus 
secular).” In his long letter, the PKK leader stressed how both major Sunni 
and Shiite movements “betray” true Islam, mentioning the need “for a new 
institutionalization of Islam in Kurdistan.” Öcalan argued that the British 
Empire imposed nationalist ideologies to divide the Muslim world, and 
later, nation states such as Saudi Arabia and Iran excessively utilized “the 
virus of nationalism.” Öcalan further stated that Hizbullah and Al-Qaeda 
represent “contemporary fascism that was imposed on Islamic ‘ummah’ 
by capitalist nihilism.”67
Considering ideology as a relational discursive process through the notion 
of symbolic localization would shed light on the gradual changes in revolution-
ary ideologies. As defined earlier, symbolic localization refers to a discursive 
process of collective reputation work. In this process, revolutionaries blend 
local cultural repertoires and their “we” identity in order to build recognition, 
legitimacy, and prestige in the eyes of local populations. How do revolutionar-
ies attempt to localize through discursive politics? What are the mechanisms 
of symbolic localization? I suggest three cultural instruments most frequently 
employed: moral authority building, public symbolism, and memory work.
Moral Authority Building: Religious authority f igures may play a role 
as moral entrepreneurs who re-articulate revolutionary culture within the 
mainstream discourse. Once institutionalized, these discursive practices 
64 Hürriyet 2013.
65 Radikal 2013b.
66 BBC Türkçe 2013.
67 ANF 2014b.
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might form a new source of legitimacy. I call this process “moral authority 
building.” Moral authority building provides strong emotional power for 
revolutionaries in the larger society. Nonetheless, the group’s ideology is in 
gradual transformation in this discursive process. Revolutionaries become 
entrenched in their moral discourse in a relational manner: the Kurdish 
ethno-nationalist imams targeted the rival Islamic groups, questioning 
their authenticity.
These imams introduced ideological diversity within the movement and 
thus contributed to the PKK’s ideological transformation. Hank Johnston’s 
research on Spain highlights the importance of ideological diversity within a 
social movement. Studying the Catalonian anti-Franco movement, Johnston 
points out that the Christian, Marxist, and conservative ideological ele-
ments expanded the movement’s “ability to encompass a variety of different 
interpretations and to incorporate new and unfamiliar events.”68 The PKK 
movement has further gained ideological diversity by supporting popular 
68 Johnston 1995: 240.
Figure 6.4  An electronic billboard advertising Altan Tan, a renowned pro-Islamic 
politician, as a pro-Kurdish party nominee
Photo by the author, diyarbakır, June 10, 2011
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(and subsequently elected) candidates having Islamic worldviews such as 
Altan Tan, Serafettin Elci, and Hüda Kaya.69
Public Symbolism: Another discursive mechanism of symbolic localiza-
tion is “public symbolism.” As discussed above, revolutionaries’ public image 
is often tarnished as they are labeled as terrorists. In dealing with this 
stigma, revolutionaries construct innovative discursive rituals in which 
they could engage with the public at large. These rituals are collective and 
often performed by moral authority f igures whose words can attract public 
attention. Appealing to moral authority on their behalf, revolutionaries 
utilize vernacular religious repertoires to resonate with local residents. 
Through these moral performances, radical activists seek to change public 
perception and thus to be accepted as a part of the moral domain. “If the 
f irst step in dehumanization is to reduce an other to a simple phrase, an 
enemy, a parasite, or a terrorist,” writes Ron Eyerman, “the first step in moral 
performance or empathy is attentiveness to the complexity of another’s 
status and situation, something which can be viewed as an attribution of 
subjectivity.”70
Revolutionary appeals to moral authority in order to win public sympathy 
were evident in the Nicaraguan and Iranian revolutions in 1979. Sandinistas 
gained remarkable attention as they employed liberation theology discourse 
through collective rituals in churches. Similar to the Kurdish imams exam-
ined here, public events led by Catholic priests provided a broader base of 
legitimacy for the Sandinistas’ armed group, FSLN. Although these priests 
were not among the guerilla f ighters, they acted as organic intellectuals 
for the poor masses.71 Public symbolism enabled the Sandinistas to localize 
due to the pervasiveness of Christian values in Nicaraguan culture. In this 
process of symbolic localization, Sandinista ideology was mobilized as 
well. Giulio Girardi documents how these Catholic activists broadened 
Sandinista discourse toward a more inclusive orientation.72
Memory Work: Memory work refers to a discursive process of revisiting 
the past through new lenses in order to shape the present. Agents of memory 
69 Ideological diversity, however, may lead to in-group disputes and clashes. See, Benford 1993. In 
this sense, the relational quality of symbolic localization is an important dynamic to understand: 
the competition drive has impeded in-group strife. The Kurdish imams are embraced by the 
PKK movement, including its most secular elements, because of the fact that the local Islamic 
representation boosted the PKK’s status over its rivals (the AKP and the Gülen movement).
70 Eyerman 2006: 201.
71 Sawchuk 1997: 46.
72 Girardi 1989: 36-38.
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often f ight over who should be remembered and how to interpret the past.73 
As Eric Hobsbawm points out, nationalist activists often supported their 
cause by reference to a “people’s past,” to “traditions of revolution,” and to 
the activists’ “heroes and martyrs.”74 Such re-construction of local historical 
f igures provides revolutionaries legitimacy, recognition, and moral power 
among indigenous populations.
Memory work, however, is bounded by the local competition structures. 
“People’s ability to reconstruct the past,” claims Michael Schudson, “is 
limited by the crucial social fact that other people within their awareness 
are trying to do the same thing.”75 Through Said Nursi and Sheik Said, 
Kurdish ethno-nationalists are involved in “mnemonic battles” with their 
pro-Islamic rivals, and thus, shaping their narratives in a relational man-
ner.76 These interactive and dynamic semiotic practices of revolutionaries 
influence the movement ideology in the long term.
I now turn to a most intriguing contemporaneous process: Hizbullah’s 
symbolic localization. Pro-Islamic activists have increasingly become ethno-
nationalist under the forces of civil society competition. Conflict transforma-
tion has been underway as Kurdish, Islamic, and ethnic identities blur.
73 Ducharme and Fine 1995; Zerubavel 1996.
74 Hobsbawm 1983: 13. See also, Wickham-Crowley 1989: 143.
75 Schudson 1989: 112.
76 For the term “mnemonic battles,” see Zerubavel 1996: 295-97.

7 Îslam Çareser e
Islamic Activists Discover Kurdish
In 2009, the AKP government launched an off icial Kurdish TV channel, 
TRT Şeş, when the Constitutional Court was preparing for the closure of 
yet another pro-Kurdish party, the DTP, due to its links to the PKK. Prime 
Minister Erdoğan inaugurated the channel by uttering the Kurdish words 
“TRT Şeş bi xêr be!” (May TRT 6 be beneficial!). The pro-Islamic party’s move 
was a surprising step to many Kurds and was called “a great revolution.”1 
Turkey’s weakening secularist elite seemed not happy about these reforms; 
only two years before the launch of TRT Şeş, the highest administrative 
court ruled to dismiss Abdullah Demirbaş, the mayor of Diyarbakır’s Sur 
Municipality, on the grounds that the municipality had published some 
brochures “in languages other than Turkish” (read: Kurdish).2 Soon after the 
pro-Islamic AKP’s introduction of TRT Şeş, private enterprises were allowed 
to open channels in Kurdish. Two brands were quick to step onto the stage; 
Dünya-TV and Çağrı TV, owned by the Gülen movement and Hizbullah.
The PKK had long enjoyed a monopoly over Kurdish channels since the 
establishment of MED-TV, later named ROJ-TV, in 1995, as a satellite TV 
channel that operates in various European countries.3 As the PKK’s mo-
nopoly was now challenged by pro-Islamic actors, the Kurdish language has 
become an arena of f ierce contestation. Through competition, pro-Islamic 
activists have gradually become pro-Kurdish in their discourse. I argue 
that this discursive shift paves the way for an ideological transformation 
and the symbolic localization of pro-Islamic actors despite the presence of 
1 Author’s interview with Abdurrahman Kurt, a Kurdish deputy from the AKP at the time, 
in the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Ankara. June 26, 2009. The prime minister’s speech 
reminded the Turkish public of the Leyla Zana crisis in the parliament. In 1991, pro-Kurdish 
party deputy Leyla Zana was banned from politics and imprisoned because she had spoken 
Kurdish during the oath ceremony at the Turkish Grand National Assembly.
2 The multilingual municipality services also included Syriac and English. For the details of 
the case, see Olson 2009: 41-42.
3 The Turkish State’s ban on using Kurdish in mass communication was the primary reason 
for this monopoly. See, Hassanpour 1998; Romano 2002. Due to pressure from Turkey, MED-TV’s 
license was revoked by the UK in 1999. PKK activists established a new channel, MEDYA-TV, in 
France. Again, upon Turkey’s pressure on France, the French authorities shut down MEDYA-TV 
in 2004. Within a few months, Kurdish ethno-nationalists successfully established ROJ-TV, this 
time in Denmark. Since 2004, the Turkish authorities demand ROJ-TV’s closure, preparing more 
than twenty f iles that indicate the link between the channel and the PKK. See, Ayata 2011: 528. 
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nascent ethno-nationalist feelings, especially observed through their keen 
interest in the Kurdish language. Thus, rival Kurds’ civic competition does 
not only lead to the PKK’s ideological embracement of Islam but also to a 
transformation in the Gülen and Hizbullah movements.
Increasing Competition over Kurdish Language
The “war of words” between TRT Şeş and ROJ-TV began very early on:
On 19 September (2008), Ibrahim Şahin, director of TRT, announced 
to reporters that the TRT Kurdish channel would begin in March 2009 
and would be broadcast on, interestingly enough, ROJ-TV, and it would 
be available anywhere that ROJ-TV was broadcast. This announcement 
certainly must have been met with surprise by the 56 Kurdish mayors 
who had been indicted for requesting Denmark’s Prime Minister Fogger 
Rasmussen not to shut down ROJ-TV, which broadcasts from his country.4
TRT Şeş noticeably challenged ROJ-TV in its programming and outreach, 
and the competition was clear to the naked eye. As I entered the room of 
Sinan İlhan, the founding director of TRT Şeş, he had two large TV screens, 
airing TRT Şeş and ROJ-TV. İlhan claimed that TRT Şeş truly respects the 
Islamic identity of Kurds and that ROJ-TV just started recently to air Islamic 
cultural programs in order to compete with TRT Şeş.5 My conversations with 
Remzi Ketenci, the director of the Dünya-TV based in Antep, left a similar 
impression on me: pro-Islamic activists aim to block the PKK’s propaganda 
by reaching out to the Kurds in their native language.6
As a response, the PKK especially targets those Kurds who make shows for 
TRT Şeş. Appearing on ROJ-TV, Bahoz Erdal, a chief PKK commander, stated 
that “anyone who participates in the TRT Şeş is a jash, traitor.”7 Pro-PKK 
media often call TRT Şeş “TRT Jash” pejoratively. These threats discouraged 
Kurdish musicians and local male singers (dengbêj), and therefore, TRT Şeş 
experienced diff iculties in recruiting celebrities.8
4 Quoted in Olson 2009: 45. ROJ-TV now broadcasts in seventy countries around the world 
via satellite, reaching even Kurdish refugees in Japan and Australia (Ayata 2011: 526). 
5 Author’s interview with Sinan İlhan at TRT headquarters off ice. Ankara, June 28, 2009. See, 
also, Ayata 2011: 530.
6 Author’s interview with Remzi Ketenci, Gaziantep, May 30, 2011.
7 KM 2009.
8 Ayata 2011: 531.
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Kurdish ethno-nationalists primarily frame TRT Şeş as a Turkish state 
project instead of a pro-Islamic project. As my informants often repeated, 
“The state has long cursed Kurds in Turkish. Now it curses in Kurdish.” The 
foreign news editor of Azadiya Welat, the PKK’s f lagship daily in Kurdish, 
put it in plain terms: “These reforms are part of the war against Kurds. So 
TRT Şeş should not even be called a reform. And yet Kurds will surely benefit 
from this de facto condition.”9
The long-term ethno-nationalist strategy, however, was not simple 
criticism: the pro-Kurdish party launched the “Education in the Mother 
Tongue Initiative” just a few days after the government’s announcement 
of the TRT Şeş initiative. “There will be demonstrations for the right of 
education in the mother language,” said pro-Kurdish party group leader 
Selahattin Demirtaş. “We will support this campaign within the framework 
of a democratic plan.”10
9 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır, July 12, 2009.
10 Olson 2009: 47.
Figure 7.1  A TZP Kurdî protest banner in Kurdish national colors red, yellow, and 
green. It reads “As my tongue slays, my sword would never be in its 
sheath.”
Photo by the author, diyarbakır, May 28, 2013
134 Rival KuRdish MoveMenTs in TuRKey 
The PKK decided to strengthen its civic platform, TZP Kurdî (Tevgera 
Ziman û Perverdehiya Kurdî), Movement for Kurdish Language and Education. 
Although TZP Kurdî was formed in 2006, it was not strongly supported within 
the Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement until the “Education in the Mother 
Tongue Initiative” began in late 2008.11 Kurdish language institutes such as 
Institute Kurdî, opened following the EU-led reforms in 2004, were brought 
under the umbrella of TZP Kurdî.12 TZP Kurdî organized mass protests in vari-
ous Kurdish cities and called for a boycott of the public educational system.13
TZP Kurdî also celebrates International Mother Language Day, February 21, with 
various activities.14 In a major conference on education in the mother tongue in 
August 2013, TZP Kurdî declared the path for pushing the agenda systematically:
– TZP-Kurdî sees education in the mother tongue as an indispensable 
right and doesn’t make it a matter of debate. In this respect, it condemns 
Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s statements (in which 
he had said that the recognition of Kurdish as a language of education 
would lead to a separation in the country).
– All Kurdish institutions and establishments, as well as their executives 
and politicians, should perform their work in the Kurdish language. 
Delegates of the Conference will be responsible for the supervision of 
these works.
– Students and teachers at all schools should communicate with each 
other in their mother tongue.
– Simultaneous demonstrations should take place in all provinces and 
districts every week to voice the demands for mother tongue education.
– Mass demonstrations should take place everywhere on 16 September 
(the beginning of the school year).
– All Kurdish establishments should reject the institutions that perform 
their language work in line with the mindset and interests of the state.
– All Kurdish municipalities should open kindergartens providing educa-
tion in the mother language.
– All executives and deputies nominated as candidates for local and 
general elections should certainly know their mother language very 
well.
11 Qahir Bateyî, then spokesperson of TZP Kurdî, complained that initially they were not 
taken seriously within the PKK movement. See, his interview with Mehmet Ali Küçük (2008). 
12 Author’s interview with an activist at Institute Kurdî, Diyarbakır Kürt Enstitüsü. Diyarbakır, 
July 12, 2009. 
13 Kaya 2013: 116.
14 ANF 2014a.
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– All executives and workers of Kurdish municipalities should use their 
mother tongue in daily life and develop projects on the mother tongue 
issue.15
Within a few weeks, the AKP government declared new constitutional 
amendments that targeted some barriers to the use of Kurdish language. 
Accordingly, the establishment of private schools that give education in the 
mother tongue is endorsed. Moreover, political parties are allowed to make 
propaganda in “other” languages (that is, Kurdish). Many pro-Kurdish party 
members had been criminalized due to their public speeches in Kurdish 
during their electoral campaigns.16
The government’s “democratization package” also included the recogni-
tion of the right to claim local (original) village names. Since thousands 
of Kurdish villages were systematically renamed by the Turkish state, the 
pro-Kurdish party had earlier proposed re-naming of settlements, thus, 
naming in Kurdish.17
Unlike in the PKK’s early years, Kurdish ethno-nationalists are now 
careful to express local city names in Kurdish in their publications as well 
as in daily routines. A few examples include Amed instead of Diyarbakır, 
Riha instead of Urfa, Dilok instead of Antep, and Hewler instead of Erbil. In 
some cities, the verbal expression would not make much of a difference, 
such as Van (in Turkish) and Wan (in Kurdish). However, if written as Wan, 
the city is symbolically claimed against the “oppressive” Turkish regime. 
Until September 30, 2013, the Turkish Constitution rejected employment 
of letters such as “w” that are not included in the law with respect to the 
Latin alphabet revolution in 1928. Although the law was meant to abolish 
15 For the full f inal declaration of the conference, see ANF 2013. 
16 Nicole Watts (2010: 116) narrates how pro-Kurdish party activists’ increasing usage of Kurdish 
language was legally punished:
“In 2006 and 2007 at least twenty investigations of the Diyarbakır metropolitan municipality 
and the Diyarbakır municipalities of Sur and Kayapınar were opened for activities that included 
the following: billboards advertising a human rights week in Turkish, Kurmanji, and Zazaki; the 
Sur municipality’s release of a Kurdish translation of the free Linux software release ‘Ubuntu’; 
municipal use of Kurdish to off iciate during wedding ceremonies; publication of children’s 
books in Kurdish and Turkish; publication of public brochures on health and cleanliness in 
Kurdish and Turkish; and the publication by the greater Diyarbakır metropolitan municipality 
of a book of Kurdish baby names. As of mid-2008 about twenty-f ive of the legal prosecutions 
against Baydemir [then Mayor of the Diyarbakır metropolitan municipality] directly concerned 
use of the Kurdish language.” 
17 For the democratization package in details, see Radikal 2013a. The pro-Kurdish DTP’s 
proposal, an amendment to Law 5442, dated back to April 20, 2008. Thus, the AKP’s response 
in September 2013 was an outcome of long contentious politics. For details, see Jongerden 2009. 
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the Arabic alphabet in modern Turkey, it was frequently utilized against 
the Kurdish language that employs the non-Turkish (unlisted) letters ‘w,’ 
‘x,’ and ‘q.’
The Gülen movement strongly supported the AKP’s new language re-
forms. Earlier, in the summer of 2013, Fethullah Gülen gave an interview to 
Rudaw, a Kurdish newspaper in Iraqi Kurdistan, expressing his support for 
education in the mother tongue. Recognizing the AKP’s bargaining plans 
by utilizing such reforms, Gülen emphasized that such issues should not 
be objects of any political bargaining:
Human rights and freedoms are natural rights and no one has the author-
ity to grant those rights to others as if they were favors … It is bizarre to 
discriminate based on ethnic differences since being Turkish or Kurdish 
was not our choice. All human beings, including prophets, are equal since 
they were created by God as humans.
In the same interview, Gülen also challenged the off icial Turkish dis-
course by stating that Turkey should not only grant Kurdish rights but 
also take a leading role in defending and supporting all Kurds around 
the globe.18
Fethullah Gülen’s statements were influential in shaping Hizmet’s dis-
course. When asked about Hizmet’s proposal for education in Kurdish, the 
chairman of the Journalists and Writers Foundation, a prominent Hizmet 
organization, pointed out the fact that the movement Gülen schools abroad 
offer four languages, namely the local language, regional language, English, 
and Turkish. He suggested a similar policy in Turkey:
When we earlier proposed a constitutional model too, we had put forward 
the proposal that no constitutional restriction should exist for the Kurd-
ish language to be taught as a local language. In this regard, it is essential 
that the curriculum at such schools is redesigned in line with the local 
people’s demands in the Southeast.19
Following the AKP’s declaration of democratization packet, a private 
Hizmet school in Şırnak announced that it was institutionally ready for 
18 Rudaw also highlighted this point by making the interview headline read: “Dive Tirkiye 
Bibe Parezvana Mafen Kurdan Li Seranseri Dinyaye,” [Turkey must be an advocate for Kurds’ 
rights around the world] Rudaw, June 30, 2013 http://rudaw.net/kurmanci/interview/30062013
19 HMNP 2013. 
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full education in Kurdish. Fethullah Gülen called on the state off icials to 
take serious and swift steps to train Kurdish language teachers in order to 
back reforms institutionally. He added, “these steps should not be taken in 
an offensive manner as if it is a gift granted upon them.”20
Well known for organizing the annual Turkish Language Olympiads, 
Hizmet activists now set up International Language and Culture Fests 
instead, putting Kurdish and Arabic on equal footing with Turkish. 
Hizmet school teachers in Iraqi Kurdistan share their experiences with 
the activists in Diyarbakır and Batman: education in Kurdish, Arabic, 
Turkish, and English has been a signature feature of Hizmet schools in 
Kurdistan, serving students from Kurdish, Turkmen, and Arab back-
grounds. Gülen activists also relate their embrace of the Kurdish language 
to the ideas of Said Nursi, who is accepted as the ideological founder of 
Hizmet schools.21
20 Zaman 2014.
21 For Nursi’s philosophy and Hizmet schools, see Tee and Shankland 2013.
Figure 7.2  A flyer in Kurdish for International Language and Culture Fest, 
organized by Gülen/Hizmet activists
Photo by the author, Batman, June 1, 2013
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The opening of TRT Şeş not only triggered “a war of words,” but also influ-
enced the growing ethnic pride of Islamic activists. Such official recognition 
of the Kurdish language has encouraged the public use of Kurdish at local 
events in the civic sphere including mosques, coffee houses, funeral homes, 
and wedding ceremonies. In mosques, people began to hear recitations of 
mevlid, i.e. commemoration poems for the Prophet Muhammad, in Kurdish 
instead of Turkish.22 Nur brotherhood groups such as Nûbihar have become 
more active in publications in Kurdish, even engaging linguistic debates 
unprecedentedly.23 A representative of Nûbihar, for example, told me that 
they avoid the secularist fallacy of Kurdish ethno-nationalists in the usage of 
Kurdish. Similar to the Turkish state’s early Republican period, PKK-linked 
media discards Arabic-rooted words in Kurdish; instead, they systematically 
choose Persian-rooted words.
More visibly, Hizbullah has also started to become active in Kurd-
ish Islamic music. The groups’ musicians take center stage in wedding 
celebrations and commemorational gatherings of their potential constitu-
ency. The movement now has its own production company, Özlem Ajans, 
which releases new albums each year. Mihemed, one of the prominent 
singers of Hizbullah, perceives their effort as a contribution to the Kurdish 
culture: “Regardless of sales, we try to make an album in every two-three 
months as a cultural work. We’ve been making albums in both Kurdish 
and Turkish for a long time; yet lately we have focused our concentration 
on albums in Kurdish.” In our conversation, Mihemed also explained 
how they emulate Kurdish ethno-nationalists in making Kurdish protest 
music:
It began with a question like why don’t we have our own Ahmet Kaya.24 
Defending your own rights and raising your voice cannot be possible 
through songs for love of God. In fact, those who love God are the ones be-
ing oppressed and we would like to give them voice through our music.25
Pro-Islamic activists, thus, have started to localize symbolically.
22 Radikal 2009c.
23 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır, May 31, 2013.
24 Ahmet Kaya (1957-2000) was a famous Kurdish poet and singer. His protest music against 
oppression and state violence has been influential among both Kurdish and Turkish leftists. He 
left Turkey in 1999 because of charges against him because his political views are sympathetic 
to the PKK. 
25 Author’s interview. Istanbul, June 7, 2009.
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Hizbullah: From Ayatollah Khomeini to Said Nursi
Although active as an underground organization since the 1980s, Hizbullah 
published its f irst document in 2004, Hizbullah In Its Own Words: Selections 
from the History of Struggle written by the movement’s new leader Isa Altsoy 
under the pseudonym I. Bagasi. In this short book, Altsoy emphasized the 
movement’s embedded nature of Kurdish-ness:
Hizbullah is an Islamic movement, centered in Kurdistan, dedicated to 
defending the Muslim Kurds’ Islamic and human rights and to f inding 
solutions to historical, social, political, economic, and cultural problems 
through an Islamic approach. Hizbullah’s duty is to struggle against 
oppression, tyranny, and injustice to make Kurds free.26
The document was revolutionary. It was not only the f irst publication in the 
name of Hizbullah but was also a declaration that it was to be a “Kurdish” 
movement. The book signaled the path for Hizbullah in the next decade. 
In the same year, Hizbullah activists opened Mustazaf-Der, the f irst civil 
society organization of the movement. Since then, they have narrated their 
movement’s history to emphasize its Kurdish Islamic identity. During the 
1990s, however, when Hizbullah was in a bloody f ight against the PKK, 
Hizbullah used to emphasize the global Islamic community, ummah, 
circulating the writings of globally renowned Islamists such as Ayatollah 
Khomeini, Sayyid Qutb, and Ali Shariati.27
Published since 2008, Hizbullah’s weekly newspaper Doğru Haber often 
depicts the movement activists as defenders of pro-Kurdish rights. In 2009, 
the movement launched a quarterly magazine, Banga Ḧeq Ji Kelhaamed: 
Kovara İslamî Çandî u Hunerî, published in two major Kurdish dialects that 
are common among Turkey’s Kurds, i.e. Kurmanji and Zazaki. The very 
f irst issue of Kelhaamed starts with one of the writings of Said Nursi that 
is directed at the Kurdish community (originally published in a Kurdish 
newspaper in 1908).
Subsequent issues include articles that describe how Nursi’s oppressed 
identity is symbolic of a larger oppression of Kurdish Muslims, specif ically 
Hizbullah activists. In claiming Kurdish Islam, Hizbullah now presents 
notable Kurdish Muslim scholars like Ehmedê Hanî, Sheikh Said, and 
Said Nursi as inspirational leaders for their activism. The movement’s 
26 Bagasi 2004: 65.
27 Uslu 2007: 124.
140 Rival KuRdish MoveMenTs in TuRKey 
weekly Doğru Haber devotes one full page to the local Kurdish Muslim 
f igures.
Said Nursi receives special emphasis in Hizbullah discourse for two major 
reasons. First, Hizbullah aims to repair its tarnished image as “violent jihad-
ists” in the mainstream media. As a leading voice of non-violence, Said Nursi 
offers a clear public message that Hizbullah denounces violent methods in 
its struggle. Unlike the PKK’s depiction of Nursi the rebellious, Hizbullah 
emphasized Nursi’s non-violent activism as an oppressed (mustazaf ) Kurd.
Second, claiming Nursi as their inspirational leader, Hizbullah activists 
engage with local Kurdish repertoires and therefore further gain legitimacy 
in public. This symbolic localization occurs through strategic subversion; 
Nursi’s relation with other rival Islamic groups such as Gülen/Hizmet move-
ment is questioned as Hizbullah depicts Nursi as “Kurdish.” Thus, Hizbullah 
re-constructs itself as defender of Kurdish Islam through the re-construction 
of Nursi and the de-legitimization of Gülen/Hizmet.
Hizbullah activists narrate how they have a deep spiritual connection 
with Said Nursi. In my conversation with Mahmut, who served ten years in 
Figure 7.3  Said Nursi as portrayed on the cover of Kelhaamed, Hizbullah’s journal 
in Kurdish. Issue no: 8, Spring 2011
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prison for his links to Hizbullah, I learned that their spiritual connection 
has grown:
When we were jailed, our f irst religious discussion was based on Risale 
[i.e. Nursi’s writings]; it was a great source of strength. So we pay much 
attention to the Risale. It is one of our fundamental sources. Other Islamic 
scholarly collections are of course important for us, but the Risale is an 
exceptional treasure.28
Hizbullah also reinterpreted the historic struggle of Said Nursi. For ex-
ample, a publication about Nursi’s life repeatedly refers to the community 
of Nursi followers (in the early years of the Turkish Republic) as Cemaat 
(“the Community”), which is what Hizbullah is called by its own members. 
The book often refers to students of Nursi as “mujaheeds” despite the fact 
that Nursi never employed such a term in any of his letters and books. It 
also refers to Nursi as “the Great Mujaheed” and Rehber (“the Guide”) of 
his community – reminiscent of how Hüseyin Velioğlu is commemorated 
among Hizbullah members.29
Other Nur communities and Hizmet are quite skeptical about Hizbul-
lah’s narrations of Nursi. Many Hizmet activists feel that Hizbullah has 
no genuine interest in Nursi other than to exploit his image. Hizbullah, in 
response, often calls on other Nur communities to reread Nursi and to revisit 
his message, as Nursi, carrying “the intention of fostering enmity,” was “the 
founder and leader of a movement that tried to establish and reinforce a 
communal union against the (Turkish secularist) regime.”30
The call to revisit Nursi’s message is especially directed at the Gülen 
movement. Pointing to Hizmet activists in our interview, for example, 
Hasan remarked:
They do not apply themselves to acting upon their readings [of Nursi 
writings]. Although Üstad31 [Said Nursi] tried to bring forth his writings 
by undertaking all kinds of efforts, hardships, and suffering – and he tried 
his best to act upon his writings – these people now are very comfortable, 
and they have complete free-floating manners. I do not know how to say 
it, I mean, they are so at peace with the dominant power in effect; they 
28 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır. July 25, 2009.
29 Şakir 2007: 57, 68, 77, 157. See also, Tutar 2009: 82.
30 Şakir 2007: 24, 153; Özbey 2009: 45-47.
31 Said Nursi is often referred to as Üstad, i. e. the Master Teacher, by those who admire him.
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show their acceptance of power holders through serving the status quo 
voluntarily ... These brothers, indeed, should re-examine themselves and 
f ind the Risale [Nursi’s writings].32
Hizbullah’s criticisms of Hizmet, however, do not stem only from their 
Islamic ideals. Nursi’s ethnic Kurdish identity is often stressed to emphasize 
Gülen’s Turkish roots. In this way, the reconstruction of Nursi occurs as a de-
legitimization of rival claims, and therefore, functions as a de-legitimizing 
force. In Hasan’s words again:
Üstad’s persistent representation as Sayyid, i. e. the descendant of the 
Prophet Muhammad, is another important issue. Üstad himself says 
that “I’m a Kurd, I’m not a Sayyid.” He stresses this point insistently. He 
says that he might be considered a Sayyid in a spiritual way because of 
his servanthood to the Quran, but he was not a Sayyid in fact ... Yet, they 
persistently call him a Sayyid. Why? “He is not a Kurd,” they mean; the 
issue comes to that point.
Thus, the evolution of Hizbullah from a global revivalist movement to a 
local Kurdish Islamic one should be read in light of the larger political 
context. Hizbullah’s rivals have increasingly become active in the Kurdish 
Islamic sphere. On the one hand, Hizbullah’s Islamic rivals in the Kurdish 
civil society such as the Gülen movement have gained momentum in the 
past decade. On the other hand, Hizbullah’s Kurdish rivals, primarily the 
PKK-led ethno-nationalists, have increasingly utilized Islamic repertoires. 
Hence, Hizbullah’s emphasis on Kurdish identity has helped to challenge 
its Turkish-Islamic rivals in the region; whereas, Hizbullah’s Islamic claims 
have distinguished the group from many Kurdish ethno-nationalists. In 
this sense, local Kurdish Islamic symbols that enable the combination of 
these two identities have become very important for Hizbullah activists.
HÜDA-PAR: Calling the Party of God in Kurdish
The Hizbullah trial was f inally concluded in Diyarbakır’s Sixth Court in 
December 2009 with the decision to sentence all of the suspects to life in 
prison. Upon the Hizbullah members’ appeal, the f ile was forwarded to the 
Supreme Court of Appeals. On January 4, 2011, in accordance with a recent 
32 Author’s interview, Diyarbakır. July 25, 2009.
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amendment to the Turkish criminal code that set a limit of ten years for 
the time detainees can be held without being sentenced in a f inal verdict, 
the eighteen members of Hizbullah were released from jail.33 Most of the 
released – including higher-ups Edip Gümüş and Cemal Tutar – have failed 
to check in with their local police stations as required by law. The Ninth 
Chamber later released a warrant for their re-arrest, but the police have so 
far failed to locate the fugitives.
Soon after these dramatic events, Turkish authorities closed Hizbullah’s 
key civil society organization, Mustazaf-Der (Association for the Oppressed), 
in 2012. Mustazafin (sing. mustazaf ) literally means “those who were weak-
ened under the yoke of a brutal power” or simply “underdog.” The word 
gained a new conceptual meaning during the 1979 Iranian Revolution, which 
is also known as “the revolution of mustazafin.” In his writings, Ali Shariati, 
an Iranian sociologist whose works were embraced by the revolutionaries, 
identified the term “proletariat” with mustazaf, whereas the bourgeoisie was 
the equivalent of mustakbar, i.e. arrogant.34 Thus, the notion of mustazaf 
clearly developed a strong connection with global Islamic revivalism.
As their key organization was closed, Hizbullah activists decided to 
follow the path of Kurdish ethno-nationalists by forming a legal political 
party to be represented in the Turkish parliament. This ambitious project 
entailed further localization among Kurds. They picked a name for their 
political party, Free Cause Party, apparently for its acronym: HÜDA-PAR, 
which is “The Party of God” in Kurdish, equivalent of Hizbullah (The Party 
of God in Arabic). Hizbullah to HÜDA-PAR was not a simple name change 
from Arabic to Kurdish but a symbolic localization strategy: the colors of 
the party flag, green and yellow, express both Islamic and Kurdish identity.35
The next chapter explores competing narratives in the process of symbolic 
localization and conflict transformation. I discuss how competitor Kurdish 
activists engaged in narrative contests about illegal state operations against 
the Kurds. In order to gain visibility and legitimacy in public, all competing 
movements blame the “Turkish deep state” and those who collaborated with 
the state during the 1990s. The narrations of the deep state and its allies, 
however, are radically contested by competing movement narratives and 
bounded with the inter-movement rivalry dynamics in the region.
33 In Turkey, an inmate under arrest becomes a convict only after the approval of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals, which combines the functions of courts of cassation and appeals.
34 Taheri 2008: 217.
35 HÜDA-PAR’s major events such as annual celebration of the Prophet’s birthday have become 
more reflective of Kurdish national colors. See chapter 5.

8 Enemies of the “Deep State”
Narrative Contests and Symbolic Localization
The real rulers of a nation are undiscoverable.
– Felix Frankfurter
The state is an abstraction, only the people is a concrete fact.
– Karl Marx
It was a blazing summer afternoon in Diyarbakır and a few days before 
the crucial nationwide elections in 2011. As violence escalated in the 
city, so did questions. I ran into DIAYDER’s main off ice to get a sense of 
new developments. My passion to understand the strategic logic of the 
alleged PKK attacks on a few imam-preacher schools led to my asking 
tough questions to Zahit Bey, the executive director of DIAYDER. The 
imam’s cold response was not only a denial of PKK involvement, but also 
a challenge to my curious tone: “One would hardly know what is actually 
happening behind the scenes. Here, things are not the way it appears to 
one’s eye.”
The imam’s reference to dark forces in everyday Kurdish politics has lately 
become an arena for cultural contestation. What has happened? Who were 
the perpetrators? Why? In the late 1980s, the implementation of martial law 
in the Kurdish-populated cities neither hindered the PKK insurgency nor 
protected local Kurds; instead, it reinforced a non-democratic environment 
in which violence became a part of everyday reality. The prolonged war 
between the Turkish military and the PKK provided a context for both 
illegal state operations as well as for false-flag operations of the PKK.1
As early as 1985, the Turkish State started to make alliances with local 
tribes against the PKK and established armed Kurdish militias in villages, 
known as the village guard system (köy koruculuğu). Accordingly, tens of 
thousands of village guards were drafted from among local villagers. The 
State paid considerable wages to the village guards and supplied them 
1 Spain’s war against the Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom), ETA, had 
similar outcomes. Between 1983 and 1987, the Spanish government illegally sponsored death 
squads, known as Grupos Antiterroristas de Liberación (Antiterrorist Liberation Groups), GAL, 
to f ight the ETA. See Woodworth 2001.
146 Rival KuRdish MoveMenTs in TuRKey 
with weaponry.2 The village guardianship system, however, was open to 
abuses and did not mitigate increasing insecurity in the region.3 Hizbullah’s 
armed struggle with the PKK (1991-1996) further worsened the anarchic 
atmosphere.
In the early 1990s, thousands of Kurds simply disappeared because they 
were alleged PKK sympathizers. Stories and rumors circulated among local 
Kurds as dead bodies and tortured corpses were found on the outskirts 
of the cities.4 Assassinations of pro-Kurdish politicians skyrocketed.5 
Regardless of different and often conflicting narratives, a consensus has 
emerged about the existence of illegal, dark, and secret state operations 
and counterterrorism units that targeted Kurds, popularly known as the 
“deep state” in Turkey.
This chapter analyzes how the notion of the “deep state” has become a cul-
tural construct that has acquired a life of its own. Each rival movement has 
contributed to the public vilif ication of the “deep state” in order to resonate 
more with local Kurds. In other words, the rivals have pursued a strategy of 
legitimacy building in public as they narrate the deep state’s operations to 
exterminate Kurds. The activists ardently engaged in theorizing about the 
Turkish state as they condemned their rivals for being co-opted by “evil” 
elements of the state. In these competing narratives of the history, the rivals 
contested what actually happened in the past, who was co-opted by the state, 
the Turkish state’s security policies, and even the nature of the state itself.
Analyzing narrative contests, I suggest that meaning-making processes 
of Kurdish activists are not separable from the dynamics of social movement 
competition in the region.6
2 For the village guard system, see McDowall 1997: 422; Romano 2006: 82.
3 The tribal structure of Kurdish society also contributed to abuses in the village guard 
system. Some tribes that entered the system misused their new authority and arms to drive 
other smaller tribes from their lands. See McDowall 1997: 422.
4 According to İnsan Hakları Derneği, a secular leftist human rights association, there were 
more than 200 places that were used by counterterrorism squads of the Turkish military to 
torture and execute Kurds. In these mass graveyards, the death toll is about 3,000 people. See, 
the interactive map: http://www.ihddiyarbakir.org/Map.aspx, Accessed March 4, 2012. The total 
number of lost and murdered Kurds, however, is more than 6,000. See, İHD 2009. The death toll 
is only comparable with notorious examples of state-led violence in Argentina and Chile in the 
late 1970s, known as the “dirty wars.” In Argentina, 10,000-15,000 died or disappeared; in Chile, 
the estimated toll was 4,000. See Loveman 1998: 486. 
5 In just two years, between October 1991 and October 1993, f ifty-four Kurdish politicians and 
activists were murdered and hundreds were threatened with blackmail. See Oran 2010: 47-48. 
Most cases still remain unsolved.
6 Social movement studies are increasingly paying special attention to the storytelling 
practices of activists. Among leading works are Polletta 1998a, 1998b, 2006; Davis 2002. Scholars 
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The “Deep State” and Kurds
People began to hear the term “deep state” after a traff ic accident in the 
small town of Susurluk in northwestern Turkey in 1996. Three of the four 
passengers in the luxury car died at the scene. Revelation of the occupants’ 
identities became a milestone event as it publicly revealed a peculiar net-
work for the f irst time. Those who died were (1) an ultranationalist hit man 
on Interpol’s Red list, (2) his mistress who carried a fake identity certif icate, 
and (3) the former deputy head of the Istanbul Police Department. And 
f inally, the survivor was a deputy in the Grand Turkish National Assembly 
and the leader of a Kurdish village guard clan. The Susurluk accident trig-
gered a massive public reaction and introduced a new political term derin 
devlet, the deep state.7
Fast forward to November 2005 when a defector from the PKK employed 
as an informant by the security forces and two off icers of the local gendar-
merie bombed a local bookstore in Şemdinli, revealing that some army 
off icers illegally target PKK sympathizers.8 The state prosecutor linked 
high-ranking military off icers to the incident, including General Yaşar 
Büyükanıt (later the chief of the general staff) who had served in the region 
in the late 1990s. The prosecutor’s indictment pointed out that the bombing 
“was part of a series of similar attacks intended to provoke the security forces 
into a clampdown on the restive Kurdish region that would then unleash 
European criticism and jeopardize Turkey’s hopes of joining the EU.”9
This particular incident, popularly referred to as the Şemdinli affair, was 
followed by other revealing events, and consequently, f ive different illegal 
clandestine organizations were detected that have ties with some army 
note three distinct features of narratives: (1) some are a form of selective appropriation of past 
events and characters, (2) others provide a temporal order of events, and (3) some weave events 
and characters into what is called the “relationality of parts” or “emplotment” (Ewick and Silbey 
2003: 1341). Narrative accounts select certain events in the past as building past, present, and 
future in a consequential way in order to clarify “the point of the story” (White 1987).
7 In the early 2000s, characterizations of state-maf ia relations in popular Turkish soap 
operas and television series such as Deli Yürek (the Reckless Heart), Kurtlar Vadisi (Valley of 
the Wolves), Yılan Hikayesi (Snake Story), and Alacakaranlık (Twilight) further contributed to 
popular discourse about shadowy f igures within the state.
8 Aytar 2006: 6-7.
9 Turgut 2006; quoted in Kaya 2009: 104. The prosecutor Ferhat Sarıkaya also accused General 
Büyükanıt of attempting to influence the judicial process as the general had commented that he 
knew the alleged bomber off icer personally and that the off icer was a “good boy.” The prosecutor 
was disbarred by the Supreme Board of Prosecutors and Judges (Hakim ve Savcılar Yüksek Kurulu) 
on the grounds that his indictment was faulty.
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officers and ex-army members.10 The events hinted at the existence of shadowy 
formations within the security forces and raised questions about the legality 
of the measures used in fighting terrorism with respect to citizens’ rights. In 
the words of Christopher De Bellaigue in The New York Review of Books,
Some members of the armed forces, afraid of losing the prestige, political 
autonomy, and big budgets that they have enjoyed since the PKK rebellion 
gained momentum in the late 1980s, do not want peace at all … The relative 
freedom with which Öcalan’s (the captured leader of the PKK) lawyers have 
been able to pass on his messages has led some to suspect that he is cooperat-
ing with his captors – that he has defected, in effect, to the ‘deep state.’11
De Bellaigue’s comments found echo in everyday Turkey, especially after 
one particular illegal clandestine group became publicly known: Ergenekon.
Named after a mythical valley in Central Asia,12 Ergenekon was allegedly 
supported by counterterrorism units within the Turkish military such as 
JITEM (Gendarmerie Intelligence and Anti-Terror Struggle). As a response 
to the PKK attacks in the late 1980s, Turkey declared eleven provinces in 
east and southeast Anatolia to be in OHAL, “Emergency Rule Law,” govern-
ing the region by martial law.13 Enjoying the independence from checks 
and balances by the civil authorities, some of the army members became 
involved in a “dirty war,” including forming some illegal death squads that 
killed several thousand community leaders and human rights activists for 
allegedly being PKK sympathizers, waging false-flag terrorist attacks, and 
forcing hundreds of thousands to evacuate their villages.14
JITEM units were heavily recruited from former members of the PKK, 
who provided information in return for immunity from prosecution or 
reduced jail sentences. As Gareth Jenkins notes,
In addition to gathering intelligence, JITEM units would detain, inter-
rogate, and frequently torture and execute suspected PKK members. 
10 Radikal 2006.
11 De Bellaigue 2007: 37.
12 In the legend of Ergenekon, a she-wolf rescued the Turkish nation in a most desperate 
situation in Central Asia. The Turkish republican elite reproduced the Ergenekon myth in its 
early years, trying to establish a secular nationhood disconnected from the Ottoman past. See, 
Türköne 2009.
13 From 2000 onwards, after the EU negotiation talks began, the number of provinces in the 
OHAL was gradually reduced till its f inal abolition in November 2002. For details, see Chapter 4. 
14 Van Bruinessen 2004: 12; Kaya 2009: 100.
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JITEM units also targeted those who were believed to be merely Kurdish 
nationalists, assassinating journalists and intellectuals and bombing the 
off ices of publishers and Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs).15
In June 2007, a legal investigation into the Ergenekon organization was f iled. 
The state prosecutors def ined Ergenekon as a collusive terrorist organiza-
tion within the Turkish state, rooted mainly in the Turkish armed forces.16 
The type of network was reminiscent of the notorious Italian counterter-
rorism unit, Gladio, and therefore, the state prosecutors’ indictment linked 
Ergenekon with NATO’s secret stay-behind armies in member countries 
against a potential Communist invasion.
Despite disputes between pro-Islamic and pro-secular constituencies 
about the Ergenekon case, major political players in the Southeast, namely 
the pro-Kurdish DTP and the AKP, have concurred that the Ergenekon has 
used brutal violence against the Kurdish population. As the Ergenekon’s 
covert operations against the Kurds became public, criticism of the deep 
state increased in the region.
The Rival Movements and Competing Narratives on Ergenekon
The question “What is Ergenekon?” posed in a nationwide poll saw the 
majority of AKP and DTP voters def ining Ergenekon as an organization 
that is “responsible for all mysterious violent acts.”17 The DTP leader, Ahmet 
Türk, maintained that the Ergenekon conspiracy was directly tied to the 
Kurdish question in Turkey:
Wherever this organization [Ergenekon] grew, it was within the geogra-
phy of Kurdistan. Where did the arrested generals do their duty? Within 
Kurdish geography. Against whom did they direct their operations? The 
Kurds. According to off icial statistics, there are 17,000 unsolved com-
mitted murders. Ninety percent of them were committed in the Kurdish 
regions. People were murdered savagely and thrown into acid pits. They 
were taken from their homes in the middle of the night and killed. They 
were forced to eat feces and underwent unimaginable torture.18
15 Jenkins 2008.
16 Kaya 2009: 105.
17 Ünver 2009: 25.
18 Quoted in Olson 2009: 131-32.
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Türk further criticized the AKP for its failure to adequately investigate 
Ergenekon operations in Kurdish-populated regions. The AKP off icials, on 
the other hand, charged the DTP for its lack of support in their f ight with the 
status quo regime that is responsible for the Ergenekon-like organizations.
Involved in a never-ending process of meaning-making, rival Kurdish 
activists of the PKK, Gülen, and Hizbullah have vilif ied the “deep state” 
through telling stories. Their narrations, however, have not been free-
f loating performances. Competition among the rival activists has led 
them (1) to engage with the notion of deep state to the extent that they 
could exploit the discursive opportunity in the best way possible, and (2) to 
build their legitimacy in the public eye as they emphasize the deep state’s 
collaboration with rivals.
I call rival movement activists’ story-telling efforts to re-construct 
their identities through the negation of their competitors a process of 
“social movement distinction.” As a form of strategic subversion, the social 
movement distinction is a never-ending discursive performance of self-
construction (Re-construction) that can be realized to de-authenticate the 
rivals (De-legitimization). In the Kurdish case, the rival activist narratives 
claim their bona f ide Kurdish-ness (Re-construction) through condemning 
their rivals’ collaboration with the deep state (De-legitimization).
Thus, narrative contest is a form of social performance, entailing a 
“feeling for the game” that the social movement actors play. It is a highly 
developed cultural game that has two components: (a) story-telling as a 
form of mimicry and (b) competition or agon, i.e. warfare. As Marie Maclean 
puts it,
In the normal narration, while there is always a narrator, we are fre-
quently left to deduce the possible reactions of the narratee from the 
strategies of the text. In the narrative contests, however, the double 
nature of the narrative contract is actualized because each performer is 
seen in a double role. Apart from explicitly judgmental statements, each 
competitor also gives an implicit opinion of the previous narration by the 
tale he or she chooses to tell and the manner of telling it. So each is not 
only actor but audience, and simultaneously both counsel and judge.19
In what follows, I analyze the rival movements’ reputation work through 
narratives.
19 Maclean 1988: 126.
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The Gülen/Hizmet as Enemy of the Deep State
The Turkish military’s intervention in politics on February 28, 1997, popularly 
called the post-modern coup, initiated a process “of monitoring, controlling, 
and criminalizing all Islamic activism” including the Gülen movement.20 
The February 28 process came as a great shock to Hizmet activists. For the 
f irst time in the movement’s history, activists were publicly ostracized, 
charged, and discriminated against for allegedly being enemies of the state.21 
20 Yavuz 2003: 277. In the February 28 process, two political parties were banned because of 
their allegedly Islamist roots; about a thousand military off icers were removed from their posts 
for similar reasons; some corporations were labeled ‘green capital’ and discriminated against; 
hundreds of Qur’an teaching centers were closed; and thousands of students were expelled from 
public and private universities because of their adoption of the headscarf. See, Gürbüz 2009; 
Taş 2011. 
21 The state security court prosecutor opened a court case against Fethullah Gülen by demand-
ing the death penalty. For the details of the case, see Harrington 2011.
Figure 8.1  Public responses to question about the existence of the deep state 
(Conducted by Metro Poll in January 2009)
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Fethullah Gülen had to go into exile in the United States because of extreme 
pressure.
In 2004, the movement’s Samanyolu channel launched a TV series, 
Şubat Soğuğu (The Cold February), narrating the February 28 process 
through a f ictional account. The Cold February (2004-2006) depicts 
shadowy forces gathered around a clandestine group of the power elite 
known as Cemiyet (the Committee) and how they effectively operated 
to shape state policies in the 1990s. The Committee, which includes 
both outside/foreign elements and domestic members, appoints a key 
bureaucrat (Mehmet Aziz Tarman) as the chief executive to control the 
State’s national security policies through manipulations, provocations, 
and the construction of mass hysteria. As the ultimate power behind the 
extra-judicial activities in the country including the major atrocities in 
the Kurdish-populated Southeast, the Committee has strong relations 
with outside “hostile” forces abroad. In this sense, The Cold February 
resonated with local discourses among Kurds as well as Turks because it 
reproduced multiple and conflicting local meanings that are primarily 
shaped by people’s own lay theories.
The Gülen movement’s narrative of the Kurdish issue was a public 
challenge to the off icial state discourse. As the civil society competition 
escalated after the 2007 elections, the Samanyolu channel launched another 
TV series, Tek Türkiye (One Turkey), this time exclusively for narrating the 
Kurdish issue.
One Turkey tells the story of a young, idealistic doctor called Tarık who 
travels to the Southeast from Istanbul. Planning a short trip, Tarık aims to 
help local people who suffer from the war between the Turkish state and 
the PKK rebels. Tarık’s trip turns into a long journey when he learns that 
he was born in the village that he visited in the Southeast, so he is a Kurd, 
not a Turk. Although One Turkey does not mention the Gülen movement, 
Tarık’s persona clearly represents a Hizmet activist in the region. Tarık is 
an observant Muslim Kurd who has a high level of education. His original 
Kurdish identity functions as a representation of the bona f ide Kurdish-
ness of Hizmet activists (Re-construction). Through Tarık’s emphasis on his 
Islamic identity, a recognition of his Kurdish-ness, his unyielding defense 
of the land of Turkey against PKK guerillas, and his community service as 
a doctor (and then local governor in later episodes), viewers get a concrete 
message: Separatism is not a solution for the problems in the region; instead, 
investing in the education of the youth and Turkish-Kurdish unity around 
an Islamic identity could prepare a better future.
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The most striking feature of One Turkey is its constant reminder of the 
deep state. The series depicts some powerful, ill-intentioned f igures who 
employ covert operatives who are involved in provocative secret opera-
tions to incite hatred among local Kurds against the state. Reminiscent of 
the Committee in the Cold February series, these f igures are not visually 
recognizable but could be heard by the viewers. Their forum, called Karanlık 
Kurul (the Dark Committee), often collaborated with some of the Kurd-
ish guerilla leaders (representing the PKK), some radical Islamic groups 
(representing Hizbullah) as well as some high-level Turkish army off icers 
who specialize in counterterrorism (representing the JITEM, Gendarmerie 
Intelligence and Anti-Terror Struggle). The show, thus, narrates how the 
leaders of the PKK and Hizbullah collaborate with the deep state for their 
self ish interests and sell out the cause of Kurdish people’s well-being 
(De-legitimization).
One Turkey suggests two pictures of the Turkish state for its audience: (1) 
ugly elements of the state (“the deep state”) that are not part of the genuine 
Turkish state, and (2) the real Turkish state that embraces its Kurdish popu-
lation as equal citizens. Consider the following occasion in the eighty-sixth 
episode of the show: After a legal interrogation, two former members of the 
PKK (who were not involved in criminal acts and who later turn themselves 
in) were set free by the Gendarmerie station. As they are about to leave, 
an off icer from a specialized unit (JITEM) wants to re-interrogate them. 
The colonel who administers the Gendarmerie station insists that their 
interrogation was held and they should be allowed to leave. The dispute 
continued as following:
The JITEM off icer: Your benign interrogation techniques would not work 
for them! Let me have a chat with them. You’ll be surprised to see how 
eager they are to talk.
The Colonel: That’s enough for them to be tortured by the terrorists. 
Don’t torture them!
The JITEM off icer: Don’t be kindhearted, commander. You’ll cry a lot 
then!
The Colonel: Do not touch them! I know what you guys wanna do. Your 
sole job is to make the people of this land into sworn enemies of their 
fellow citizens and their state. But don’t get too excited: Your dynasty 
will fall apart soon.
The JITEM off icer: Who do you think you are! Beware of your rank. You 
could never reach us. Know your limits or we will put you in your place.
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The dialogue presents two conflicting approaches to the Kurdish rebels. 
The Colonel represents the authentic Turkish state’s position: conducting 
business within the legal boundaries, sympathetic towards its Kurdish 
citizens, and cognizant of abusers who work within the state apparatus. 
On the other hand, the JITEM off icer represents the dreadful face of the 
Ergenekon, the Turkish deep state: torturing its Kurdish citizens, recruiting 
from former members of the PKK, who provided information in return for 
immunity from prosecution or reduced jail sentences, and deliberately 
escalating the hatred between Turkish and Kurdish communities in order 
to strengthen their militaristic authority.
Another occasion in the same episode includes a Kurdish girl’s regretful 
account before a gentle school teacher who was also previously a rebel in 
the mountains:
I made a lot of mistakes. I was rebellious against my people and my state. 
But now I realize that the state is not only those who do bad things to 
us. I supposed that they were the state. In fact, it turned out that they 
were bandits who had inf iltrated the state. The real state, indeed, has 
been you and us.
The girl’s account highlights the main idea in the One Turkey series: many 
Kurds who were ignorant about the deep state and its activities condemned 
the Turkish state; now it is time to realize that there was a bunch of criminals 
acting in the name of the state.
In the Gülen activists’ narrative, the very def inition of the state remains 
a symbol of unity among its Turkish and Kurdish constituents, whereas 
the def inition of the deep state refers to a dark relationship between some 
elements within the state and radical elements in society. Many episodes 
of One Turkey narrate how the Kurdish guerilla leaders (representing the 
PKK) are in close connection with the deep state in order to facilitate further 
recruitment to their party (De-legitimization). References are made to the 
Turkish state negotiations with Abdullah Öcalan, the captured leader of the 
PKK, in a way that implies the Kurdish ethno-nationalists’ compromise with 
the deep state in return for the PKK’s organizational survival. The message 
is clear: the defenders of Kurdish ethno-nationalism are indeed prioritizing 
their organizational survival over the Kurdish people’s well-being; therefore, 
they have sold out. In a similar vein, some episodes depict Hizbullah as 
the spawn of the deep state conspiracy in order to boost the militaristic 
hegemony in the region (De-legitimization).
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The PKK: “The State wants to sweep its filth under the carpet!”
Soon after his election with the pro-Kurdish party ticket as the mayor 
of Diyarbakır, Osman Baydemir removed the Turkish Republic’s founder 
Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s statue from one of the city’s main squares. Then 
he erected a statue of Musa Anter, a prominent Kurdish writer and activist, 
who was killed as part of a wave of ‘unknown-assailant murders’ in 1992. It 
was a powerful attempt to shape ‘geography of memory’ by drawing public 
attention to the Ergenekon atrocities.22 As the pro-Kurdish party DTP leader 
Ahmet Türk put it,
We feel that the Ergenekon issue is very important for the future of Turkey 
and for transparency in politics. I believe that if all dimensions of the 
Ergenekon issue are made clear, the Kurdish and Turkish people will 
better understand one another. It is important to make clear the efforts 
of Ergenekon to put the Turkish and Kurdish people at loggerheads … 
The source of the Ergenekon conspiracy was the Kurdish question. The 
origin, nurturing, and growth of the Ergenekon organization were in the 
Kurdish region. The operation they perpetrated in the Kurdish region 
consolidated their power and made them a stronger organization.23
The ethno-nationalist narratives on the Turkish deep state, however, were 
bound up with the inter-movement competition structure. Pro-Kurdish 
politicians expressed their deep concern about the investigation held by the 
pro-Islamic AKP. Emine Ayna, a leading pro-Kurdish party deputy, stated 
their strategic approach as she commented on the pro-Islamic actors’ claims 
about the Ergenekon case:
Our position is clear. Whatever the claims of the Ergenekon case that are 
exposed, Kurdish intellectuals and Kurdish politicians will realize that 
the issues are not as they appear and, indeed, the Kurdish intellectuals 
and politicians will analyze the Ergenekon case and will take action.24
Ayna’s frank statement illustrates the difficulty and elasticity of this contested 
issue as a consequence. The competing activists could speculate on constantly 
developing the Ergenekon case as they learn about their rivals’ discourses.
22 For the term, see Alderman 2002.
23 Quoted in Olson 2009: 23-24.
24 Ibid. 2009: 25.
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Kurdish ethno-nationalists depict the deep state as the Turkish state 
itself. For example, Ahmet Türk argued that Ergenekon was not comprised 
of individuals who had worked for the state but by individuals within the 
state. Ergenekon’s atrocities, exclaimed Türk, were perpetrated “by the 
state itself.” “If you cut off the tail of a snake without crushing its head, it 
becomes more dangerous … The ‘covered’ face of the state wants to sweep 
its f ilth under the carpet.”25 Likewise, Songül Abdil, the mayor of Tunceli 
from the DTP, narrated the atrocities of the Turkish state and its armed 
forces as she maintained that Kurds were hardly surprised by the horrif ic 
tactics of the Ergenekon:
In 1938, during the massacre in Dersim [Tunceli is usually called Dersim 
by Kurds], thousands were killed ... They stabbed our women’s stomachs 
with bayonets, extracted their babies, and threw them into the Munzur 
River.26
Abdil’s equation of Ergenekon with the Turkish state and its military does 
not reflect her opinions solely. In my f ield interviews, I heard similar nar-
rations. Ararat, an activist who works for the Kurdish daily Azadiya Welat, 
claims that Ergenekon was the last attempt of the Turkish state to eliminate 
Kurdish resistance:
In fact, we should ask the question why the state had needed the Ergene-
kon in the f irst place, and later, could not get along with this organization. 
The Ergenekon was needed since the Kurds have come to a certain point 
in their democratic struggle, have become powerful; and then, it became 
apparent that they cannot be resisted through legal means. In this sense, 
the state has chosen to establish illegal squads within its apparatus. I 
mean, the Ergenekon is not something separable from the state or govern-
ments; therefore, we do not see it as a component or section [of the state].27
Ararat’s account portrays the deep state as the illegal “dirty” face of the state, 
and PKK activism is viewed as a successful challenger that drives Turkish 
state policy (Re-construction). Moreover, Ararat criticizes the party in power, 
the AKP, and holds it to be complicit in the crimes despite the pro-Islamic 
AKP’s claims to f ight against Ergenekon (De-legitimization).
25 Radikal 2009b.
26 Radikal 2009a.
27 Author’s interview. Diyarbakır, July 12, 2009.
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Another activist, who works to unionize pro-Kurdish teachers in Urfa, 
describes how he sees pro-Islamic actors as complicit in the crimes of the 
state:
According to my own perception and our communal perception in 
general, the Ergenekon case is an operation of the state to purify itself ... 
In fact, the Ergenekon case is a result of negotiation between the AKP 
and the deep forces in Turkey … Those arrested [in the Ergenekon case] 
were the main f igures who had implemented violent policies to solve 
the Kurdish question for years. First, they were eliminated due to their 
failure to solve the Kurdish question despite their employment of all sorts 
of violence … Second, the operation [to eliminate them] was an outcome 
of cooperation between the AKP and the Turkish Armed Forces. What 
kind of cooperation? The AKP is told to attack those hawks by political 
means … In return, the AKP demanded their support; assuring them 
it could diminish Kurdish people’s interest in the PKK and the DTP by 
playing the religion card.28
The union activist’s portrayal of the cooperation between the pro-Islamic 
actors and the state is remarkable in two ways: First, he interchangeably 
uses “the deep forces” and “the Turkish Armed Forces” through negative 
connotations as he narrates their violent stance on the Kurdish issue. Thus, 
similar to Ararat, he does not distinguish them as separate political forma-
tions. In this regard, he also reiterates the pro-Kurdish activists’ opposing 
position vis-à-vis the state (Re-construction). Second, he accuses the AKP 
of being co-opted by the state in terms of solving the Kurdish question. 
Therefore, rival Islamic-Kurdish identities are now in play to crush the PKK 
mobilization (De-legitimization).
For many Kurds, the PKK leader Abdullah Öcalan is a powerful story-
teller. Öcalan warned Kurds that the criminalization of Ergenekon is a 
strategic choice that is linked to current transformations in the Middle 
East. The real threat, he concluded, is American-led “soft Islam,” the AKP 
and the Gülen:
The United States had a major influence on the elimination of Ergenekon. 
Having a new plan for the Kurds, the US wanted to realize its aims. Yet, 
through active resistance, these people [the Ergenekon convicts] did 
not let the US realize its Kurdish project. The US does not want the PKK 
28 Author’s interview. Urfa, July 5, 2009.
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to remain as it is, and therefore they develop conspiracies (against us). 
Those who were detained in the Ergenekon case are professional soldiers 
who have been trained by the US since the 1960s as intelligence and 
counter-guerilla off icers. The US told them, “You screwed up!” and later 
put them out with the garbage. Now, the US wants to realize its (Kurdish) 
project through “soft Islam.”29
Öcalan also adds “radical Islam” as an element of this project, claiming that 
Hizbullah has been nurtured into “a ready to use force against Kurds” in the 
hands of the Turkish state.30 Öcalan’s accounts often refer to Hizbullah as the 
Hizb-i Kontra (Party of the Counter). Given the fact that kontra is employed 
to refer to counterterrorism/counter-guerilla groups, Hizb-i Kontra (Party 
of the Counter) labels Hizbullah as collaborators of the counter-guerilla 
forces that attack the PKK.31
Hizbullah: “We’re the Victims of the Deep State!”
One of the f irst publications of Hizbullah was Eşreften Esfele (From the Most 
Honorable to the Most Shameful). Written as f iction in the form of a novel,32 
Eşreften Esfele depicts Hizbullah as a group of young Muslim Kurds who are 
organized for the well-being of their local community. The novel describes 
“illegal” and “shameful” operations conducted by some undercover agents 
in order to damage Hizbullah activism and its rising reputation among the 
Kurds. The story ends with Hizbullah’s kidnapping of a key undercover 
29 For the full talk, see Öcalan 2009b. Öcalan’s talks from his cell are regularly recorded by his 
lawyers and widely distributed in the Kurdish community as Görüşme Notları, i.e. the Meeting 
Notes. The PKK- aff iliated online platforms such as http://www.rojaciwan.com/ and http://
www.f iratnews.com/ provide the Meeting Notes in full. 
30 Öcalan 2008a, 2009d, 2011a.
31 Öcalan depicts complex relations between “soft-Islam” and Hizbullah, even calling the 
AKP the off icial form of Hizbullah (Öcalan 2008b). His narratives put the AKP, the Gülen 
movement, and Hizbullah on one straight line that has been compromised by the deep state, 
which he sometimes calls the “Gladio.” “Among the Turkish army, there were those who accepted 
the AKP’s power in Turkey and those who did not. Cooperating with those who accept- and 
in fact they have been those who represent the NATO Gladio-, the AKP went to eliminate the 
other segment of the Gladio who started to operate independently. I mean, the Gladio was not 
eliminated totally; instead, an agreement and a negotiation were held with one part of the 
Gladio.” See, Öcalan 2011b.
32 Among Hizbullah’s f ictional novels are Konuş! Yoksa … (Speak Up! Otherwise …), İstanbul: 
İhlas Yay. 2004 and Can Laleler Solmasın (Don’t Let Lovely Tulips Wilted), İstanbul: Dua Yay. 
2009.
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state agent, Zülküf Dogan, and subsequently the capturing of many others. 
After his abduction, Zülküf’s muttering to himself, in fact, summarizes the 
major themes in the novel:
You’re f inished now. You who had many innocent people tortured for no 
reason! You who had people jailed and who made their families miserable! 
You who were spreading seeds of doubt and disunity that caused people 
to cease to care for the Brothers [Hizbullah]; who was inculcating Devil-
inspired thoughts that led them to renounce Islam! You who sexually 
abused little children; and you, who besides being a spy, has turned others 
into spies! What a pity for you!
The confessions of Zülküf aim to give the main message to the reader: 
Hizbullah did not kidnap and murder random civilians; instead, those 
killed were undercover agents of the Turkish state.
The public discussions of the Ergenekon case have provided Hizbullah 
activists with a discursive opportunity. An online Hizbullah publication 
claimed that its earlier description of “the dark and dirty plans of the Kemalist 
regime”33 referred in fact to the Ergenekon operations in the region.34 Depicting 
the Turkish secularist regime as the foundation for the deep state, Hizbullah 
activists do not really distinguish the Turkish state from its deep entities. As 
one of the activists told me, the deep state is “a component of the state itself.”35
Hizbullah activists narrated how they were both victims of the deep 
state as well as the bona fide Kurdish challenger against the deep state (Re-
construction). Often portrayed in the 1990s as an armed machine of the Turk-
ish deep state aimed at eliminating the PKK, they are quite disturbed. “For 
33 Hizbullah activists use “the Kemalist regime” and “the secularist regime” interchangeably 
to refer to the Turkish state regime.
34 The anonymous document further claims: “From its very establishment, the Kemalist 
regime has been a system that strives to exist at the expense of its own people, a system that 
never considers the nation’s values and wishes … We should emphasize that the roots of the 
Ergenekon-like organizations go back to societies such as the Union of Committee and Progress 
[İttihad ve Terakki], which has been active since the foundation of the Kemalist regime … The 
Community [Cemaat] of Hizbullah has become the target of the Ergenekon-like groups since its 
earlier days of widespread and effective public activism. We could easily claim that there is no 
community in the world that struggled with the Ergenekon-like organizations and got results 
as much as the Hizbullah did. This fact has incited enmity against the Hizbullah at its peak.” 
See Anonymous 2008.
35 Author’s interview. Istanbul, June 5, 2009.
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us, to collaborate with the Ergenekon is disbelief” said Hasan, who was sent 
to prison for being a Hizbullah member, complaining about the allegations.36
Hizbullah’s military f lank leader Cemal Tutar narrates how the PKK 
and the Gülen defame Hizbullah. Tutar’s claims represent the movement’s 
overall stance: the overwhelming majority of the Hizbullah’s public state-
ments portray the PKK and the Gülen as corrupt because of their dark 
relations with deep forces of the system (De-legitimization).
A passage from Tutar’s statement illuminates how the PKK is depicted 
by Hizbullah activists:
Everywhere in the world, the enemies of Islam who do not want to ac-
knowledge successful Islamic movements attempt to slander them and 
thus devalue their victories. Nowadays, Al-Fatah’s efforts to cast a shadow 
on the achievements of HAMAS in Palestine – and its alienation from its 
own people so that it could even cooperate with Israel – are not different 
from the wrongdoings of the PKK. It’s because [similar to the PKK], in 
order to diminish the people’s support, Al-Fatah claims that HAMAS was 
established by Israel. For this reason – as well as for many other reasons 
– one could strikingly see how the PKK and Al-Fatah are identical.37
The narration of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is purposeful because 
mainstream Kurdish public opinion perceives HAMAS as a legitimate 
defender of the Palestinian people. In this way, Hizbullah is depicted as 
a popular resistance movement as unyielding as HAMAS, whereas the 
Kurdish ethno-nationalists are portrayed as having dark relations with 
the system similar to Al-Fatah (Re-construction and De-legitimization).38
36 Similar statements are made by other activists who use pseudo-names to publish on Hizbul-
lah’s website:
“To mention Hizbullah’s name together with the Kemalist regime’s intelligence off ice is the 
greatest insult to our community. The Kemalist state uses many organizations including 
nationalist, leftist, and fascist since they are ideologically and politically open to be utilized … 
Yet, Hizbullah is quite different in terms of its belief system and organization structure … It 
can never be used by any power. First of all, the political thought, ideology, and belief of the 
Hizbullah perceive the Kemalist regime as a system of inf idels. Hizbullah not only believes that 
the regime should be destroyed but also takes action to smash it.” (Nuhoğlu 2011). 
37 Tutar 2009: 82.
38 In our interview, one of the prominent Hizbullah singers told me that they especially seek to 
raise consciousness about the plight of the Palestinians through their songs. The most popular 
albums of the Group Özlem (the movement’s music agency) such as Bu Ne Sessizlik (Defeaning 
Silence) and Vuslata Özlem (Yearning for the Reunion) have several songs in support of the cause 
of HAMAS and Palestine. Author’s interview. Istanbul, June 7, 2009.
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In a similar vein, an article published in Hizbullah’s weekly Doğru Haber de-
scribes Gülen as a part of “a MOSSAD-linked deep project” against Hizbullah:
In recent years, Gülen-swayed missionaries have been rushing into the 
region in order to subdue Kurds, or even make them monkeys. Backed by 
Pennsylvania [where Fethullah Gülen is living], they are certainly part of 
a Zionist international plan that targets Kurds. Everybody and his brother 
knows about the notorious plans to launch a Kurdish establishment as 
Israel’s servant in order to shape the future of Kurds in accordance with 
Israeli interests.39
Narratives in Conflict Transformation: Reputation Work and 
Symbolic Localization
How do narrative contests contribute to the shift in the violent ethnic con-
flict toward non-violent political persuasion in the region? In their study of 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, Daniel Bar-Tal and Gavriel Salomon argue that 
narratives are motivational tools to solidify group identity and dehumanize 
the enemy. Thus, narratives help to prolong injustice and ethnic conflict. 
Transformation of the conflict, they suggest, depends on changes in collec-
tive narratives. The first step in this direction is for people to learn about the 
other side of the story, giving legitimacy to competing narratives. Willingness 
to listen to the other, however, should come from the stronger party f irst.40
The Ergenekon investigation provided an unprecedented opportunity 
for Turkey to face its dirty war in the Southeast. As victims of the secularist 
military regime, the pro-Islamic AKP and Hizmet supported the investiga-
tion. Public criticisms of the military opened Pandora’s Box: the Turkish 
constituency began to hear competing stories about “terrorists” for the 
f irst time in such a degree. Having roots in both Turkish and Kurdish 
constituencies, these pro-Islamic actors helped to deminish the ruthless 
Turkish nationalist stance that long imposed “narrative violence.”41
In my f ieldwork, I observed that Turkish Hizmet activists spoke highly of 
the drama series One Turkey whereas Kurdish Hizmet activists were more 
39 Atak 2011. Doğru Haber has long called Gülen-aff iliated media “Fesat Medya Grubu,” (Cor-
rupt Media Group) pejoratively. For allegations on TV show One Turkey, for example, see its issue 
no: 54, April 10-16, 2009. 
40 Bar-Tal and Salomon 2006: 39; Pappé 2006: 198.
41 Cobb 2013: 29.
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critical of the show. Feeling enlightened about the Kurdish issue, a Turkish 
activist asked a leading Hizmet spokesperson who is ethnically Kurdish, 
“Do they [Kurds] not watch One Turkey, to realize what is going on behind 
the scenes? It should be nominated for the Oscars.”
Although a Kurdish audience would f ind such a question orientalist and 
disturbing, his questioning tone was more an expression of his sympathy for 
Kurds. Through One Turkey, he recognized that some Kurds were “forced” 
to join the PKK because of outrageous attacks by the “deep state” during 
the martial law era. Thus, the “attribution of subjectivity,” that is seeing 
the other as a victim of structural forces, enabled the Turkish constituency 
to be willing to hear more about alternative narratives about the conflict.
The pro-Islamic activists’ meaning-making processes, however, are not 
constructed in a vacuum. Public criticisms of the deep state have provided a 
“discursive context” to interpret their positions vis-à-vis the Turkish State.42 
Narratives have helped to situate all social actors in the new game – non-
violent competition in the civil society. What should be remembered? 
How? From Hizbullah’s novels to ethno-nationalist municipality projects, 
narratives play a huge role in symbolic localization of competitor Kurdish 
activists. Narrative contests are, in fact, an essential part of reputation 
work: rival activists re-constructed their self-image through “distinction”43 
among other Kurds. They call Kurds to build trust on their bona fide Kurdish 
movement by harming the reputation of their competitors. Thus, there is the 
process of social movement distinction, a constant discursive performance 
of articulation, re-appropriation, and negation.
Transforming the ethnic conflict, rival Kurdish activists are now “repu-
tational entrepreneurs”44 thanks to the interpretive and representational 
character of their narratives. Competitors in a narrative contest are not 
supposed to carve out the details of their message since their narrations are 
constructed through images that summarize “the point of the story.”45 The 
tarnished image of the Turkish State and its collaborators is more publicly 
memorable than what actually happened in the region. Gary Alan Fine put 
it plainly: “We remember our history not through the details of events but 
through the labels that characterize and summarize these events.” “These 
labels,” adds Fine, “have a life of their own.”46
42 See, McCammon et al. 2007; Woehrle, Coy, and Maney 2008.
43 Here, I follow Bourdieu’s def inition in his classical work. See, Bourdieu 1984.
44 Fine 2006.
45 White 1987.
46 Fine 2001: 71.
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The real is relational.
– Pierre Bourdieu
At the outset of “Kurdish Opening” in the summer of 2009, I was on my way 
to Diyarbakır. Although the AKP government and then-Prime Minister 
Recep Tayyip Erdoğan were far from fulf illing their promises to reach a 
f inal settlement for the PKK’s disarmament, local dynamics in the region 
were changing rapidly. Denied an interview earlier with the Istanbul repre-
sentative of Mustazaf-Der – an association later closed due to its link with 
Hizbullah – I was not expecting a genuine conversation with Hizbullah or 
PKK activists in Diyarbakır. The calm political climate, however, enabled 
me not only to have in-depth conversations with all parties but also to 
get permission to record them in full. For those who observe Kurds at the 
grassroots, the Kurdish Opening was not simply about the AKP and the PKK 
guerilla forces; instead, it was a manifestation that hinted at much deeper 
transformation in local civil society step by step.
One of the most insightful approaches to understanding de-radicalization 
is political moderation theory. Studying revolutionary socialist parties in 
Europe, proponents of moderation theory believe that radicals gradu-
ally become moderate if they are allowed to operate within the legal and 
electoral system.1 In this perspective, three major factors are highlighted: 
the dynamics of electoral competition (carrots), the threat of state repres-
sion (sticks), and limited organizational resources – which make more 
investment in legal parties mean less investment in radical f lanks.2 The 
moderation theory perspective, however, pays attention primarily to the 
state’s relationship with one single political movement instead of a complex 
exchange among multiple players. The PKK’s competition with pro-Islamic 
Kurds (such as Hizbullah and the Gülen movement) may be seen as second-
ary in importance, partly due to the perspective’s exclusive focus on the 
electoral process.
1 See, Schumpeter 1942; Michels 1962; Przeworski 1985. Stathis Kalyvas later developed the 
perspective by analyzing right wing religious parties in Europe. See Kalyvas 1996; Kalyvas 
and van Kersbergen 2010. More recently, moderation theory was discussed regarding Islamist 
mobilizations in Egypt, Jordan and Yemen, and Turkey. For Egypt, see Wickham 2004; Hamid 
2014. For Jordan and Yemen, see Schwedler 2006. For Turkey, see Tezcür 2010a.
2 Tezcür 2010a: 31.
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The scant attention paid to these local dynamics becomes more explicit 
when we consider the issue of state repression. Moderation theory suggests 
a model of carrot and stick, that is, less repressive measures toward off icial 
political party members and strong punishment for the radical challengers. 
Activists, however, may not be so lucky as to avoid the wrath of the state. 
As Nicole Watts notes on the Kurdish case, “Although some activists gain a 
certain amount of legal protection because of their status in off ice, neither 
they nor non-elected activists working within the system can necessarily 
expect the reduction in risk that their compatriots in more liberal systems 
enjoy.”
Perhaps it is the opposite – “the personal and professional risks may 
sometimes go up.”3 Watts adds that Turkey’s political context poses sig-
nif icant challenges for moderation through pro-Kurdish parties. “In non-
competitive or semidemocratic regimes, the creation of movement-linked 
political parties and working within the formal political structures may 
signal a heightened cycle of contention and an expansion of the f ield of 
conflict.” Analyzing the case of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, Shadi 
Hamid comes to a similar conclusion. “Opposition moderation did not 
produce regime moderation,” writes Hamid. “The confounding reality is 
that moderation is precisely what autocrats f ind so threatening.”4
In this book, I suggest going beyond the Turkish State vs. Kurds. Hence, 
as my argument goes, competition in civil society and the culture of rivalry 
provide institutional mechanisms in which various Kurdish actors would 
see their best interest in reputation building as legitimate non-violent actors 
instead of waging violence. Once these civic institutions are established 
and gradually developed over time, it is hard to go back.
One would be tempted to ask why the competing Kurdish groups do not 
outbid in violence instead. Why do they compete through non-violence? 
Why not compete to gain authenticity by furious attacks on the Turkish 
state? In fact, competition for violence is quite common as observed in the 
examples of Hamas and PLO rivalry and recently between Al-Qaeda and 
Daesh (ISIL).5
Such outbidding in violence, however, is mostly observed in the emer-
gence period of revolutionary groups, exemplif ied in the cases of the PKK 
and Hamas when these groups needed to “prove” themselves. Moreover, 
3 Watts 2010: 8.
4 Hamid 2014: 136. 
5 For the “outbidding thesis” and its criticism, see Bloom 2004 and Brym and Araj 2008 
respectively. 
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the nature of contender groups in the local context matters. Why should 
the PKK promise violence to compete with the non-violent Gülen as wag-
ing violence could potentially destroy the PKK’s credibility? Why would 
Hizbullah try outbidding in violence as the group is much weaker than the 
PKK, and moreover, it was non-violent activism that paved the way to the 
revival of Hizbullah from the ashes?
In fact, militant violence may lead to marginalization of the revolutionar-
ies; stakes are too high and people tend to avoid costly high-risk activism.6 
More importantly, militants would lose the f ight over their public image, 
especially when the public receptiveness to “terrorism” charges is soaring. 
One recent example is the trajectory of Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA), 
Basque Homeland and Freedom. In Spain, ETA has lost its public support 
considerably in the post 9/11 era.7
Aware of the problem of excessive violence, revolutionary movements 
develop a twofold strategy. On the one hand, they maintain strong guerilla 
forces or paramilitary groups to wage violence against the state authorities. 
On the other hand, they aim to build institutional bases in the civil society 
through non-violent social movement organizations. Revolutionaries often 
believe that maintaining a balance between waging violence and invoking 
non-violence would make them successful in their f ight.8
I contend that increasing institutional activism in the civic sphere ena-
bles revolutionaries to build both legitimacy and institutional credibility. As 
they become active shapers of the civil society, they also become exposed 
to mainstream discourses. This gradual shift in discursive space is further 
reinforced by moral boundaries. In this respect, religious authority f igures 
and trusted community leaders play important roles as moral entrepre-
neurs, bridging revolutionary culture and mainstream discourse. Once 
institutionalized, such discursive engagements can be powerful sources 
of legitimacy.
Then the question is whether such a double strategy introduces a genuine 
conflict transformation. Not necessarily. The civic organizations can be 
used to make strong patronage networks, as exemplif ied in the cases of 
Hamas and Lebanese Hizbullah.9 Such social service organizations not only 
invite a strong in-group identity but also provide an alternative government 
– a “state within the state” – in the making. Such patronage politics do not 
6 On the free rider problem, see Olson 1965.
7 See, Alonso 2011.
8 Krause 2013: 259. See also, Gamson 1975.
9 See, Knudsen 2005; Karagiannis 2009.
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necessarily help in transforming conflict culture in civic spheres because 
each group would aim to give benefits to its own base, not being interested 
in encroaching on turf of the “other.” In Egypt, for example, Islamists never 
become interested in winning the hearts and minds of popular voters at 
the expense of their ideological stance. Instead, as Hamid argues, they 
consciously avoid a strategy of engagement and thus, “learn to lose” at the 
ballot box for the sake of self-preservation.10
Strategic Engagement and Conflict Transformation
Strategic engagement appears to be the key to transforming ethnic conflicts. 
The PKK did not have to make an Islamic opening. Likewise, Hizbullah was 
not forced into publishing pro-Kurdish journals. It is true that the larger 
context encouraged the actors’ decisions but these strategic moves were not 
necessary. In fact, ideology-based movements are often reluctant to pursue 
broader engagement strategies because of their deep concern for keeping 
the “purity” of their ideologies. In this regard, the PKK and Hizbullah took 
courageous steps. Political context shapes social action, but agents’ choices 
at critical junctures are extremely signif icant in the f inal outcome.
Engagement strategies may invite a gradual shift in perceptions. As David 
Westby notes, “the strategic imperative may keep movement theorists and 
leaders abreast of social change and even ordain signif icant ideological 
transformations.”11 Based on his case study in Northern Ireland, Lee Smithey 
explains how construction of a post-conflict culture requires a paradigm 
shift. In intractable ethno-political conflicts,
adversaries’ identities can become def ined such that they are mutually 
opposed to one another, indivisible, and non-negotiable. They become 
inseparable from the conflict that comes to be understood in zero-sum 
terms of “us” and “them.” Using this calculus, any gain by one side 
amounts to an unacceptable loss by the other side. Each group feels 
as if its very existence is under threat, and each responds defensively, 
further modifying their own interpretive schemata to distinguish their 
opponents from themselves in even more stark terms, justifying more 
extreme action against opponents.12
10 Hamid 2014: 114.
11 Westby 2002: 297.
12 Smithey 2011: 12.
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Smithey contends that such intractable conflicts can take on “new forms” 
that have less violent outcomes – albeit not fully resolved. Similar to identity 
contests and competing narratives in the Kurdish case, the unionist activ-
ists’ civic initiatives in a transforming civil society are based on “a strategy 
of public persuasion” in Northern Ireland.13
Winning hearts and minds in an ethnic constituency cannot be separable 
from electoral politics. Perhaps the most interesting aspect of the modera-
tion theory is debate over strategic investment in electoral competition. 
Güneş Tezcür rightly points out the growing signif icance of such competi-
tion in Turkey. “A rigid state-society dichotomy overlooks the importance 
of electoral competition in shaping the strategies of Kurdish nationalists 
who have been deeply concerned with threats to their political hegemony 
from other Kurdish actors.”14 Consider the following episode of contention.
In February 2011, prominent Kurdish poet Şivan Perwer met with Turkey’s 
Deputy Prime Minister Bülent Arınç in Germany, declaring his support for 
the Turkish administration’s “Kurdish Opening.” Immediately afterwards, 
the PKK accused Perwer of being a jash, literally a “donkey’s foal” in Kurdish. 
Jash is a highly political term that used to imply “collaborator” and “traitor.” 
Perwer’s prompt response was a YouTube video in which he explained his 
decades-long service to Kurds and Kurdistan. Speaking in Kurdish, Perwer 
condemned the PKK leaders for not even knowing the Kurdish language 
and concluded, “Be ashamed and apologize to Kurds. You do not have a right 
to declare anyone a traitor. If there are traitors, they are those who accuse 
others of being traitors.”15
Şivan Perwer’s experience was not exceptional. Some other pro-Kurdish 
leftists such as Ahmet Altan, Taner Akçam, and Roni Margulies faced similar 
13 Ibid., pp. 34-35, 138. Since Smithey’s primary focus is the cultural construction of post-conflict 
identities, he reasonably limits his analysis to the unionist/loyalist identities, not considering 
their main rival, i.e. nationalist/republican. Yet, as he suggests in his theoretical discussions 
(pp. 38-39), the strategy of public persuasion is an inter-subjective process in which both the 
unionist/loyalist and the nationalist/republican activists are involved. In fact, the emergence 
of nationalist/republican civic initiatives similar to their unionist/loyalist counterparts can be 
analyzed through a process of resemblance. Some unionist groups’ formation of Irish language 
circles and the nationalist/republican activists’ invitation of unionist/loyalist ex-combatants to 
their panels as speakers are recent examples of strategic engagements in a post-conflict culture. 
Quite similar to the Kurdish case, this competition driven exchange between these movements 
would have been unheard of a decade ago when a conflict culture was prevalent.
14 Tezcür 2009: 32.
15 After Perwer’s public debate with the PKK, tensions escalated. PKK supporters attempted 
to sabotage Perwer’s concert in the Netherlands. “Save your children and let them be educated 
(so that) they should not be like these clowns who assault their own people,” Perwer angrily 
told his audience. See, Radikal 2011.
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allegations for their “treacherous” activism.16 Strikingly, however, the PKK 
did not respond harshly to Sezgin Tanrıkulu, another well-known f igure 
among Kurds who joined the Republican People’s Party (CHP), generally 
perceived as Ataturk’s party defending Turkish nationalism.
The PKK’s position was clear. Not Sezgin Tanrıkulu but Şivan Perwer, 
who flirted with the AKP government, should be publicly declared a traitor 
because it is not the secularists but the Islamists who are perceived as rivals 
for Kurdish votes.17 In her speech in Varto, Emine Ayna stated zealously, “No 
one who becomes a candidate of the AKP can say, ‘I am a Kurd.’ This is not 
acceptable because the AKP’s policies deny the Kurds. Whoever becomes 
an AKP candidate is not a Kurd even if she says ‘I am a Kurd.’ “18
Global Dynamics and Pro-Ethnic Strategies
A constant play of “zoom-in” and “zoom-out” is necessary to grasp the 
pro-ethnic activist strategies. If we zoom out to see global dynamics, we 
may be able to understand how strategic engagement at local levels f its 
the larger picture. As Susan Olzak notes, “the spread of a world culture 
legitimating human rights for minorities and oppressed groups increases 
political opportunities for minorities, raises the likelihood of ethnic protest, 
and exacerbates ethnic tensions within states.”19 The emerging discourse 
on human rights, of course, is strongly supported by the transnational 
organizations and the “core” nations in the world system.20 Thus, a nation 
state’s increasing engagement with transnational political organizations 
(such as the EU, NATO, and the UN) would provide ethnic minorities within 
these states unprecedented resources and opportunity.
16 See, Botî 2010. Forty-one Kurdish intellectuals issued a joint declaration condemning threats 
against prominent Kurdish writers and artists by the Kurdistan Freedom Falcons, TAK. See, 
Sabah 2011. The PKK leaders, however, deny any connection with the TAK. 
17 Non-specialized readers might wonder why I pick these particular cases. The cases of Şivan 
Perwer and Sezgin Tanrıkulu might be illuminating since they are both well-respected Kurds. I 
believe it is worthwhile to ask why declare Perwer a traitor and not label Tanrıkulu despite the 
fact that Perwer’s relation to the AKP is quite different than Tanrıkulu’s relation to the CHP: he 
only had a meeting with a high-ranking AKP off icial, whereas Tanrıkulu has joined the CHP as a 
party member. Yet, the AKP is seen as a major competitor in def ining Kurdish identity, whereas 
the CHP is not perceived as a rival player in the f ield.
18 Quoted in Tezcür 2009: 11.
19 Olzak 2006: 9. Emphases in the original.
20 For the world-system perspective, see Wallerstein 1976. For transnational organizations 
and human rights regime, see Smith 1995; Smith and Johnston 2002. 
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“As the states become more enmeshed in a world system of diplomats, 
economics, and f inancial and military obligations,” contends Olzak, “state 
actions become more constrained by the density of ties.” Thanks to these 
global integrative processes, ethnic groups “become less constrained by 
their own state authorities,” and “(H)ighly integrated nation states can-
not simply repress, jail, or torture the ethnic challengers without risking 
international condemnation. World-level sanctions are regularly employed 
to induce recalcitrant states to conform to international norms, as are 
military forces, advisers, and other external pressures.”21
The world polity perspective is useful in explaining the signif icance of 
a larger global context for local politics. Moreover, the perspective offers 
substantial explanations of violence based on the world-systems approach. 
Olzak claims that dependent countries, which often suffer high rates of 
poverty, are significantly more prone to outbreaks of ethnic violence. On the 
other hand, dominant countries in the world-system experience non-violent 
ethnic contention.
Despite its considerable insights, the perspective is limited on two major 
fronts in studying ethnic violence. First, many cross-national studies of 
ethnic separatism suffer from a lack of attention to the internal structures of 
ethnic mobilizations, following the incumbent-challenger model. However, 
most of these movements are internally divided, and these divisions matter 
insofar as they shape state policies, independent from their place in the 
world system. In her cross-national research, for example, Kathleen Cun-
ningham found that internally divided movements receive state concessions 
at a considerably higher rate than unitary ones, and the more divided the 
movement, the more likely it is to receive concessions. Cunningham’s f ind-
ings also suggest that concessions to unitary movements appear to work 
better at settling these disputes. Hence, “states use concessions not only 
as a tool to resolve disputes, but also as part of the bargaining process.”22
Second, the problems that have long plagued large-N analyses (such as 
endogeneity in causal analysis) make the world polity approach less attrac-
tive to those who would like to analyze meso-level factors with a holistic 
methodology. As Olzak acknowledges, “there are substantive reasons to 
believe that economic stability, political democracy, state violence, and 
group insurgency are all intertwined and involve simultaneous causation.”23 
The approach is especially silent about ethnic politics in the developing 
21 Olzak 2006: 17.
22 Cunningham 2011: 275.
23 Olzak 2006: 197.
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world, not f itting “core” vs. “dependent” categories. For example, what is 
the role of Turkey’s EU membership process on the pace of the Kurdish 
insurgency? Should we expect more violence or less due to Turkey’s higher 
interconnectedness with the transnational regime? What we learn is that 
globalization certainly encourages more protests overall,24 but resulting 
local outcomes could be violent,25 or non-violent,26 or selectively violent27 
contentions in semi-democratic regimes. It might be useful to conceptualize 
globalization as a context for what Andreas Wimmer calls an “exogenous 
shift”28 that transforms the “arena” and “rules of the game.”29 Yet, undertak-
ing a strategy in this context still falls on the shoulders of ethnic activists.
Toward a Multi-Institutional Politics Perspective
This book draws on unique insights from a multi-institutional politics 
perspective in studying conflict transformation and ethnic mobilization. 
First, unlike structuralist accounts that assume power is primarily vested 
in the state, we need to understand power as “dispersed.”30 The structuralist 
view is unwarranted especially in a rapidly globalized world: since the 1960s, 
only about one-third of all self-determination movements around the globe 
can be considered as unitary actors in their interactions with the state.31 
The Kurdish case is no exception.
The exclusive attention to the state is also delimiting because “society 
is composed of multiple and often contradictory institutions,” as attested 
to in the recent waves of institutional, feminist, and cultural theories.32 
Similar to neo-Marxist scholars who debate about the nature of the state, 
pro-ethnic activists may differ in their conceptualizations of how state 
24 Goldstone 2004: 333.
25 Fearon and Laitin 2003: 75.
26 See, Nepstad 2011.
27 Goodwin 2006: 2027.
28 Wimmer 2008: 1005.
29 Jasper 2004: 5. For an excellent conceptual discussion, see Cunningham 2012.
30 For the conception of power as “dispersed,” see Foucault 1977, 1980. For the neo-liberal 
transformations and social movements, see Voss and Williams 2012.
31 The data comes from Kathleen G. Cunningham’s sample of self-determination groups. Only 
8% of the self-determination groups in the sample are continuously represented by only one 
organization. Cunningham def ines self-determination group factions as “any organizations 
that represent the SD group and make demands related to self-governance, such as the Kurdish 
Worker’s Party in Turkey.” See, Cunningham 2011: 275.
32 Armstrong and Bernstein 2008: 82. See, for example, Sewell 1992 and Fligstein 1997.
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power operates. Activists are lay theorists, unwittingly narrating ideas of 
power and dominance in everyday life. These divergent understandings of 
power and domination, of course, would shape the targets of mobilization 
and the means by which to challenge structures. Hence, an a priori assump-
tion that considers the state as the target is misguided.
Jack Goldstone highlights how social movement activists are indeed 
embedded in “external relational f ields.” These f ields include
(1) other movements and countermovements that may compete for at-
tention and resources, or provide reinforcement and alliances, or engage 
in direct competition or conflict with the movement; (2) political and 
economic institutions (and their history) that provide the framework in 
which movements recruit, act, and seek responses; (3) various levels of 
state authorities and political actors (including political parties and civil 
and military off icials) whose responses to the movement and its actions 
affect its developments and outcomes; (4) various elites – economic, 
political, religious, media – whose interests, capacities, and actions affect 
movement development and its outcomes; (5) various publics whose 
interests, capacities, and actions affect movement development and its 
outcomes; (6) symbolic and value orientations available in society that 
condition the reception and response to movement claims and actions; 
and (7) critical events – such as wars, economic crises, or incidents of 
violence or outcomes of specif ic episodes of confrontation.
According to Goldstone, “it is the relations among these elements of the 
external f ield – both relations among them and of them to movement claims 
and actions – that appear to shape movement dynamics.” Thus, Goldstone 
rightly concludes, we need to regard social movements “as elements in a 
complex f ield of players in politics and society that are seeking advantages 
by using a variety of tactics.”33
Second, culture is regarded as “constitutive” of the structure instead of 
having a derivative, secondary, and trivial role.34 Pro-Kurdish mobilizations 
cannot be grasped without taking emotional dimensions seriously.35 Compe-
33 Goldstone 2004: 358.
34 Armstrong and Bernstein are not the f irst scholars making this argument. A remarkable 
body of literature emerged after the “cultural turn” in social movement studies, calling for 
taking culture and emotions seriously. See, for example, Jasper 1997; Goodwin and Jasper 1999; 
Polletta 1997, 1999, 2006; Goodwin, Jasper, and Polletta 2000, 2001.
35 This emphasis has been pervasive due to the pejorative legacy of emotions in classical 
models of social movement theories. Even the def initions of social movements were def ined 
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tition among ethno-political and Islamic activists to build moral authority, 
legitimacy, and prestige has become a constitutive element of everyday 
politics in the past decade. “Feeling the game” in town,36 what Charles 
Tilly calls “the blame game,”37 these rival activists have developed certain 
norms and repertoires regarding how to perform their reputation work. The 
“practical” senses “of a particular social game”38 have little instrumentalist 
logic to them because contentious players “may be ready to die for those 
ends, independently of all considerations of specific, lucrative profits, career 
prof its, or other forms of prof its.”39
Moreover, we cannot grasp the nature of political institutions and 
their potential effects without a proper understanding of the culture and 
emotions of ethnic politics. If there is a causal impact of institutions upon 
collective action forms (such as radicalization and moderation), it heavily 
depends upon “their emotional dimensions,” often “left untheorized.”40 These 
emotional dimensions, however, should not be regarded as attributes of 
individuals or their actions “within the sphere of subjectivity alone”; instead, 
we need to consider “emotions in terms of relationships, not substances.”41 
Transpersonal phenomena (such as ethnic solidarity, trust, reputation build-
ing, and so forth) and social movement rivalry analyzed in this book call 
for a relational approach in understanding collective emotional processes.
As Mustafa Emirbayer and Chad Goldberg rightly suggest, “emotional 
sociology” is needed, not “sociology of emotions” – in a similar fashion to 
what Jeffrey Alexander and his colleagues have done regarding the study 
of culture. There is “something to be explained” when we utter a “sociol-
ogy of culture” or a “sociology of emotions” as if they could be separated 
from everyday social reality. “If we allow this separate thing to be called 
‘sociology,’ then we def ine our f ield as the study of substructures, bases, 
morphologies, ‘real’ things, and ‘hard’ variables, and we reduce [collective 
psychology] to superstructures … sentiments, ‘unreal’ [passions] and ‘soft’ 
dependent variables.”42 “Emotions,” agrees Jim Jasper in his call to social 
in a rational-choice language. For example, Doug McAdam 1982: 20 def ines social movements 
as “rational attempts by excluded groups to mobilize suff icient political leverage to advance 
collective interests through noninstitutionalized means.” For problems in studying emotions 
in social movement scholarship, see Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005; Jasper 2011a. 
36 For the metaphor, see Bourdieu 1998: 77-83.
37 Tilly 2010a: 382.
38 Lamaison and Bourdieu 1986: 112.
39 Bourdieu 1998: 83.
40 Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005: 480.
41 Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005: 471, 486.
42 Alexander 1996: 3 quoted in Emirbayer and Goldberg 2005: 494.
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movement scholars, “are part of a flow of action and interaction, not simply 
the prior motivations to engage or the outcomes that follow.”43
Third, a multi-institutional politics perspective favors a relational sociol-
ogy in understanding the role of agency.44 The moderation of radicals and 
conflict transformation in Turkey cannot be solely explained by either 
political structures or individual preferences. As a prominent thinker in 
relational sociology, Pierre Bourdieu argues that social action should be 
conceptualized in its own practical complexity, as it is based on “acquired 
dispositions” where “an action can and should be interpreted as oriented 
toward one objective or another without anyone being able to claim that 
objective was a conscious design.”45 As an example of acquired dispositions, 
Bourdieu frequently employs the metaphor of playing games. Players sooner 
or later internalize the rules of the games without strategic calculations. 
They increasingly “feel the game” as they play it.46
Recent applications of Bourdieu in ethnicity literature offer insights that 
are congruent with the multi-institutional politics perspective. The work 
of prominent scholars such as Roger Brubaker and Andreas Wimmer are 
especially useful in explaining “boundary-making” strategies in ethnic 
politics. According to the “ethnic boundary-making” approach, collective 
ethnic action is “not simply a function of some presocial forms of rationality 
or interest, any more than it is a mere performance of a free-floating script 
or narrative.” Though interests might be “positional and symbolic,” and 
therefore, “irreducibly social” and relational, there is “considerable room 
for creativity and improvisation.”47
Philip Gorski and Gülay Türkmen-Dervişoğlu succinctly note the 
potential contribution of such novel perspectives regarding the study of 
43 Jasper 2011a: 297.
44 For the role of agency in a “relational sociology” framework, see Emirbayer and Goodwin 
1994; Emirbayer 1997; Emirbayer and Mische 1998; Mische 2011.
45 Bourdieu 1998: 97-98. Bourdieu’s oeuvre was strongly influenced by the social context of 
the French academy, wherein two schools of thought were in radical negation of one another; 
that is, Sartre’s voluntarism and Levi-Strauss’ structuralism. For Bourdieu, Sartre’s strong 
emphasis on “the creativity, freedom, and undetermined power of choice of the individual 
subject” and Levi-Strauss’ stress on the “causal power of structures … operating independently 
of the consciousness of the agents” are both obstacles to the construction of a satisfactory 
social theory. See, Brubaker 1985: 746. Avoiding pitfalls of subjectivism or objectivism, Bourdieu 
f inds a middle ground where the social reality is seen as “relational.” In his words, “the real is 
the relational: what exists in the social world are relations, not interactions between agents or 
inter-subjective ties between individuals, but objective relations which exist ‘independently 
of individual consciousness and will,’ as Marx said.” Quoted in Wacquant 1989: 39.
46 Bourdieu 1998: 77, 98.
47 Gorski and Türkmen-Dervişoğlu 2013: 203. See, Brubaker 2004, 2012; Wimmer 2008, 2013.
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ethnic mobilization and conflict resolution: “(T)he crucial mechanisms of 
ethnic and nationalist mobilization and conflict are not to be found in the 
autonomous structures of culture, nor in the self-interests of individual 
actors, but in between the macro and micro levels.”48 Thus, in this book, I pay 
ample attention to the dynamics of exchange among rival social movement 
activists and their multivocal – sometimes ambiguous and often contradic-
tory – interpretations of a changing political context.
A Kurdish Spring on the Horizon?
In the next decade, global and local dynamics suggest two major develop-
ments. First, Kurdish self-determination will be expressed ever strong in 
Turkey. Despite close relations with the PKK, the Syrian Kurdish cantons 
at Turkey’s borders are now increasingly perceived as the legitimate local 
governments by the international community. As discussed in chapter 3, 
Öcalan’s Democratic Republic thesis has evolved through the relational 
dynamics, started with a secularist paradigm to reach out to the old Turkish 
elite against the AKP. In a similar vein, the PKK’s abstract conceptualization 
of “self-determination” takes a tangible face in most secularist forms to 
get Western elite support in the wake of a radical Islamist threat in the 
Middle East. The claim of democratic local governance in Syria is also tied 
to the Turkish context where Kurdish ethno-nationalists forcefully demand 
broader rights for self-rule in the form of European models of federalism.
Thus, it is highly possible to see a de facto autonomy of Kurds in Syria, 
which would inevitably lead to Southeastern Turkey becoming more inde-
pendent in its governance at local levels. European models of federalism 
will be discussed in a most heated fashion, but the holding of a plebiscite 
such as Scotland’s seems unlikely. Such an off icial change in Turkey’s policy 
may only be seen after a formally independent Kurdistan in northern Iraq.
The second major development on the horizon is the advent of a post-
Öcalan era in Kurdish politics. Successful election campaigns of the pro-
Kurdish party against the authoritarian Erdoğan regime have boosted the 
prestige of Kurdish politicians, providing them unprecedented reach and 
influence. Young leaders such as Selahattin Demirtaş and Sırrı Süreyya 
Önder have gained prominence because they are increasingly perceived 
as reasonable actors for a permanent peace. Their ever inclusive language 
draws votes from both pro-Islamic Kurds and pro-secular Turks. For the 
48 Ibid.
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f irst time, PKK commanders in the Qandil mountains face a challenge of 
multivocal pro-Kurdish organizations beyond Abdullah Öcalan. Thus, the 
traditional players are replaced with a variety of actors under the forces of 
social competition.
Despite the escalation of violence in late 2015 and ensuing PKK hegemony 
among Kurds, Turkey’s Kurdish conflict nowadays is by no means compa-
rable to the 1990s, the “dirty war” years. This book is a humble attempt to 
explain “why” and “how” such transformation occurred at the grassroots.

 List of Abbreviations
AKP Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (Justice and Development Party)
BDP Barış ve Demokrasi Partisi (Peace and Democracy Party)
CHP Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi (Republican People’s Party)
Daesh (ISIL) al-Dawla al-Islamiyya fil Iraq wa’al Sham (Islamic State of Iraq and the 
Levant)
DBP Demokratik Bölgeler Partisi (Democratic Region’s Party)
DİAYDER Din Adamları Yardımlaşma ve Dayanışma Derneği (Religious Leaders’ 
Assistance and Solidarity Association)
DTP Demokratik Toplum Partisi (Democratic Society Party)
DEHAP Demokratik Halk Partisi (Democratic People’s Party)
ETA Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (Basque Homeland and Freedom)
FP Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party)
HADEP Halkın Demokrasi Partisi (People’s Democracy Party)
HEP Halkın Emek Partisi (People’s Labor Party)
HÜDA-PAR Hür Dava Partisi (Free Cause Party)
JITEM Jandarma İstihbarat ve Terörle Mücadele (Gendarmerie Intelligence and 
Fight against Terrorism)
KADEK Kurdish Freedom and Democracy Congress
KCK Koma Civaken Kurdistan (Union of Communities in Kurdistan)
KRG Kurdistan Regional Government
MSP Milli Selamet Partisi (National Salvation Party)
PKK Partiya Karkeren Kurdistan (Kurdistan Workers’ Party)
PWD Partiya Welatparêzên Demokrat (Democratic Patriots’ Party)
RP Refah Partisi (Welfare Party)
SP Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party)
TAK Teyrênbazê Azadiye Kurdistan (Kurdistan Freedom Falcons)
TZP Kurdi, Tevgera Ziman û Perverdehiya Kurdî (Movement for Kurdish 
Language and Education)
YPG Yekîneyên Parastina Gel (People’s Protection Units)
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 Appendix: Data and Methods
I utilized a multi-method approach in this study. My data comes from a 
variety of sources including interviews, f ield observations, social movement 
publications, archival materials, and secondary sources.
Interviews
In the summers of 2009 and 2011, I visited civil society establishments of the 
three major social movements (namely the Kurdish ethno-nationalist move-
ment, the Gülen movement, and Hizbullah) in Diyarbakır, the central city 
for Kurdish resistance movements. These social movement organizations 
included charity organizations, solidarity associations, reading centers for 
youths, neighborhood fraternity unions, and women’s clubs.
I conducted 77 f ield interviews, most of which were fully recorded. I 
identif ied recurring themes and selectively transcribed and translated 
the relevant portions into English. Instead of transcribing word by word, 
scholars f ind this selective transcription approach useful in dealing with 
large interview data.1 Interviews were designed as semi-structured, face-
to-face, and informal in order to establish non-hierarchical relations with 
the respondents.2 Interviewees include active politicians in the pro-Kurdish 
party (DTP) and the pro-Islamic party (AKP), Kurdish ethno-nationalist and 
Islamic activists, and non-aff iliated local Kurds including some journalists, 
writers, religious leaders, and artists.
Since the Kurdish issue remains a touchy subject in Turkish politics, 
I alter any identifying characteristics throughout the study in order to 
maintain confidentiality. Although some interviews were held in the city 
of Urfa, most of the interviews were conducted in Diyarbakır. The majority 
of the politicians were serving as deputies in the Turkish Parliament and 
interviews with them were conducted in the Turkish Grand National As-
sembly as well as at pro-Kurdish party headquarters in Ankara.
Field Observations
My f ield observations and informal conversations with activists were par-
ticularly useful in illuminating the nature of competition among the rival 
movements. At several occasions during my interviews, I had some other 
interested individuals who listened to the entire interview conversation, 
1 Heaton 2004: 66.
2 Taylor 1998.
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and later, engaged in dialogue with me. At times, I recorded some occasional 
gatherings and informal group discussions in which three or four activists 
answered my queries freely. When the activists did not allow me to record, 
however, I took written notes. I jotted down informal communications 
in the f ield as I shadowed their gatherings, so I could grasp the “hidden 
transcripts” of the rival movements, i.e. criticisms of the “other” that go on 
behind the scenes.3
These informal interactions taught me to realize how important it is to 
build trust in the f ield. I was especially fortunate to get support from two 
leading KCK activists in Diyarbakır, Mr. X and Mr. Y, who served in prison 
for their cause. In my visit to various ethno-nationalist organizations, either 
Mr. X or Mr. Y escorted me and made sure that the interviewees allowed me 
to record. Although they are not among my respondents, I spent consider-
able time with Mr. X and Mr. Y and engaged in many informal discussions, 
which provided me valuable information.
I was also in the f ield when Gezi protests erupted in summer 2013 as well 
as before, during, and after the general elections in June 2011 and June 2015. 
The election time periods were especially useful to observe the dynamics 
of competition in the f ield. As a participant observer, I took hundreds of 
photographs and made quite a number of video clips of communal events 
such as political rallies of pro-Kurdish and pro-Islamic parties as well as 
dengbej (traditional Kurdish male singers) performances, Friday prayer 
protests, and rituals in Kurdish funeral homes. I utilized these documents 
to inform my analyses on activists’ symbolic contestations.
Analysis of Movement Publications
In addition to the f ield data, I collected and examined a wide range of 
movement publications of all three social movements including press 
releases, public statements, annual reports of movement organizations, 
periodicals, f lyers/brochures, and documents in movement-controlled 
websites. Some issues from the dailies of the Gülen movement and the 
Kurdish ethno-nationalist movement, respectively Zaman and Gündem, 
are utilized for further information about the movements’ activism in the 
region. Moreover, I have collected the prison notes of the PKK leader, Abdul-
lah Öcalan. Öcalan’s messages to the outside public are regularly recorded 
by his lawyers in their monthly meetings since 2007. I gathered these notes, 
which make up almost a thousand pages, from the PKK aff iliated websites 
such as http://www.rojaciwan.com/ and http://www.f iratnews.com/.
3 Scott 1990.
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Hizbullah’s weekly periodical, Doğru Haber, its quarterly magazine 
Banga Heq Ji Kelhaamed, and the website of its news agency, İlke Haber 
Ajansı, were particularly helpful since I was able to conduct few interviews 
compared with other movements due to their reluctant attitude toward 
outsiders. Continued police surveillance is the primary reason for the 
Hizbullah activists’ unwillingness to talk to strangers. Many activists have 
either served some time in prison or had been arrested in the late 1990s 
on terrorism charges, and members of off icial associations today still are 
faced with the legacy of Hizbullah’s illegal operations. For instance, only a 
month after denying my request for an interview, an Istanbul representative 
of Mustazaf-Der (Hizbullah’s off icial charity organization) was arrested. In 
need of additional sources on the movement, I obtained the court defense 
of Hizbullah’s military flank leader, Cemal Tutar, wherein he narrates the 
history of the movement from an insider perspective. I also examined the 
Hizbullah activists’ memoirs, which were published as novels to avoid legal 
barriers. I agree with Andrew Martin’s claim that social movement publica-
tions are an “underutilized resource” in current research, and scholars need 
to benefit from these signif icant sources of information.4
Secondary Sources
I have also collected many secondary sources on Turkey’s Kurdish ques-
tion. These include data from Turkish Statistical Institute archives, data 
collected by the Directorate of Associations in Diyarbakır, public surveys, 
journalist accounts in the Turkish press, and non-academic books published 
in Turkish.
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